Language and Communication Tools:

- Strategic Communication & Intercultural Competence
- International Police Cooperation & Interoperability
- Security Sector Reform & Governance
- Integrity, Ethics & Code of Conduct
- Democratic Policing, Rights & Protection
- Human Relations: Community Interaction & Engagement
- Geopolitics & Human Terrain Analysis
- Crisis Transformation: Management & Mitigation

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Police Mission Partner Interview

Personal Details
1. What is your name?
2. In which town/city/area do you live?
3. What are your main interests? (sports, hobbies etc.)

Profession
4. What other employment have you had before joining the police?
5. What is your current assignment with the police and where? (i.e. your specific role)
6. What year did you join the police?
7. Why did you join the police?

International Experience (leave blank if ‘No’)
8. Have you ever worked with police from another country in your State?
   Yes / No - if yes, please provide details:
9. Have you ever been assigned to work in another country (Mission, Posting, Embassy etc.)?
   If yes, where and what was your job:

Course Needs and Expectations
10. Do you have any specific police-related language needs from this seminar (e.g. tactical, legal, criminal, procedural, small-talk etc.)?
11. What are your expectations from this seminar?
Mission Knowledge

1. Explain:
   a. Rule of Law (RoL)
   b. Security Sector Reform (SSR)
   c. Security Sector Governance (SSG)
   d. Democratic Policing
   e. Human Rights
   f. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
   g. Human Security
   h. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

2. What is the International Bill of Rights?

3. A common argument is that Rule of Law and Human Rights mechanisms are “Western” – and therefore not relevant. Agree or Disagree?
   Are there any similar instruments in Muslim countries?

4. What international or regional Human Rights instruments (guidelines) specifically determine the conduct of law enforcement?

5. What is the difference between institution building and capacity building?

6. Why is gender such an important theme?

7. What is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)?

8. How does corruption undermine the aims of a Security Sector Reform?

9. What is the difference between a refugee and internally displaced person?

10. Many guidelines and policy papers use the phrases “human rights-based approach” and “integrated approach”. What do these two phrases means?
Crime and the Media

Section 1: Discussion

Explain the headlines:
- First impression: What do you understand from these headlines? What has happened?
- Why is certain language (words) used to describe an incident?

| 1. 4 bodies found in Camden County house; 6 arrested in drug raid nearby |
| 2. Student kidnap case against bus driver on hold for mental review |
| 3. Two arrested in woman's slaying |
| 4. Search on for gunman in triple-killing |
| 5. Robbery suspect takes hostages at Paris bank |
| 6. Gunman Kills 2 Men; Mother, Unborn Baby Shot |
| 7. Articles Hurt Search For Yates' Jurors |
| 8. Life or Death for Cop Killer? |
| 9. Five Killed In Murder-Suicide |

Section 2: Discussion

1. The number of copycat suicides is proportional to the amount of media coverage. True or false? Why?

2. The media influences public perception to crime and criminality (e.g. terrorism, sexual assault, burglary, racially motivated etc.). True or false? How?

3. The London Riots of 2011 saw the use active use of Social Media Apps to inflame, incite and direct civil strife and public disorder. How can the police counter these strategies?

4. Terrorist groups are often nothing more than:
   A. Angry, disenfranchised young men?
   B. Fundamentalist and/or Radicalised Muslims?
   C. Organised Crime Syndicates (drugs, weapons, trafficking, migrant smuggling)?
   D. Thugs and petty criminals?

5. In the public domain crime statistics list crimes committed by domestic residents, but do not reflect crimes committed by transient groups or external parties based abroad. Why? Should the public be given the real criminal statistical facts?

6. Based on media coverage, what is the main difference between the US Police approach to Incident Management (tactical, strategic, negotiation) to that used by your Police?

7. Does immigration have a direct influence on criminality? True or false? Why?

8. A. Custodial sentences are the most effective means to punish / rehabilitate criminals?
   B. What other options exist to the traditional prison system?

9. Should the police have a monopoly over policing, enforcement, law and order?
Police Ethics: Code of Conduct

Case Studies
Although names have been changed, these are based on real scenarios.

Discussion Exercise:
1. What are the issues facing the police?
2. Ethically, what options do they have?
3. What should they do?
4. What would they do?
5. What would you do?

Case 1 (Germany)
Smith has kidnapped Susan and secured her in a sealed concrete drain. He has left her with very limited water; the summer sun is slowly turning the drain into a hot-box. He demands a large ransom from her millionaire father who promises not to contact the police in return for his daughter’s life. Despite this, the father contacts the police, who persuade the father to let them control the handover of the money. Due to time pressure, in the handover Smith is immediately arrested, instead of more usual post-ransom surveillance. He is taken to a police station where he is questioned but refuses to admit his involvement in the case, or disclose Susan’s location - but does state that he must now be dying from dehydration. Police are unable to locate Susan and are running out of custody time. They discuss whether they should exclude the solicitor from the interview and use some stronger tactics.

Case 2 (Australia)
Jones is a serious offender whom police believe is part of an organised paedophile ring. The police are desperate to catch him and his network before they kill a child. They are contacted by Jones’ daughter, aged 15, who offers to provide information to the police ‘covertly’. The police debate whether to use the daughter as an on-site informant in view of her age, reliability, the family relationship to their suspect and the possible dangers to her.

Case 3 (United Kingdom)
John is a local community-based police patrol officer. He is dealing with a series of complaints against an 11-year-old boy, who is racially harassing and abusing elderly residents in a housing estate. They demand that John takes some action and suggests a “good clip round the ear”. The boy, when spoken to is rude, abusive and spits at John. John, angry and convinced that the boy will not respond to reason, slaps him hard. The boy’s parents file an assault complaint against the officer. The local residents and local media support John’s actions. Police Management have to decide what action to take against him.
Police and Community Relations

- The London Riots

Between 6 and 11 August 2011, thousands of people rioted throughout Greater London. The resulting chaos generated violence, looting, arson, and the mass deployment of police.

Protests began in the North London suburb of Tottenham, following the death of Mark Duggan - a local and alleged drug dealer - shot dead by police on 4 August 2011, during an intercept operation. As an ongoing investigation, transparency over the circumstances surrounding Duggan’s death was drawn-out and murky, with police quickly accused of a cover-up.

The protest became inflamed after police restrained a sixteen-year-old girl who was alleged to have been acting in an aggressive and disorderly manner. Multiple violent clashes with police followed, along with the destruction of police vehicles, a courthouse, public transport and dozens of homes, as well as vandalism and looting businesses within the protestors own communities. In an environment of poor police response, gangs of vigilantes took to the streets to defend their homes and community against hooliganism.

The London Riots were also called the “Blackberry Riots” due to the role Blackberry Messenger (BBM), smartphones and social media played in inciting and strategically directing civil disobedience. Chaos reigned supreme.

In the aftermath some 4000 people were arrested, 2200 were formally charged. But the destruction and cost went well beyond material goods, damaging the relationship between the police and the communities it was sworn to serve and protect.

Vocabulary Building 1: Match the word with the correct definition.

| A. looting                      | B. incite       | C. vigilante |
| D. arson                       | E. restrain     | F. inflame   |
| G. intercept                   | H. aftermath    | I. allege    |

1. to arouse or intensify violent emotion
2. one who takes law enforcement into one's own hands
3. a consequence, especially due to disaster
4. to hold back; control, prevent; to deprive freedom
5. the crime of unlawfully setting fire to a building
6. to accuse/claim that someone has done something wrong
7. to provoke, stir up or urge on to action
8. to pillage and plunder
9. to seize, obstruct, impede, interrupt, block, detain
Police and Community Relations

- What caused the London Riots

Of course, Mark Duggan’s death was not the true reason behind the riots, merely the catalyst.

It is important to note that unlike civil disorder from years before,

“There was no sense among the rioters of being part of a collective, no desire to change society, just an immature, anarchy-based desire to cause chaos and to profit from looting. The riots were not a protest in any way, but a mixture of confused rage, gang thuggery and teenage mayhem”.

Those who have no self-worth fear no consequence.

Root causes have been summarised as:

1. Social and Economic Inequality
Marginalisation, deprivation, lack of social mobility (ability to move up) and social capital (of little worth in society).

2. Weak Police Response
This outbreak of mass criminality was "unleashed by an weak police reaction to the initial incident". Because the police didn't crack down right away, it essentially "gave permission for dozens of thugs to come and loot and burn the neighbourhood." When a mob sees that police can’t control a situation, it "leads to adrenalin-fuelled euphoria".

3. High Youth Unemployment
Given the range and coordination of the rioting, "this was clearly an event with far deeper causes than simple random hooliganism". Most of the looters and vandals were under 20, destroying the same low-income neighbourhoods they live in. With few prospects, these kids clearly "had nothing else to do with themselves, and no reason to fear or feel responsible for the consequences of their actions."

4. Moral Poverty and Opportunism
What set these riots apart is the deliberate, consumer-like looting. Whereas all riots loosen inhibitions, "looting tends to involve a wider range of people - children, women, older people - because it does not involve physical violence." And as more people get involved, more damage is done, with little sense of responsibility or guilt.

5. Racial Profiling
To anyone who asked them, the rioters made it very clear what their motives were: "repaying years of police mistreatment." That's especially true in "communities where there is a relatively high percentage of blacks". The anger black people felt at being stopped and searched more often, combined with "continuing deprivation, growing unemployment, a feeling of lack of opportunity" made for a "toxic mix."
Police and Community Relations

- **Hypothesis: Culture**

Culture can be defined as the “the shared inherited and learned ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes and knowledge which characterises a society, group or organisation”. This is most commonly expressed through national, ethnic and religious identity - and is often the source of stereotype.

Another form of culture is organisational culture, which is commonly seen in specialist professional closed environments, such as the police and military. A culture to which you do not belong can be experienced but you’ll seldom be part of it.

Sociocultural beliefs and attitudes become entrenched over generations, therefore cannot be easily changed or altered. To an extent, the same can be said with organisational culture (e.g. institutionalised sexism, racial profiling etc.). Factors influencing behaviour are often associated with social expectation, custom, peer pressure, and certain Pavlovian conditioning traits.

London’s boroughs have large concentrations of both lower socio-economic and immigrant communities - communities which often display disproportionately low income, high unemployment, a largely unqualified workforce and disenfranchised youth. In examining London’s immigrant groups, all have their own language, culture, perspective, and attitudes. As immigrants, integration and acceptance by the wider [host] community is slow, if not reluctant; similarly adopting local norms by these new groups are also slow, if not actively discouraged.

The London Riots exhibited a clash of two cultural types, represented by two unlike cultural groups: mixed lower socio-economic [groups] vs. an organisational culture - the “System”, embodied by the police.

In the eyes of the British public, police ideally serve the interests of the community - ‘policing by consent’, performing their role in a ‘transparent and accountable’ manner. However, by those on society’s fringes, London’s Metropolitan Police were seen to personify the attitudes of white middle class England – a class and lifestyle the lower socio-economic groups can only dream of.

“White middle class” England had the social expectation of the ‘others’ to conform and integrate. Those groups who did not (or could not) were looked down on with disdain, or treated with suspicion and fear. In London, those clearly of immigrant background, within the lower socio-economic areas, were regularly targeted by the police using ‘stop and search’ tactics. Such tactics were seen as hostile, racist and repressive – strengthening the idea that these groups and the immigrant community were barely tolerated ‘outsiders’ – of little worth or social standing.

What was not considered before or after the riots was how the police were seen as an organisation by those on society’s fringes. Many immigrants originated from countries where police corruption, violence and victimisation are considered normal. Therefore, any police presence was viewed with distrust and fear, reinforced by MPS racial profiling and stop-and-search practices. However, other parties viewed the British police and justice system with disrespect, regarding it as soft and impotent.

Mark Duggan was shot during an armed police intercept as part of Operation Trident. Operation Trident targeted gun crime in London, with special attention to shootings relating to the illegal sale of drugs and crime in Afro-Caribbean communities.
Police and Community Relations

At the time it was not clear if Duggan had a criminal connection, nor was it clear if he had a gun, or indeed if he had actually shot at a police officer. But the lack of police transparency, past experiences of racial profiling, and suspicion that it was a police cover-up was enough to spark protest.

With large elements of the community turning against them, the police did not know how to respond. The tactic of letting the situation ‘burn itself out’, and not provoking the crowd by keeping a discrete distance had the opposite desired effect: it reinforced the belief of police impotence, leading to an escalating of the situation.

After five days, and the deployment of over 44,000 police officers in London, the riots did eventually burn themselves out. But the financial and social costs were heavy. And community trust in the police – as an organisation and partner – disappeared as quickly as flat screen TVs during the looting.

In the aftermath the ‘blame game’ was played, but ultimately the riots were a monumental failure to re-connect with the communities and identify their priorities.

A bulk of the responsibility was shouldered by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) for lack of forewarning, poor preventative measures and weak response. However, immediately following Mark Duggan’s shooting (prior to the riots), the MPS did attempt to gauge the mood of the public by consulting community contact groups. But with budget cuts impacting Community Policing reliable engagement had been lost.

Vocabulary Building 2: Match the word with the correct definition.

A. impotent  
B. marginalise  
C. entrench

D. Pavlovian
E. personify
F. disenfranchise

G. embody
H. conform
I. disdain

1. to deprive a person of their rights as a citizen

2. to push to the side specific groups of people

3. lacking physical strength to act effectively; helpless

4. automatic behavioural response due to conditioning

5. an idea or philosophy fixed in the cultural mind

6. represent or symbolise [police as government]

7. to become a visible form of an idea

8. to social fit in, to follow local customs

9. to look down on a person or social group
Comprehension Check:
Which statement is True (T), False (F), or not stated (NS) in the article?

1. People in Tottenham came together to protest after police shot Mark Duggan  
   ______
2. Mark Duggan was considered a threat by police  
   ______
3. The police were accused of covering up facts relating to Mark Duggan’s death  
   ______
4. The protest turned to riots over the alleged police assault of a 16-year-old girl  
   ______
5. Urban poverty and social deprivation have nothing to do with the riots  
   ______
6. It’s stated that police practiced racial profiling and stop-and-search tactics  
   ______
7. UK law enforcement is done so with the consent of the community they police  
   ______
8. The lower-class view police as a tool of repression  
   ______
9. Immigrants either fear or don’t respect the role and authority of the police  
   ______

Group 1: Discussion

1. How would your police have dealt with the riots (before, during, after)?
2. At present British police do not have large scale Riot Units, instead maintaining small rapid response teams, supported by all uniformed officers as and when required.
   What is your opinion of such a system? Is it an effective use of manpower?
3. Do you think rioting like this could happen in your state or country? Why? Why not?
4. What is the role of Community Police in preventing/deescalating such situations?
5. How does ethno-cultural diversity effect police relations in your community?
6. Are your police seen as a reflection of society?
7. Do such social conditions contribute to home grown radicalisation and terrorism?
   What are the typical identifying traits?
8. As a backdrop to the riots were allegations of police corruption, disproportional use of force and racial profiling (incl. stop-and-search tactics), leading to lack of trust.
   What measures would you take to reestablish faith and trust in the police?
9. What parallels do you see between the London Riots, and those witnessed in the US?

Group 2: Assignment

At the request of the London Metropolitan Police, you have been assigned to give advice on how they should to deal with such civil disturbances in the future.

Key issues:
- trust
- community partnerships
- prevention
- intervention
- social media
- crisis communication
- de-escalation
- limitation/confineent
- strategies and tactics
Leslie Evans talks about the success of Scotland’s Violence Reduction Unit (SVRU) in bringing down crime rates in Scotland. She outlines why violent crime is not just a policing issue, and should be treated as ‘something to be cured rather than punished.

In England and Wales the issue of knife crime has never been far from the headlines, with the continued loss of too many young lives. The statistics are stark. Last year, there were 209 knife-related fatalities in England and Wales – the highest since records began in 1946. At the time of writing, there have been over 20 fatalities from stabbings in London this year – real people and real families’ lives shattered.

Scotland has an important story to share, in how it reframed the problem and implemented a radical approach to tackling knife crime. As a result, key decision makers for England and Wales have been looking to Scotland to learn from our experiences with knife crime in a bid to refocus their efforts in tackling the problem. There has been political will from all sides and an impressive range of initiatives deployed. A Violence Reduction Unit has been set up in London with the promise of more to follow. Changes are being proposed to the laws governing offensive weapons. And community-based approaches have been introduced to provide positive alternatives for young people who are most at risk of becoming involved in knife possession and knife crime.

**The Scottish Context**

Each local context is unique, and Scotland has its own particular experience of these issues. Around 14 years ago, stabbings were considered a ‘Scottish problem’, with Glasgow gaining a dubious reputation as the UK’s capital of knife crime. At that time, young men were routinely turning up at hospital emergency departments with horrific knife wounds. Gang-related violence had become a depressing – and seemingly inevitable – way of life for many. In 2005, the UN and WHO published reports highlighting the issue and Scotland’s appalling record on violent crime.

In response, the authorities took the bold decision to form Scotland’s Violence Reduction Unit (SVRU). This was Scotland’s first independent centre of expertise on the issue, funded by central government.

**A Different Approach**

The SVRU offered something different. It was independent of the police and so did not treat violence as a traditional law and order matter. Rather, it viewed violence as a public health issue – as a “disease affecting communities”. And because that disease is caused by poverty, inequality and despair – issues that lie outside the bounds of policing – the SVRU knew that an alternative approach was required, one that dealt with the root causes of violence and tried to prevent it happening in the first place.
A radical approach to tackling knife crime in Scotland

The SVRU searched the world for possible solutions to tackle Glasgow’s violence. This included approaches being developed in Chicago (which involved mapping the epidemic curves of violence, in the same way that this method is applied to containing infectious diseases); and Boston (where gang members were given the option to renounce violence and get into education or work, or face tough penalties). In both of these American cities, traditional enforcement measures were being used alongside preventative measures, in line with the public health approach.

From the outset, the SVRU’s mantra was that violence is always preventable, not inevitable. By diagnosing violent behaviour much like any other disease, the SVRU analysed the causes, examined what works and developed solutions. Once evaluated, these solutions were scaled up to help other communities across the country.

Prevention and Engagement

Iain Murray, who previously worked as a police inspector for the SVRU, neatly summed up this shift towards prevention in a media interview. From the start, he says, the SVRU attempted to “understand what the problems are”.

The police for years had been experts at detection and enforcement. I’d much rather be at the top of the cliff putting a fence up, stopping someone from jumping over, rather than at the bottom of the cliff waiting until they’ve jumped. That’s the public health approach as far as I’m concerned. You’re engineering out issues, rather than waiting for them to happen.

The SVRU was pioneering in another respect. It engaged directly with some of the most violent and disruptive young people in the country. It was – and still is – relentless in its approach. It drafted in former offenders – inspirational individuals – to share their experience. It encouraged team-building and fostered empathy. It showed that there were alternatives to lives impoverished by gangs, alcohol and toxic masculinity.

As a result, behaviours began to change. Threats were replaced with respect. Rivalry and territoriality were replaced by compassion and hope. And, very gradually, some long-established gangs began to disperse.

The impact in Scotland has been profound. All the key indicators point towards a sustained long-term reduction in levels of violence. Most recently, the publication of Scotland’s Crime and Justice Survey showed that violent crime has reduced by nearly half in the last decade. Similarly, emergency hospital admissions for assault fell by 55% between 2008-09 and 2017-18. During the same period, the proportion of recorded serious assaults cleared up by the police has increased from 62% to 79%. Between 2006-07 and 2017-18 there has been a 65% decrease in crimes of handling offensive weapons (not used in crimes against the person).
A radical approach to tackling knife crime in Scotland

Range of measures
However, we know violence remains a very real problem in Scotland. Scottish authorities know they must continue to work hard to sustain the downward trend. Domestic abuse and sexual violence remain significant areas for concern – as does the often toxic relationship between alcohol and violence, which still features in the majority of serious assaults in Scotland.

However, there has certainly been a shift in our focus in dealing with the problem. Stop-and-search as an early enforcement tactic had a role to play but, in Scotland, the emphasis has not been on tough enforcement; our police and authorities have long realised that we cannot simply arrest our way out of the problem. As such, stop-and-search must be used proportionately, alongside a range of other measures, such as prevention and education. Above all, the absolute focus is on policing by consent and community partnerships. This means that the police and authorities have actively sought to engage with young people at risk, built trust and forged better relationships with them.

Connecting with Young People
The Scottish Government has an overarching policy aim to make Scotland the best place to grow up for all our children and young people. Over the last few years, the Scottish Government has connected directly with young people, not only through the SVRU but also through a range of programmes to prevent them from falling into violent lifestyles. Programmes such as No Knives Better Lives, Police Scotland Youth Volunteers, and Mentors in Violence Prevention all offer young people opportunities to engage and for their voices to be heard.

In terms of youth justice, the Scottish Government pioneered the Whole Systems Approach. This highlights the importance of different organisations and professions working together to support children and young people before situations reach crisis point. In Getting it Right for Every Child, we also have a national approach for improving outcomes and supporting the wellbeing of our children and young people by offering the right help, at the right time, from the right people.

Breaking the Cycle
Since 2015, the Scottish Government has also supported a Navigator programme, now operational in four Scottish hospitals. The Navigators use the opportunity provided when people with chaotic lifestyles are admitted to hospital, to break the cycle and help them gain access to vital services. Many of these individuals are repeat victims of violence.

I saw the programme in action when I visited Edinburgh Royal Infirmary and heard vivid and unforgettable stories about how Navigators are empowering victims of violence and offering them a helping hand at those ‘reachable moments’. I was inspired by the commitment and compassion from both medical and non-medical staff. One consultant summed it up when she said it was “lovely, at last, to have hope for these patients when they leave hospital”. Kindness is a word that is not used often enough in the context of public services, but the work of Navigators certainly has kindness and compassion at its core.
A radical approach to tackling knife crime in Scotland

National Performance Framework

And kindness features in Scotland’s recently refreshed National Performance Framework. The framework has been in place for over a decade, ensuring that all policies are sharply focused on the achievement of national outcomes, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish. As with all work on violence, the Navigator programme is aligned to the achievement of an overarching national outcome (in this case, that “we live in communities that are inclusive, empowered, resilient and safe”). In this way, we describe the difference the approach will make, draw in funding and resources from different sources, and support partners to work together – collective and collaborative leadership with shared purpose.

With the National Performance Framework as our North Star, we can be innovative in how we tackle different issues, and more joined up in our work. For example, new approaches are being developed across Scotland’s public sector to minimise the impact of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs). As we know, ACEs can increase the likelihood of experiencing violence in later life.

Cure Not Punishment

Scotland’s pioneering work to tackle knife crime shows what can be achieved when we take a creative and tenacious approach to improving outcomes. Above all, our experience in Scotland has taught us that we should treat violence as something to be cured rather than punished. This is the learning to share, and hold onto as we address the significant challenges that remain.

Discussion Questions

1. What measures do you police use to counter youth violence and repeat offending?
2. What are your views on treating violence as a public health issue? Would this approach work in your country?
3. Which stakeholder organisations, groups and individuals should be involved in dealing with youth violence and repeat offending?
4. Are adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) a genuine factor in violent crime and repeat offending?
5. What are the key points raised in this article, that could be implemented elsewhere?
**County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime**

UK criminals are using violence to force vulnerable teenagers to carry drugs from London estates to rural streets 200 kilometres away.

Mark Townsend, Guardian (9 March 2019)

As always, they were gathered in Andover Square, the tree-shaded courtyard in the middle of the Islington, North London housing estate. Another group stood on a nearby corner; another loitered outside the tower blocks of the Six Acres Estate. “You see? They have taken over the streets,” said Fawzia Addou, one of a group of mothers escorting reporters around the streets of Finsbury Park, north London. The mothers, dressed in disguise, were pointing out the drug-dealing spots where their sons worked.

The dealers were everywhere: behind the bowling alley, outside the tube station, at the top of Finsbury Park Road, as well as the bus stop opposite City and Islington College.

The mothers cannot understand why the drug trade is so brazen, so open. They say the police know all about the locations because they have repeatedly told officers.

Those who could identify their teenage sons were almost grateful. Many other children, aged under 16, have simply disappeared. Some emerge weeks later, hungry, exhausted. Some have been beaten, stabbed, and are visibly traumatised.

They are the victims of “county lines”, a drug distribution system in which criminal networks exploit thousands of children and vulnerable adults to funnel hard drugs from cities to towns and rural regions across the country, often using the public transport network to move their illegal merchandise. The youngsters transporting the drugs are recruited by ruthless criminal organisations, who target them with a mixture of financial rewards and threats, often finding recruits outside schools or the pupil referral units to which they have been sent after being excluded from mainstream schools.

The destabilising influence of the county lines system has helped to drive fatal stabbings to the highest levels since records began. The mounting death toll has become increasingly politicised with government crisis meetings and warnings of a “national emergency”.

But the controversy has changed little on the streets around the Andover estate. The mothers, all Somalis who fled their country during the civil war in the 1990s, say they have been abandoned by the state.

Many of their children, they reveal, have asked to leave London because of the violence or have been sent to Africa for their own protection. “We are refugees, if we cannot keep our children safe, we move on,” said Kameela Khalif.

Community representatives estimate that hundreds of British teenagers have left for Somaliland or Somalia – a country that in the recent past has seen car bombings, airstrikes and a deadly siege – because the UK has become too unsafe.
County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Beyond its medieval centre, past St Benedict’s church and the cobbled lanes, the west side of Norwich opens on to a network of housing estates. Here, among the streets of Heigham Grove, children from N4 – the London postcode of Finsbury Park some 180km away – have been discovered working county lines.

According to the latest police assessment, there are 27 county lines currently operating into Norfolk, most from London and most affecting Norwich, Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn.

A “hostile” strategy towards the drugs gangs, Operation Gravity, has seen 1,024 people arrested in Norfolk since November 2016. Analysis of these arrests produced a striking theme – the minority were locals. More than 800, in fact, did not have a Norfolk postcode. Of 18 girls, only three were from the county.

Further investigation found 500 gang members from London or elsewhere had recently left a criminal “footprint” inside Norfolk. “It was a bit of an eye opener,” said Chief Inspector Sonia Humphreys, of the Norfolk Constabulary.

Most children from London arrive into Norfolk by train. Those from Finsbury Park and Islington, whose mosaic of multi-ethnic gangs include Easy Cash, Kelly Gang and Andover Boys travel from King’s Cross (London) direct to King’s Lynn (170km). Further east across the capital a competing Somali-led gang, the Mali Boys, uses Liverpool Street station to travel direct to Norwich (180km away).

The Mali Boys, run by Somali “olders”, are symbolic of a new wave of commercially aggressive county lines operations which have attempted to gain a Norwich foothold. “Historically, we’ve seen a lot of violence when the Somalis come up,” said Humphreys.

Transport Police are briefed to look out for young black children travelling alone to Norfolk, often using first class, often paying with cash. Gangs are increasingly aware such journeys can seem conspicuous.

“White British children are now being targeted because gangs perceive they are more likely to evade police detection,” states an internal Norfolk Police document.
County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Although Norwich teenagers are increasingly joining county lines operations, recruits largely remain inner-city children exported elsewhere.

Last Wednesday, another seven Somali mothers gathered inside an Islington community centre to discuss their “lost generation”. Rakhia Ismail, Deputy Mayor of Islington is counselling 15 mothers who have lost sons to county lines and has dozens more terrified about trafficking.

Addou, part of a network of 13 parents whose children have been taken by drug gangs, estimated that half – possibly as much of 70% – of Islington’s Somali community had been directly impacted by knife crime and county lines. “The ones not affected are worried because they’re next,” she said. Addou’s son has been found in King’s Lynn four times. Groomed by gangs in a football park outside his school, the first time he disappeared she traced him to a local dealer. “He said that he couldn’t come home until Tuesday. They were holding him.” She sent the 15-year-old to Somalia then Kenya.

Sahra Amburo, a prominent member of N4’s Somali community, told how her 15-year-old was top of his class, a risk factor in itself because gangs target the most intelligent or popular, knowing friends will follow.

Her son vanished one Sunday afternoon in 2017. After obtaining his phone records, she tracked him to Essex where he was being held by a group of dealers. She flew him immediately to Somaliland. “I took him away otherwise he would have been killed because they knew our address,” she said.

Another described how she learned her 16-year-old son had been taken 200km away to Hemel Hempstead. She hung dozens of posters of his face across the Hertfordshire town. After three days the gang handed him over. “Straightaway he said ‘please take me away from this country’.”

Last Wednesday, a new development tormented the group. One of their sons, aged 19, who had been sent to Kenya for safety, was being enticed by a gang via Snapchat to return to N4. “The drug dealers want him. If he returns, I will lose him,” said Iana Ali. On Friday, she flew to Mombasa to persuade him to stay.

When a teenager was fatally stabbed earlier this year, 300 metres from the town centre, the deceased’s 15-year-old Somali friend was told he was next. Within two days his mother put him on a one-way ticket to Mogadishu. “Now he’s walking the land, living free,” she said.

All the mothers have learned that county lines necessitate violence. Exploited children hoping to rise up the criminal food-chain must exhibit escalating brutality. Nick Davison, Assistant Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary, outlined the concept of “ultra-violence” where younger recruits maintain status by executing acts of increasingly outrageous savagery.

Beatings turn to stabings in the buttock, then the chest, the face. “If you don’t, you become vulnerable to becoming a victim of that behaviour,” said Davison.
County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Internal police documents confirm widespread violence – “85% of forces report knives referenced in relation to county lines intelligence, 74% report firearms referenced”.

Children who attempt to escape are tortured. A 16-year-old reported missing from London was found by Norfolk police in possession of a 15cm kitchen knife and 30 wraps of drugs. In custody they discovered his body was covered with scarring “consistent with burns from boiling liquid”.

And the gangs have long memories. The mother who rescued her child from Hemel Hempstead allowed him to return to London in November 2017, assuming he would be safe. Within days of arriving he was stabbed in the stomach, his assailant wiggling the blade inside the body to cause maximum harm. After 40 days in hospital he returned home and has not left since. “Both my sons are too scared to leave the house,” she said.

The family has received no counselling or trauma aftercare.

Others take drastic measures. One London gang member, stabbed multiple times, turned to religion to escape. Norfolk officers subsequently discovered he had travelled to fight in Syria.

The lack of safety has provoked outrage. “We parents are fighting a war with the gangs to save our children,” said Khalif. They argue that their sons have been denied a statutory right to a safe environment. “The government must take responsibility,” said mother-of-seven Addou. When her son was caught, he refused bail because it was safer in prison. Others complain their probation prevents them from leaving the country.

The mothers ridiculed government claims that there is “no direct correlation” between crime and police numbers. Davison, agreed that “budgetary cut backs” and the state’s inability to provide security outside the family had been adeptly “exploited” by criminals.

The mothers’ deepest grievance is police apathy. They, along with many in the community, have shared detailed intelligence with police. Since 2015, addresses, locations and movements of individuals have been offered that they say connect county line operations to its “generals”. “I’ve told the police so many times but now I’ve stopped. I expect it be acted on, or at least given some feedback. It’s one-way communication,” said Addou.

The Islington Somali Community (ISC) complains that eight neighbourhood police serve a ward, Finsbury Park, which has a population of 17,200. Dealing spots, others say, lie within an area of concentrated CCTV coverage. The breakdown in trust is so great that unsupported claims of collusion flourish.

“Some parents believe that some police are working with the gangs because nothing is done,” said Ali. There is also disquiet over the latest political outcry over knife crime, in particular that it took the death of a white teenager to prompt the outrage.

“It is absolutely tragic but it has taken a white girl to get killed for this to top the political agenda,” said Kalyfa Ismail. A year ago, three Somali youngsters in nearby Camden were knifed in 24 hours; two died and one just survived. “Where was the emergency summit then?” said Addou.

Another burning issue is the increasing evidence linking school exclusion rates and gang recruitment. Excluded pupils are 200 times more likely to receive a knife-carrying offence.
County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Abdiwahab Ali, director of the Somali Youth Development Resource Centre (SYDRC), is conducting pioneering research into the issue. Early estimates suggest half of Somali origin children excluded permanently in Camden enter the criminal justice system. Then there are the “units” – the pupil referral units accused of being fertile grounds for gang recruitment. Ismail described gang members waiting in lines outside Islington’s unit.

Bilan Hoseen, who works with excluded Somali teenagers, said many are too petrified to attend the local unit. “They get a taxi there because they feel too unsafe to walk,” he said.

Secondary schools have also been targeted by police with 10 of Norfolk’s 50 sites having a dedicated officer to spot vulnerable children. “Through this we have discovered kids who have gone missing from high school in Norwich travelling to London to pick up drugs to support county lines activities,” said Davison.

The exploitation of thousands of children provides the labour for county lines. Latest figures for the National Referral Mechanism, the government system to identify trafficking victims, revealed drug gangs helped prompt a 66% increase to 2,118 cases in 2017. But first the children must be groomed. They are usually targeted between the ages of 13-14, with the optimum age of 15-16.

Addou said the gang gave her football-mad son a new ball and the offer of protection. Months later he was running drugs in Norfolk. A caged artificial-turf pitch, 100 metres from Andover’s central square, is a well-known recruitment ground for N4 county lines operations. One mother on the Andover estate said her nine-year-old son was already receiving money for sweets from gangs. Others describe 14-year-olds wanting to “do Deliveroo” when they turn 16, a code for couriering drugs.

Fast food joints in Finsbury Park are targeted by gang recruiters. In Norwich, officers are told to be vigilant in shopping centres. Recruiters, said Humphreys, seek a “chink in the armour” of adolescents using techniques indistinguishable from child abusers. Internal briefings by police forces have highlighted video interviews conducted by youth worker Paul McKenzie with gang recruiters. “It’s like listening to an exploiter of sexual abuse,” said Humphreys.

Once hooked, their families are threatened with violence or they are trapped through debt bondage. Although a county line can make a gang up to £5,000 a day, mothers say there is scant evidence of wealth distribution. “Our boys come home hungry, tired, cold. They are still growing, their clothes no longer fit.”

Both Norfolk’s senior officers and Islington’s Somali mothers concur that the solution requires ambition. Davison, whose force has closed down 21 county lines, agrees the answer is bigger than the level of policing. “We will not arrest our way out of county lines. It needs a whole system approach, offering young people alternatives,” he said.

Beyond removing children from the country, the mothers list various solutions; more parental involvement in schools; safe spaces; more vocational education; a de-radicalisation programme for groomed children.

In the absence of a concerted new approach, both police and parents know that the teenagers of N4 will continue to surface in Norwich while their younger brothers on the Andover estate receive new gifts from the guys in the square.
County Lines Gangs: How Drug-Running is Fuelling Knife Crime

Quick Facts

### What is meant by county lines?
Gangs in major cities seek new markets outside urban hubs for their drugs, primarily crack cocaine and heroin. Network expansion into the regions often comes with exploitation.

### Who are the victims of these operations?
Children and vulnerable adults are often coerced into ferrying and stashing the drugs. They can be homeless or missing people, addicts, people living in care, trapped in poverty, or suffering from mental illness. Even older and physically infirm people have been targeted. Gang members have been observed attending drug rehab to find potential runners.

### How do they target people?
Initially they can be lured in with money, gifts and the prospect of status. But this can quickly turn into the use of violence, sometimes sexual.

### How widespread are county lines?
NCA research shows police have knowledge of at least 720 county lines in England and Wales, but it is feared the true number is far higher. Around 65% of forces reported county lines being linked to child exploitation, while 74% noted vulnerable people being targeted.

### How many children are at risk?
Children without criminal records - known in the trade as "clean skins" - are preferred because they are less likely to be known to detectives. Charity The Children's Society says 4,000 teenagers in London alone are exploited through county lines. The Children's Commissioner estimates at least 46,000 children in England are caught up in gangs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Numbers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The number of county lines operating from London to Norfolk</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of people arrested in Norfolk since 2016</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of gang members who left criminal footprint in Norfolk</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islington Somalis affected by knife crime and county lines</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood police serving Finsbury Park's 17,200 population</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimum age for recruiting children to work in county lines</td>
<td>15-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in trafficked children, boosted by drug gang activity</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The amount a gang can earn in a day from a county line</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
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### Discussion Questions
1. Do county lines exist (or similar) in your country?
2. How much influence and reach does gang culture have on youths in your country?
3. Is gang recruitment of children/youths similar in your country? (carrot or stick)
4. What role does ethnicity, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds play in recruitment?
5. How does your prosecution system typically deal with juvenile offenders? Does it work? Can you see alternative solutions?
6. What are your views on children and youths being sent fragile states for refuge?
7. At the request of the London Metropolitan Police, you have been assigned to give advice on how they should deal with county lines, including disrupting child recruitment.
Inside the 21st-century British Criminal Underworld

There are almost 5,000 criminal gangs in the UK. But the old family firms are gone – today’s big players are multinational, diversified and tech-savvy.

Duncan Campbell, Guardian (4 July 2019)

Who rules the underworld today, and where do they conduct their business? Once there were the familiar mugshots and tough nicknames, the clubs and pubs where the usual suspects gathered, plotted and schemed. Now organised crime is run like any other business, and its leading figures look like every other broker or tycoon. We have entered into a world of what Sir Rob Wainwright, until recently EUROPOL’s most senior police officer, calls “anonymised” crime. The underworld has become the overworld.

The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) has estimated that £90bn (106.6bn euros) of criminal money is being laundered through the UK every year - 4% of the country’s GDP. London has become the global capital of money-laundering and the beating heart of European organised crime. English is now the international underworld’s lingua franca. Crime is an essential part of the British economy, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs, not just for professional criminals – the NCA estimates there are 4,629 organised crime groups in operation – but for police and prison officers, lawyers and court officials, and a security business that now employs more than half a million people.

Just as the names of familiar shops have been closing down, the old family firms of criminals are disappearing, whether in London, Glasgow, Newcastle or Manchester. And just as British football fans have had to learn how to pronounce the names of the legions of new foreign players, detectives have had to learn to do the same for the increasing number of new criminals. Britain was once dealing with drugs imports from half a dozen countries; now it is more than 30. A young person who would in the past have sought an apprenticeship in a trade or industry may now find that drug dealing offers better career prospects. And, apart from drugs and guns, British trading channels now facilitate the trafficking of women from eastern Europe and Africa for prostitution and children from Vietnam as low-level drug workers.

The underworld’s modus operandi has shifted in the past quarter century. “The international nature of crime and technology are probably the two biggest changes,” says Steve Rodhouse, the NCA’s head of operations. Speaking at the NCA’s headquarters in south London, Rodhouse explains how the agency’s work has mushroomed. “Pretty much all of the NCA’s most significant ‘high-harm’ operations now involve people, commodities or money transferring across international borders. The days of having a drugs gang, a firearms gang or a people-trafficking gang have changed because of the concept of poly-criminality. Groups satisfying criminal markets, whatever they may be, is now much more common. These are businesses and people are looking to exploit markets, so why confine yourself to one market?”

Wainwright, who served as Europol chief for nine years, also noted this internationalisation of crime. He stated that Europol had expanded from its foundation in 1998 when “it consisted literally, of two men and a dog – admittedly, a sniffer dog – in Luxembourg,” and now dealt with 65,000 cases a year. He estimated that 5,000 organised crime groups were operating across Europe and the mafia model had been replaced by a “more agile” model, with 180 different nationalities operating, mixing legal with illegal business and working with between 400-500 major money-launderers. This was multinational business with specialists in recruitment, movement, money-laundering and the forging of documents.

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The internet, of course, is a major factor. Wainwright compared its effect on crime to that of the automobile in the 1920s and 30s, when suddenly criminals could escape at speed and take advantage of new markets. He cited the dark web, which he said was selling 350,000 different illegal items – 60% of which were drugs – but including everything from guns to pornography and even operating a ratings system for speed of dispatch and quality. The combination of new faces of whom the British police – and often Interpol and Europol – were unaware, along with an increasingly tech-savvy pool of criminals able to disguise their identities, made for a toxic cocktail. Crooks anonymous.

One group with little interest in anonymity are the Hellbanianz, a gang of cocky young Albanians based in east London. They went online in spectacular fashion in 2017 via Instagram and YouTube rap videos to flaunt their ill-gotten wealth and firepower.

Their most prominent member, Tristen Asllani, who lived in affluent Hampstead, was jailed for 25 years in 2016 for drug dealing and firearms offences which included possessing a Škorpion submachine gun. He was caught after a police chase in north London which ended when he crashed his car into a computer repair shop. A photo of Asllani, showing him stripped to the waist after he had apparently spent long hours in the prison gym, appeared on a social media page called My Albanian in Jail, with a caption saying “Even inside the prison we have all conditions, what’s only missing are they whores”.

The flashy cars and bundles of banknotes on display in the Hellbanianz videos were the result of the importation of cocaine and cannabis, but the gang was also involved in the weapons trade. The pictures showed £50 notes wrapped around a cake and their HB logo written in cannabis. After they were arrested and jailed, other gang members have posted pictures of themselves, taken with smuggled mobile phones, from inside prison where they cheerfully inscribe their gang name on the walls.

Muhamed Veliu, an Albanian investigative journalist, who knows London well, says that the Hellbanianz have been on the crime scene in east London for many years. “They are sending a bad message to young Albanians. By seeing such photos, they think the streets of UK are paved with gold ... bizarrely, despite the fact they are in the prison, they show the outside world photos of their life behind the bars.” He said that there was a concern that UK media stereotyped all Albanians as criminals but, he added, the 2006 Securitas robbery, in which two Albanians played key roles in the theft of £53m from a depot in Kent, was regarded with some national pride back home. “It was ‘the crime of the century’, it was seen as very different from making money from prostitution, which is the lowest form of crime. It is wrong, of course, but they did need bravery to get involved, and at least they went for a bank – that was the feeling in the Albanian community.”

“Albania is Europe’s largest producer of cannabis,” says Tony Saggers, the former head of drugs threat & intelligence at the NCA. “It is important not to stereotype, but the Kosovan war led to Albanians pretending to be Kosovan in order to get asylum in the UK. Many of the people who came just wanted a better life, but there were criminals among them who were able to set up illicit networks ... The UK criminal has a get-rich-quick mentality while the Albanians’ strategy was get-rich-slow, so they have driven down the price of cocaine in the UK. They knew
that if they expanded, they could undercut the market.” It helped that their reputation preceded them. “The Albanian criminals may be ruthless and potentially murderous when controlling their organised crime,” said Saggers, “but when they come to the UK they try to be more charismatic and they use fear – ‘We’re here, we need to get on,’ that sort of approach. So there is little violence from the older Albanian criminals in the UK, because they know that violence attracts more attention.”

The Albanians had already established themselves in a darker fashion when 26-year-old Luan Plackici was jailed in 2003 and said to have made more than £1m from trafficking “poor, naive and gullible” young women who thought they were on their way to jobs as waitresses or barmaids. Some had to service up to 20 men a day to pay for the £8,000 “travel bill” from Romania and Moldova.

The international nature of people-trafficking was exposed fully in 2014 by a trial of a gang that imported more than 100 women into Britain. The trial ended with the gang leader, Vishal Chaudhary, being jailed for 12 years. Chaudhary, who lived the high life in Canary Wharf in London, contacted young women through social networks in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, offering work as receptionists, nannies or cleaners in England. But when they got to the UK, the women were forced to work in brothels. Chaudhary’s team, all of whom were jailed, consisted of his brother, Kunal, who worked for Deloitte in Manchester, a Hungarian ‘heavy’ called Krisztian Abel and his sister, Szilvia, who helped recruit the women.

There are numbers of young people involved in what the legal system terms “forced criminality”. The lawyer Philippa Southwell has specialised in such cases, which apply in particular to young Vietnamese people brought illegally into the UK by traffickers and forced to work in cannabis farms to pay back debts of up to £30,000 that their parents have undertaken in order for them to have a new life in Europe.

“*The modus operandi of criminal organisations is to target children or young adults, trafficking them across the world in a journey that can take months,*” Southwell says. “*Those being trafficked from Vietnam, often transit via Russia, Germany and France, by boat, lorry and even by foot. Once at their destination, they will be locked in the premises and made to tend the cannabis plants, by watering them and ensuring the lighting is on. These cannabis crops are sophisticated multi-million-pound drug operations, with the electricity often being extracted illegally and high-value equipment used. The windows of the buildings may be nailed shut. The farms normally operate in rural areas where the chance of detection is reduced.*”

The boys and young men were in a form of debt bondage, but no matter how hard they worked, their debt never seemed to be paid off. “*There is a misconception within the criminal justice system that they are free to leave because the doors may not always be locked,*” says Southwell, “*but the reality is that they have nowhere to go – they are controlled through threats of violence, debt bondage, isolation, fear and other complex control methods that are regularly used by traffickers.*"
Inside the 21st-century British Criminal Underworld

From the Chinese opium dealers in the 1920s, the Italian gangsters in the 30s, the Maltese pimps in the 50s, the West Indian Yardies in the 60s, the Turkish heroin dealers in the 70s to the east Europeans gangsters and Nigerian fraudsters today, there has long been an unfair tendency to blame foreigners as dominant figures in the underworld. While they may have all had their parts to play, the homegrown British villain has always been the bedrock of the underworld.

“Everyone wants to be a gangster,” says BX, a young former gang member from north-west London. “Everyone’s seen it on TV and that’s what they want to be. They look at music videos and it looks like the people in them are making hundreds of thousands of pounds, although the reality is that they are still living at their mum’s house. Most of them come from housing estates and they see their parents going to work, struggling to pay the bills. They come home, their mum’s not there, and all the places where kids could play are closing down. Nine times out of 10, they leave school without qualifications. So if you’re broke, if you can’t get a job, you’re going to take the opportunity. My parents had no clue what I was up to – I didn’t come back with any marks on my face.”

The recent upsurge in knife attacks has focused attention on gangs. At one stage last year, there were six separate knife murder trials underway at the Old Bailey, all gang-related, all involving more than one defendant, none older than 22. “It’s not a black thing, it’s not a white thing, everyone’s doing it,” says BX. “There’s no: ‘I’m black, he’s white, we can’t get along’ any more.” There were still ample opportunities for smaller-time dealers: “You can make a grand [a thousand] a week.”

The hierarchy of gangs remained a key factor. “If you’re a drug dealer, you have to find people who will do your dirty work for you. The way it works is the elders, who are, say, 24 or 25, they see you doing well, so they might take you under their wing. The young kids acting as lookouts are thinking: ‘I’m part of that guy’s enterprise. That could be me in a few years, I could get promotion.’ As they say, loyalty brings forth royalty.”

Territory is important commercially. “If you’re doing five keys (kilos) a week and then suddenly you’re only doing three a week, it doesn’t take long to realise that someone’s out there taking your customers. So you have to eliminate the opposition. How do you do that? By either taking them out, or tipping off the police. You are never supposed to snitch, but I know one guy, from Southall, who’s a millionaire now; he was in competition with a guy from the same area so he informed the police.” There’s a not-unfounded suspicion that some informers have continued to commit crimes while under police protection. “All the old-school rules – they’re gone. I know people who work with the police to get immunity for themselves. I know one who everyone knows works with the police, he’s even been shooting people, but you type his name into Google you won’t find anything about him and, believe me, his record is way longer than my arm.”
Inside the 21st-century British Criminal Underworld

The risks are high. “Of the people I grew up with, only three of us haven’t been to jail, although I’ve been arrested many times. My older brother has been in and out of jail – nine months here, six weeks there. But there are less police than ever, so that gives you the incentive, and even if you get arrested, you’re not going to do that long.”

While the young gangs have largely replaced the old family-based crews, so have young, helmeted, scooter-riding robbers smashing their ways into jewellers and mobile phone shops taken on the role of the old sawn-off shotgun-wielding bank robbers.

While those small-time home-grown villains may still thrive, an increasing number of members of the British underworld have followed old imperial traditions and headed abroad to cut out the middle-man, establishing themselves not only in the traditional bolt-hole of Spain, but in the Netherlands, Thailand and South Africa. The person who was to rewrite the rulebook on drug dealing is the street-smart Liverpudlian Curtis Warren, better known by his nicknames Cocky or the Cocky Watchman. Born in 1963, his criminal career started at the age of 12 with a conviction for car theft. By 16, he was on his way to borstal for assaulting the police. Other offences followed, but it was only when he moved into the drugs business, working out of Amsterdam, that he established his reputation as one of the most prolific traffickers of modern times – Interpol’s “Target One” and the subject of a joint British–Dutch investigation codenamed “Operation Crayfish”.

While Warren’s move to Amsterdam, where fellow British dealers also established themselves, seemed like a smart idea in that he was less exposed to the British police, it was also a weakness, because the Dutch authorities were able to tap his phone without restriction and secure the evidence they needed (although they also required English help in translating “Liverpudlian”). In October 1996, police in the Netherlands seized 400kg of cocaine, 60kg of heroin, 1,500kg of cannabis, handguns and false passports. Nine Britons and a Colombian were arrested, and Warren was soon portrayed as the biggest fish in the net. He was jailed for 12 years for a conspiracy to import what was claimed to be £125m of drugs into Britain. The media suggested he was “the richest and most successful British criminal who has ever been caught”, and he was the only drug dealer to make it on to the Sunday Times rich list. T-shirts with an old police mugshot of Warren on them were still for sale in Liverpool 20 years after Operation Crayfish.

After his release from jail in the Netherlands in June 2007, Warren was only a free man for five weeks. He headed to Jersey, but was under constant surveillance and soon arrested. In 2009, he was convicted of conspiring to import £1m of cannabis into Jersey and jailed for 13 years. Warren was alleged to have invested his wealth in everything from petrol stations to vineyards, football clubs to hotels. A Jersey court ordered him to pay £198m after he failed to prove his business empire was not built on the proceeds of cocaine trafficking. Detectives had
Inside the 21st-century British Criminal Underworld

secretly recorded him boasting during a 2004 prison visit of funnelling huge amounts of cash via a money launderer. “Fuckin’ ’ell, mate, sometimes we’d do about £10m or £15m in a week,” he told some of his visitors. “I was bragging like an idiot and just big-talking in front of them,” was Warren’s explanation later. The Jersey attorney general described him as “one of Europe’s most notorious organised criminals”. His failure to pay the money resulted in a further 10 years’ jail time.

He told journalist Helen Pidd, when she interviewed him in jail in Jersey, that he disapproved of drugs: “I’ve never had a cigarette in my life or a drink. I’ve never tasted alcohol or anything. No interest.” His ambition after he was freed was to leave England – “and never come back.” He added: “I just wish I’d not been such a worry to me mum.”

Few people were better qualified to comment on Warren than Tony Saggers, who was an expert witness in Warren’s trial. “Curtis Warren was a forerunner,” he said. “You get people like him who come from a tough background, a council-house environment, and he had a sort of bare-faced courage in some respects, to put himself in places like Venezuela and Colombia, which were probably even more dangerous then than they are now. He put himself at the other end of the supply chain, and in a way established that pattern for the elite drug trafficker. But nowadays, high-level, high-profile criminals play less and less of a role, and make use of others below them in a detached way.”

Other British criminals have also cast their nets wide during the past two decades. One of the best-known was Brian Wright, once one of Britain’s most active cocaine smugglers, who was nicknamed “The Milkman” – because he always delivered. He operated from both Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and Spain. In 1998, he was alleged to have imported almost two tonnes of the drug, with the result, according to one Customs investigator, that “the cocaine was coming in faster than people could snort it”. The Dublin-born Wright owned a villa near Cadiz, which he named El Lechero – Spanish for milkman – and had a private box at Ascot, a flat in Chelsea’s King’s Quay and used some of his proceeds to fix races on which he then bet, thus laundering his drug profits. Finally arrested in Spain, he was brought back to England and, in 2007, at the age of 60, found guilty at Woolwich crown court of conspiracy to supply drugs and jailed for 30 years.

Some very successful scams have been perpetrated on elderly Britons. John Palmer, who had been involved in the Brink’s-Mat bullion robbery (from whence he got his nickname “Goldfinger”) made his fortune in a crooked timeshare business in Tenerife. A ruthless operator, he took advantage of thousands of gullible souls, many of them elderly holidaymakers, who believed his spiel about the fortunes they could make by investing in timeshare apartments that were never built. Outwardly, he appeared to have it all: the yacht, the cars with the personalised number plates, dozens of properties. He even made it to No 105 in the Sunday Times rich list. “Remember the golden rule,” was the motto he loved to quote, “he who has the gold makes the rules.” But in 2001, he was convicted of a timeshare fraud in which 16,000 victims lost an estimated £33m and served eight years in prison.

In 2015, Palmer was shot dead. There were rumours that he was killed because he might have been cooperating with the Spanish police over another fraud case. His co-accused were convicted in Spain in May 2019 and the police in Britain issued a fresh appeal for help to find his killer – with a £100,000 reward on offer in case that tempts an elderly underworld “grass”.
Any notion that Spain might still be a safe haven for expat criminals was dispelled in 2018 when Brian Charrington – a close associate of Curtis Warren and regarded as one of the major international drug dealers of his generation – was jailed for 15 years for trafficking and money-laundering in Alicante in 2018. Described in the Spanish press as “el narco que escribía en Wikipedia”, because of his reputation for updating and correcting his Wikipedia entry, the former car dealer from Middlesbrough had been arrested in 2013 at his villa in Calpe, on the Costa Blanca, an area where some estate agents offer bulletproof glass as a special feature along with the spa bath and barbecue area. There had been wild rumours of crocodiles in his swimming pool, but disappointingly, the police found none.

Charrington was alleged to have brought vast quantities of drugs into Spain via a yacht docking in Altea, north of Benidorm. He claimed his money came legitimately. “I buy and sell villas and I pay my taxes,” he told the court, but was still fined nearly £30m. Following a lengthy investigation involving Spanish, British, Venezuelan, Colombian and French police, his assets, including a dozen houses and his cars and boats, were impounded. After his sentence, his Wikipedia entry was speedily updated.

Old school heavy-weight Freddie Foreman, who made his name with the Kray Brothers in 1960s London, penned his memoir “The Last Real Gangster” in 2015; but he doubts that the current generation of gangsters will ever write their memoirs: “I don’t think that anyone who has turned to crime these days is going to live long enough to build up a reputation, are they?”

But the recruiting sergeants of the underworld – poverty, greed, boredom, envy, peer pressure, glamour – will never be short of volunteers, whether they live long enough to make a name for themselves or not.

**Group Discussion**

1. Is the new generation of criminal any different from the old?
2. What is gang culture in your country?
3. What are the root causes behind gang culture, serious and organised crime?
4. Define organised crime. How does organised crime work?
5. What are “Emerging Crimes”?
6. What are the economic, financial and social impacts/consequences of organised crime on:
   a. the State?
   b. communities?
7. Does the abovementioned consequence differ in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS)?
8. What tools are available - domestically and internationally - to combat serious and organised crime?
9. Case Study: It has been widely stated that Kosovo is a “mafia state”. On behalf of EUROPOL you have been deployed to Kosovo to investigate these allegations. How would you approach such an investigation?
   What is at stake if the claims prove accurate?
Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade

‘They’re sophisticated, clever – and they always deliver’: from the ports of Europe to the streets of London, one criminal network is now at the top of the UK’s £5bn trade

(based on an article by Mark Townsend, The Guardian, 13 January 2019)

Something had happened the night before and the guys on the corner were keen to offer advice: “You don’t want to be hanging around here too long,” one said, refusing to explain. They were standing near a tower block on east London’s “Gascoigne Housing Estate”, undisputed territory of Hellbanianz.

The gang, an Albanian street crew of drug dealers, is known locally for its violence and more widely for their social media output featuring Bentleys, piles of £50 notes and gold Rolex watches to help enhance its reputation and recruit “youngers”. The Gascoigne Estate, built in the 1960s, is its historical home turf.

Hellbanianz belong to the “retail arm” of the cocaine trade. They are the street dealers and enforcers of the Mafia Shqiptare, the Albanian organised criminal syndicates who, the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) believe, are consolidating power within the criminal underworld and on their way to a near total takeover of the UK’s £5bn (£5.94bn) cocaine market.

The gang’s glossily produced rap music videos remind viewers “HB are ready for violence” and that they possess the necessary manpower and firearms. Even so, police sources say, Hellbanianz occupy the lowest position in the Albanian mafia.

To better understand the Albanians’ remarkable rise in the UK one might climb to the 12th floor of the Gascoigne Estate’s high-rise blocks. From there, the skyline of London, where much of their cocaine will be snorted, stretches west. In the opposite direction, several kilometres along the Thames, lie the mammoth container ports where their cocaine is offloaded in multi-kilo shipments. But it is across the Atlantic, to the jungles of Latin America, where the story of the Mafia Shqiptare starts.

How Albanians came to conquer the UK’s cocaine market is a lesson in criminal savvy; the value of making friends with the world’s most dangerous mafias; and the absolute threat of violence.

It began with a business model that was simple in concept, but sufficiently bold to subvert the existing order. For years cocaine’s international importers worked separately from its wholesalers and the gangs. Pricing structure varied, depending on the drug’s purity: the higher it was, the more it cost.

The Albanians ditched the entire model. They began negotiating directly with the Colombian cartels who control coca production. Huge shipments were arranged direct from South America. Supply chains were kept “in-house”.

Intelligence obtained by British experts revealed that the Albanians were procuring cocaine from the cartels for about £4,000 to £5,500 a kilo, at a time when rivals thought they were getting a decent deal using Dutch wholesalers selling at £22,500 a kilo. The Albanians lowered the price of cocaine – and increased its purity. More massive consignments were brought into the UK.
Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade

Tony Saggers, former head of the Drugs Threat & Intelligence Unit at the National Crime Agency (NCA), spent 30 years analysing the rhythms of the global narcotics economy, said: “What they have done very intelligently is say: ‘OK, we’ve got these margins to play with and we’re going to give a good slice of that to the customer.’”

The Albanian effect has profoundly shaped the use, production and economy of cocaine. The drug is at its cheapest in the UK since 1990 and purer than it has been for a decade, which has caused record fatalities. The UK has the highest number of young users in Europe. More broadly, far bigger and more frequent shipments of the drug have been seized entering the UK as cocaine production in South America has hit record levels - up 31% on 2016.

Rivals to the Albanian gangs initially struggled to compete because they had an inferior, more expensive product. Their only option has been to buy cocaine sourced from the Mafia Shqiptare.

Saggers said: “They have shown that you don’t have to be greedy to dominate drug markets. They’ve gone down the route of sustainable prices, good quality.”

Mohammed Qasim, a Leeds Beckett University researcher in the drug trade, described the Albanian business approach as “fantastic”, adding: “if they were a traditional listed business, they would be considered a Fortune 500 company.”

Yet for the Albanians’ model to truly work it required control of Europe’s ports. For that the Shqiptare needed to collaborate with the ‘Ndrangheta, the most powerful and globalised of the Italian mafias, which controls mainland Europe’s cocaine trade.

There is considerable evidence that not only are the Albanians working with the ‘Ndrangheta, but that they have formed the tightest of alliances. Sources say the Italian mafia consider the Albanians as equals. Saggers said: “There’s a strong Italian-organised mafia link with Albanians now, Albanians are working with them – not in competition with them. Plus, historically, the Italians have good contacts in Latin America.”

Rotterdam in the Netherlands is Europe’s largest seaport, with eight million containers passing through each year. Many arrive via the direct “Colombian express” route before crossing to the UK. The second busiest European port is Antwerp in Belgium, which connects to the Thames port of Tilbury, 24 kilometres from Hellbanianz territory.
Collectively, the Belgian and Dutch ports employ 240,000 people, an army of whom, police intelligence indicates, also work for the ‘Ndrangheta and Mafia Shqiptare.

“This gives the Albanians based on the near continent, direct access and control of it [cocaine] at the ports,” said Saggars.

NCA describes Belgium and the Netherlands as “key nexus points of consolidation and onward trafficking” and confirmed Albanian groups were “expanding their influence upstream” – police-speak for strengthening their grip on international cocaine supply.

Anna Sergi, a specialist in mafia relationships, confirmed Albanians and the southern Italian crime group have joined forces. “Whenever the ‘Ndrangheta is shipping things over, they work a lot with the Albanians,” she said.

In December 2018 Operation Pollino, named after the area of southern Italy where the ‘Ndrangheta has its roots, arrested 90 suspects. Anti-mafia prosecutors described how the ‘Ndrangheta relied on “permanent groups working in ports and harbours” along with Albanian criminal networks.

The most vulnerable point for drug smugglers is the port of entry. Security is tight, options are finite. Sources say that the ‘Ndrangheta has outsourced this element of the supply chain to the Albanians.

“You need the best people to get it out of port. If you are good at moving things then you stay ahead of your competitors – and the Albanians are good at this,” said Sergi.

Yet even the most senior Albanians are caught sometimes. Klodjan Copja, 30, who ran a £60m cocaine imports syndicate, was jailed in 2017 after his couriers were intercepted meeting drug-laden trucks arriving in Kent.

One striking aspect of what the NCA term the Albanians’ “increasing prominence” is their having – so far – avoided becoming involved in tit-for-tat feuds with rivals. The latest UK criminal threat assessment says that the Albanians are unusually skilled at developing relationships and “forging links with other OCGs [organised criminal gangs]”.

Such relationship-building has left Liverpool as the only part of England not routinely selling Albanian-sourced cocaine. Not only has the Merseyside port its own direct access to South America, Saggars says that its turf is jealously guarded by the city’s own criminal gangs.
Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade

Also working in the Albanians’ favour is their reputation for violence. Saggers says the backdrop of the Kosovo conflict has given them a swagger comparable to that of Irish criminals during and after “the Troubles” (IRA insurgency).

“They are quite charismatic and known to prioritise relationship-building rather than competitive feuds. Also, when you come from a country where there’s been conflict and you have a reputation for ruthlessness - the charisma is underlined with an element of ‘actually, we do need to get on with these people’,” he said.

Qasim also points to how the Albanian are regarded in criminal circles. “They are sophisticated, professional and they do what they promise. They always deliver,” he said.

This has much to do with the Albanian code of besa – “to keep the promise” – but Sergi adds that the reputation of the Mafia Shqiptare must also be viewed through the ancestral code of kanun, the right to take revenge: that “blood must pay with blood”.

“You most trust the ones similar to you,” she said. The concept was meant to keep things internal, close.

Then the younger generation began making flashy videos and waving money around.

Some might recognise the faces from YouTube where Hellbanianz posts footage to try to lure “falcon” – fresh recruits - with shots of scantily clad women, wheel-spinning Bentleys and abundant wads of money.

Saggers said: “The retail market is the get-rich-quick environment. If they’re importing kilos for a few thousand dollars, imagine how much money those youngsters are turning over if they’re selling at £40 a gram?”

Before its account was closed in November 2018, Hellbanianz had 115,000 Instagram followers. The video for “Hood Life”, which opens with a drone shot of the Gascoigne Estate, has been watched more than 7.5m times. The gang’s lyrics discuss defending the area with “kallash” (AK47s) – and dishing out threats to rival Albanian gangs. A video, released in late October 2018, states they are “ready for war”.

Hellbanianz’s high life – the bling, the violence – has created tensions within the Albanian community, particularly the provoking of police. The “Hood Life” video shows gang members surrounding a Metropolitan Police patrol car. “This goes against the Albanian culture. Some of their higher end drug dealers, international traders, don’t like this behaviour. It exposes their activities. They want to be low-key, making profits without being caught,” said Qasim.
Kings of Cocaine: How the Albanian Mafia Seized Control of the UK Drugs Trade

Another repercussion of the Albanian model has, say some, helped fuel escalating knife crime and drug disputes by making cocaine affordable to smaller, younger street gangs. A recent report said gangs were moving from postcode rivalries to commercial enterprises focused on dealing cocaine.

Meanwhile, so long as Mafia Shqiptare keeps delivering their cocaine, recruiting teenagers to the Hellbanianz gangster life has never been easier.

Honour among thieves: gang’s sacred oath of loyalty

Besa is extremely important in Albanian culture, especially in the rural North where most of the gangs come from.

- Just as the Italian mafia has the law of Omerta – silence – Albanian mobsters are governed by a code of honour they call Besa.
- Besa is the highest ethical code in Albanian culture and means “keeping a promise”.
- It is considered a verbal contract of trust.
- Muslim Albanians were honouring Besa when they helped protect Jews from the Nazis.
- Today, gangsters use the term Besa as a name for their “code of honour”.
- New recruits are required to take an oath that means each man gives his life to the rest.
- The close-knit nature of the gangs insulates them from outsiders and prevents police efforts to infiltrate their networks.
- Albanian gangsters have a much looser structure to their crime networks than their more famous Italian counterparts.
- Much like the Russian Mafia, Albanians are thought to work with a Leadership Council at the top of their criminal network.
- Each crime family will have a leader, known as the “krye” who chooses “kryetar” to work below them as underbosses.
- The krye runs an executive committee known as a barjack from which decisions are made on what businesses needs doing.
- Once decided, the orders are filtered down to the gangsters on the ground.

Discussion

1. What parallels and differences do you see to the drug trade in your jurisdiction/area of operation?

2. Organised crime gangs tend to operate either in dedicated geographic territories or in specific criminal activities (e.g. prostitution, drugs, counterfeit/fake merchandise etc.). In your jurisdiction, which “gangs” are known to operate in specific crime?

3. What strategies do you police use to tackle gang and organised crime? Do they work? Could the approach be improved, and how?

4. How do you deal with/approach codes of honour such as Besa?

5. What kind of relationship/dialogue does your police have with crime gangs?
Neil Basu calls for sociologists and criminologists to help tackle UK terrorism


Britain’s most senior counter-terrorism officer has said the police and security services are no longer enough to win the fight against violent extremism, and the UK must instead improve community cohesion, social mobility and education.

In his first major interview since taking up his post last year, the Metropolitan police assistant commissioner Neil Basu told the Guardian that up to 80% of those who wanted to attack the UK were British-born or raised, which strongly indicated domestic social issues were among the root causes.

Grievances held by people who were “malleable” to terrorist recruitment were highly dangerous, he said, calling for sociologists and criminologists to take a leading role in helping police tackle the problem.

Basu, who is highly regarded by government and the civil service, is seen as the next potential head of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). His comments are a significant break in tone, if not strategy, about how to combat terrorism and prevent it from becoming a multigenerational struggle that damages the UK’s social fabric.

Basu said the “Prevent” programme, which he sees as the most important plank of Britain’s counter-terrorism strategy, had been “badly handled”, but its work was vital and had to become more transparent and community led.

He also said extreme right-wing terrorism was rising, with an increase in nationalism since the Brexit vote potentially fuelling violence.

Giving his personal view on the best ways to reduce terrorism,

“Policies that go towards more social inclusion, more social mobility and more education are much more likely to drive down violence ... than all the policing and state security apparatus put together. It is much more likely to have a positive effect on society.

The prescription for me is around social inclusion – it’s social mobility, it’s education, it’s opportunity.”

Basu said counter-terrorism operations increased by 50% from 2015 to 2017 and have since remained at a high level. The terror threat is still severe despite Isis losing territory in Iraq and Syria.

Both Islamist and extreme right-wing terrorists have continued to recruit Britons, despite efforts to thwart them. “Nothing I am saying remotely excuses these heinous acts of criminal violence,” Basu said. “But the deeper causes need examining. My teams are world class at stopping attacks and locking terrorists up. But we need to stop the flow of recruits into terrorism.
Counter-Terror Chief Says Policing Alone Cannot Beat Extremism

Don’t forget that 70%-80% of the people we arrest, disrupt or commit an attack here, are born and raised here. Born or at least raised here. That has got to tell us something about our society – that we have got to look at why they would be prepared to do that.

I want good academics, good sociologists, good criminologists ... to be telling us exactly why that is.”

Basu accepted many people went through negative experiences without ever dreaming of committing violence, and some terrorists came from middle-class backgrounds and seemingly wanted for nothing.

But he said some people were more “malleable” than others to terrorist recruitment and there were common themes. “It might be everything from high anxiety, to lack of confidence, lack of education, things that may have happened to them when they are young, bullying, racism, bigotry, lack of opportunity, early experiences with law enforcement even, domestic violence,” he said.

The counter-terrorism network Basu heads had been stretched by the high volume of terrorist activity from Islamists. On top of this and right-wing extremism, he said there was a growing threat from states such as Russia, following the Salisbury novichok poisonings.

Forensics officers remove the bench where the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were found in Salisbury.

Photograph: Will Oliver/EPA

Basu said there was no one path that led to terrorism and a list of factors could result in violence if not checked at some point. “All of those things will be as relevant to a terrorist cause as they will be to other people of violence in other crime types,” he said. “Policies are up to the government, but must tackle education, access to health, not disproportionate outcomes in criminal justice, feeling like you’ve got an opportunity to get on in life”.

Basu added: “These are wider societal problems. They are not paying more police and more security services to stop more terrorist attacks. That’s not the cure for this. Like every other aspect of law enforcement, we [counter-terrorism policing] are a suppression tool for a problem. We are dealing with the symptom and we do need to deal with the root causes of it.”

While the majority of the terrorism threat was from Islamist extremists, far-right propaganda could help create a tolerant environment for some to commit violence, he said, and society needed to determine how much of that rhetoric was acceptable.

“At the moment, we seem to be accepting a level which I think is potentially breeding some intolerance,” he said. “That intolerance, for a small number of people, can spin up very quickly to a violent act, and we have some examples of that. We have some very awful examples of that.”

He said that despite its importance, “Prevent” had been the least successful part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy so far, compared with the other three strands – Pursue, Protect and Prepare – which were all “outstanding”.

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Counter-Terror Chief Says Policing Alone Cannot Beat Extremism

Prevent, which critics have called a “toxic brand”, needed “better communication, more transparency [and] an ability not to create a vacuum for people to attack it, by not actually trying to defend it”.

Asked whether Prevent, in its early years, when headed by a former senior intelligence officer, had come across as turning a community into a security issue, Basu said: “Not when it started. It morphed into that. It started off as a safeguarding, vulnerability programme. It was, in my view, badly handled.

This won’t be won by government or by people like me. It will be won by people who walk into community halls up and down the country and explain.”

Basu rejected notions that British Muslims should “assimilate” and defended the rights of religious conservatives of all faiths, saying: “Assimilation implies that I have to hide myself in order to get on. We should not be a society that accepts that.”

He added: “You should be able to practise your religion without suffering some condemnation of that; so my view is, do no harm. And that does not matter whether you are conservative Islamic, conservative Christian, conservative Hindu, conservative Sikh. You should be able to practise your culture or religion openly and still be accepting of others, and others be accepting of you. That is a socially inclusive society.”

Discussion Questions

1. Some people believe that large scale and/or long-term immigration changes the face and culture of a country. YES / NO. If so, if that necessarily a negative thing?

2. Does the presence of immigration translate to an increase in felony-level crime and violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism?

3. In July 2019 the UK introduced a threat level system to assist security services in determining appropriate responses. Does your country have something similar?

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4. In the case of a terrorist attack:
   a. what are the steps for police response?
   b. which department(s) would have jurisdiction?

5. Due to its prominence in the media, we tend to associate terrorist attacks with Islamic extremism. Accurate / Stereotype – or context?

6. European members of ISIS are attempting to return home from Iraq and Syria. Should they be allowed to return home? If so, what steps should be taken (ref. rehabilitation, detention etc.)?

7. As per the article, Right Wing and Nationalist-inspired crime is on the rise. According to both the FBI and the UK’s NCA, nationalist crime accounts for up to 70% of violent extremist and domestic terrorism. Why? How can police counter right wing extremism?

8. Beyond Islamic and Nationalist extremism, other forms of ideological terrorism exist?
Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité: the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) establishes France as a secular and democratic state, that holds equality among its peoples as unchallengeable. However, France takes this stance a step further regarding culture, ethnicity, religion, and gender - anything that distinguishes one community or individual identity from another - as a private concern, not an issue of State. Admirable as the intent of absolute equality is, ignoring individuality and difference creates its own problems.

“Although minorities should not be singled out by the State, neither should they be ignored. Refusing to acknowledge that they exist leads to alienation and creates parallel communities – just as the Britain’s staunch multiculturalism has done”.


While Britain refuses integration in their society, France treats all citizens as one. Both approaches produce similar results: disaffected and isolated from mainstream culture.

Case in point, French Muslim youth are embracing their Muslim identity more aggressively and openly than their parents’ generation. Those who strictly adhere to Islam believe their faith should regulate all aspects of their lives, including law, governance and public expression of faith. The French State’s policy of not acknowledging such differences - and the total secularisation of society - is by default alienating over five million Muslims (7.5% of the population).

Contrary to policy aims, the growing immigrant communities are far from integrated, having become a discontent Islamic sub-culture.

The 2004 law banning religious symbols in public schools provoked national controversy as it was specifically seen as a ban on the Nijab (Islamic headscarf) – and an attack on Islam.

October-November 2005 saw widespread and prolonged rioting among the Arab-immigrant suburbs of Paris, Lyon, and Lille by socially alienated youth. In identifying reasons, the appropriately named "The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?" (2006) states that,

“The French immigration experience is markedly different than those of other European countries, as France is tainted by colonial history, republican idealism, a rigidly centralised government structure, and deep-seeded traditions of xenophobia”.

The article compares French immigration policy to that of the colonial ‘mission civilisatrice’ (civilising mission),

“...rather than accept cultural differences, the French government demands that all its citizens adhere to a rigid and exclusive ‘French’ identity.”

And further emphasises that,

“Government social structures meant to ease the inequality between social classes, such as public housing and education, generally do more to aggravate problems than to solve them; public housing is woefully inadequate and the education structure institutionalises the poor quality of schools in immigrant communities".
The result: stunted social cohesion, marginalisation, low social capital, rage and extremism – the latter of which is channelled through Islamism. Extremist Islam considers itself at war with Western Ideology - a view which appeals to young Muslims who wish to reject a Western culture and society they believe rejected them. This gives them raison d’être, as expressed in the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo (7–9 January 2015) and multiple locations around Paris (13–14 November 2015). Notably, by the end of 2015 over 1700 French citizens had joined ISIS as jihadi fighters.

Young men (and women) who join Islamist movements often do so:

- growing up in a country they believe has never wanted them
- feeling excluded from mainstream society
- over a sense of injustice or grievance
- for a sense of belonging, group status and identity
- where the future appears bleak, searching for meaning in their lives
- believing that Islamic values should be implemented in all spheres of life
- where unemployment is high, the [comparative] standard of living is low
- as becoming a jihadi fighter washes away their sins - an attractive offer to the faithful

Of the latter, it should be noted that crime and terrorism are not exclusive; in the absence of a sponsor, it’s more than often criminal activity that funds domestic terrorism.

Based on past immigration mistakes Germany is taking proactive steps to address such integration issues, including social and security concerns, whereas France is still coming to terms with ethnic disparity and domestic terrorism. The challenge, from both a government policy and policing point of view, is finding acceptable compromises, and understanding that ethnicity and culture strongly influence the way in which people engage, interact and respond. Integration and acceptance is a two-way street, based on the expectations of both host and immigrant communities.

Taking this a step further, the Criminal Justice System needs to appreciate that, “...commonly held ethical values are a reflection of culture, and are not interpreted by each society in the same way. Nevertheless, many societies, lacking the West’s legal institutional knowledge, have long held human dignity as their core principle”.

“Shades of Grey in the Thin Blue Line” (2014)

What is acceptable practice in one culture, may be illegal in the West. “Policing a Diverse Society” highlights entrenched cultural themes that can pose legal issues in Western society:

- arranged and/or forced marriages
- honour-based crimes (e.g. killings)
- gender
- domestic violence
- food and alcohol
- sexuality
- education
- corruption
- modes of dress
- Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)

Dealing with many of these issues goes beyond the black and white of legal or illegal, right or wrong, requiring the ‘buy-in’ of leaders from within their own communities.

Extract from “The Human Dimension: Rehabilitating the Human Terrain System” (Simon de Saint-Claire, 2016)
When the first shots rang out at the Bataclan concert hall in Paris, France, Aurélia Gilbert knew exactly what they were. “I know some others said that it sounded like firecrackers. For me, immediately, I thought that something terrible happened — like shots fired,” said Gilbert, 46.

In November 2015, heavily armed gunmen stormed the Bataclan during a live concert and killed 90 people. The gunmen were part of coordinated attacks throughout Paris that took the lives of 130 people and injured 494 others. ISIS later claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Although Europe has not seen such a large-scale attack since then, terrorist attacks have persisted in the region, and the problem is especially troubling in France.

For the last few years, French authorities have decided to double down on deradicalisation efforts with strict assimilation methods, a watchlist, and a "terrorism hotline" to report suspicious behaviour.

Of the 511 people arrested in the European Union for religiously inspired or jihadist terrorism in 2018, 273 were in France, according to Europol, the EU agency responsible for law enforcement cooperation.

In January 2015, an attack on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo left 12 people dead and 11 others injured. Just two days after Charlie Hebdo, terrorists held 19 people hostage at a kosher supermarket before murdering four Jewish people.

Islamist terrorism in the EU was responsible for 17 attacks in 2015 and 13 in 2016, followed by a spike of 33 in 2017, before subsiding slightly to 24 in 2018.

While French authorities grapple with the best approaches to deradicalisation, there have been some major missteps along the way.

Strict Secularism

In April 2014, the French government created a "terrorism hotline" for the public to call in reports of people potentially radicalised by ISIS and related groups. The following year, they began tracking suspected citizens with a special security watchlist called the FSPRT (in English “File for the Prevention of Terrorist Radicalisation”).

Names reported on the hotline often appear on the FSPRT. As of April 2019, 11,152 actively monitored individuals appear on it. They represent varying degrees of threat — from suddenly exhibiting withdrawn behaviour to more serious actions such as contacting ISIS or traveling overseas to areas controlled by ISIS.

In 2017, France also opened its first centre for deradicalisation in Pontourny, central France, in the Loire region. The centre operated on a volunteer basis; local authorities around the country could refer individuals who were exposed to radical ideology, and these youth could decide whether they wanted to go.
France Combats Extremism with Secularism

But the nine participants - all Muslim - were expected to stop eating halal food. They studied French history, philosophy and literature; they wore uniforms and sang the French national anthem. The programme tried to replace extremism with a strict form of secularism. The result was a failure; the centre closed within a year.

In February 2018, the French government presented a new plan to combat the Islamist threat in a 60-measure document entitled “Prevent to Protect”. The plan, presently in place, calls for a cross-disciplinary approach, including the reinforcement of secularism in schools and a “greater awareness of radicalisation” in the workplace.

The plan relies on the concept of laïcité — the French term for a strict strand of secularism that involves the complete and total separation of church and state.

“The problem with the French approach is not so much omitting religion. What is more problematic is the enforced secularism,” says Raffaello Pantucci, of RUSI, a London-based think tank on defence and security issues.

“Most people radicalise for a variety of personal reasons, with religion or extremist ideas providing a useful frame for them to articulate their unhappiness through. For some, religion is a solace which helps. To instead push a line which aggressively pushes religion to one side can have a counterproductive effect,” Pantucci adds.

From Hotline to Rehab

Associations working closely with the French government also rely on the concept of laïcité.

Sauvegarde 93 (Protection 93), situated in a Parisian suburb, is an association that tries to deradicalise young people. Launched in 2015, it operates out of a modest, plain building close to Seine-Saint-Denis, one of the poorest suburbs in the country and whose official administrative number is 93. It’s here where some of the Bataclan gunmen rented a flat to plan their attack and where a few suspects were eventually killed in an anti-terror raid.

Through a team of social workers, psychologists and special educators, Sauvegarde 93 focuses on combating radicalisation through an approach that entirely omits religion from the equation.

“We try to understand both the person who has become radicalised and how to help them come out of that process,” says Zohra Harrach-Ndiaye, Sauvegarde 93’s director. “We don’t take the approach of saying, ‘They’re caught up with an ideology and therefore we have to replace it with another ideology’. We must not imagine the radicalized person as someone whose thoughts we have to empty and replace with something else. That’s not the method,” she explained.

Harrach-Ndiaye points to the success of such an approach by referring to the case of a 24-year-old man who converted to Islam. The man’s father was worried about his son’s troubling behaviour and called the terrorism hotline a few years ago. Authorities were concerned and placed his son on the watchlist. Sauvegarde 93 was then called to intervene, providing psychological help, sessions with social workers, accompanying him to see a doctor and helping him find a job to integrate back into society.
France Combats Extremism with Secularism

After three years working with the young man, Harrach-Ndiaye says there have been marked changes in his demeanor.

“He just signed a work contract. He’s thinking about getting a bigger apartment, getting married. He’s playing sports again, eating better. And something that is visible is that he has cut his beard,” noting that this physical transformation was indicative of his transformed views from religious to secular.

Harrach-Ndiaye admits there have been some failures with the programme — noting seven cases in which, despite interventions, the individuals subsequently went to prison for planning attacks or disappeared from France, presumably having gone overseas to join a terrorist group.

So far, the organisation has worked with 111 people who appear on the watchlist, which Harrach-Ndiaye admits is a small amount compared to the 11,000 citizens currently active on file.

“France is doing a lot. But I think we aren’t doing enough for other kinds of attacks, like homegrown domestic attacks,” says Gilbert, who now belongs to a victim support group after the horrors of Bataclan.

Gilbert also points out, correctly, that it is impossible for authorities to monitor every citizen on the security file 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

“This is something that we keep on thinking (about) on a regular basis. This is a risk that we know is very common,” she says.

Asked whether she expects more attacks will occur in France, she didn’t hesitate to respond: “Yes, for sure.”

Discussion Questions

1. What steps can be taken to mitigate illegal cultural practices?
2. What are your views on the given causes of violent extremism?
3. What role does religion play in the governance of your country?
4. What are your views on laïcité – enforced secularism?
5. Does your country practice ethnic profiling?
6. How does your country integrate minorities?
7. How does your country rehabilitate radicalised individuals and former jihadis?
Transforming Policing: An Interview with Mike Bush - New Zealand’s Police Commissioner

The country’s crime rate has decreased drastically in recent years after the police commissioner shifted to a focus on crime prevention instead of prosecution.

Mary Calam (London) and Roland Dillon (Melbourne)

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When Mike Bush joined the New Zealand police service as a cadet in 1978, it was an organisation focused squarely on prosecution. The ethos was: “Catch offenders, lock them up, and forget about the rest.” Thirty years later, as deputy commissioner, he began the transformation of the service by putting prevention first - a transformation he has continued as commissioner.

For Bush, this transformation has been deeply personal. “It went back to my reason for being a police officer,” he explained. In a previous role as an area police commander, Bush piloted an approach of intervening early to prevent crime and using the justice system as the final option. He saw how that made the police service better at keeping the population safe - and gave his fellow officers greater opportunities to change people’s lives.

When he was promoted to the national role of New Zealand Police Commissioner in 2014, Bush made that innovative work the foundation for a national project called “Prevention First.” It soon became the cornerstone of the New Zealand Police’s operating strategy and helped spur the transformation of the entire police service.

Prevention First was “a 180-degree shift from where we had been,” he recalled. Persuading a decentralised workforce of more than 12,000 to try something new was no easy task: Bush estimated that two-thirds of the workforce saw the new operating strategy as a threat. “When people feel threatened, they are going to opt out, they are going to challenge, they are going to resist,” he said.

As the numbers show, Bush was able to overcome this resistance and bring the service with him on the transformation journey. New Zealand’s crime rate fell by 20% between 2010 and 2014, while public satisfaction with policing rose from 79% to 84% over the same period. That has made New Zealand a global success story in policing - and a key case study in public-sector transformations.

In conversation, Bush reflected on three essential success factors of such transformations:
1. committed leadership; 2. compelling communication, and; 3. capabilities for change.

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McKinsey: We know from our research on government transformations that leadership commitment is critical in driving successful transformations. What did you do to demonstrate your personal commitment to the change?

Mike Bush: People who delegate transformation out will never succeed. Unless the chief executive and leaders in the organisation own and champion the change, it will never happen.

Seeing senior leaders within that group championing the operating model of change makes a massive difference. Once people see you delegate transformation out, it is not important to your people because it is not seen as important to you. It’s symbolic, because if you commit time, your people understand how important it is to you. Being closely involved gives you a better understanding of where the barriers are and how to remove them. It brings that absolute, relentless focus. Because if you have your arms around something, you understand it. You’re able to make things happen.

McKinsey: That must have been a huge commitment in terms of your time.

Mike Bush: My rule of thumb is - and I got this from others, so it’s not my own rule - you need to dedicate at least 60 percent of your time inside the organisation to driving a transformation.

The police service in New Zealand is very decentralised, so it was critical for the leadership team to get out and about regularly to talk to officers and staff on the front line. And this starts right with new recruits. When we induct them, on day one, I meet with them all, which helps them understand our business.

McKinsey: Can you give me an example of how that leadership commitment had an impact?

Mike Bush: When we reached out for a mobility partner, I led the procurement and spoke to the chief executives of the major providers. I said, “This is our vision. This is what we need—we do not want a provider or a supplier, we want a partner. We want to innovate. We want support.” So we wanted someone to come on the transformation journey with us.

Now three of the main CEOs that we approached all took different approaches. One quite rightly said, “Too big for us.” The second thought, “I got this in the bag. We’re already there, no problem.” And the third company, the chief executives said, “I’m going to own this. I’m going to champion it. I’m going to ensure that this happens. Because it’s important to the organisation. And actually, I really like what they’re trying to do.”

They won it. We’re still really close partners. We’re innovating. We’re doing everything we said we’d do. Again, it was led from the top in our place. But it was championed from the top in their place as well. So that was worth it. What their chief executive did made the difference.

McKinsey: Our research on government transformations highlights how critical communication is and that most organizations don’t do it nearly well enough. How did you articulate the vision?
Mike Bush: I spoke to another 40 new recruits yesterday, and I asked them why they joined. And the answer that always comes back to you is, “I joined to make a difference.” Understanding the “why” is critical. We reflected the purpose of policing right up front. The purpose of policing is to ensure people are safe and that they feel safe. Now, everyone in our business can articulate that. And we have performance measurements that are absolutely aligned to that. Reducing the number of people who are victims of crime is absolutely the raison d’être of policing, no one would argue with that - that’s the “be safe” part. But citizens are only going to “feel safe” if they trust the police - and we’ve set really high targets for trust, confidence, and satisfaction.

You also need to have the right plan to achieve the right outcomes. A big part of this is related to resource reallocation. A frontline officer who made an arrest for disorderly behavior could spend two hours preparing a file and then spend a day at court for a hearing, and yet ultimately there might still be no result. And we knew that prosecuting low-level offenses like these was not contributing to our vision of preventing crime and making people feel safe.

Implementing this new vision meant we took out 41 percent of the volume of referrals, which freed up capacity to dedicate to preventing people becoming victims in the first place, with more officers out on the street rather than in the office or waiting in court.

McKinsey: And how was that vision communicated across such a large and geographically dispersed organisation?

Mike Bush: In terms of bringing the organisation with you, the first mistake you can make is just assuming that because you have a good plan, and it is the right thing to do, that people are going to buy into [it]. It takes massive change management, massive leadership commitment, relentless communication and championing. It is continuous.

If you think about our new operating strategy, Prevention First, with victims at the center, that was a 180-degree shift from where we had been. From an organisation that was offender focused, that was prosecution focused - just catch bad people, lock them up, and forget about the rest. We went from being prosecution first to being prevention first. That, in some people’s minds, was absolutely the right way to go. But 60 or 70 percent of the organisation saw it as a threat to their traditional approach to policing.

I’ve been in the police service for 40 years. It was contrary to the organisation I grew up in. But I personally led the development of the new operating model. So I understood it. And it went back to my reason for being a police officer, for being in the New Zealand Police. So, my ability to say, “That was then, this is now,” was helpful. I was not parachuted in. This was the organisation I grew up in, and I understood its psychological drivers.
Transforming Policing

**McKinsey:** Did you run into any roadblocks when communicating the vision?

**Mike Bush:** Getting the messages right meant trial and error, and our messages evolved over time. At the start, people thought we meant enforcement and investigations were now less important than prevention work. We had to change tack, to make them understand that we know all the components of policing are important. It is just the order in which you think and act that makes the difference, putting prevention at the front and victims at the center.

For example, our detective branch saw their role as investigating serious crime and arresting serious and organised crime offenders. They thought, “Prevention is in another part of the organisation.” So it wasn’t communicated to them in a way that seemed relevant. If it’s communicated correctly, prevention becomes really relevant - arresting serious crime offenders quickly and effectively actually prevents further crime. Understanding the drivers of organised crime helps prevent a lot of other harm and crime. So we left quite a significant part of our organisation behind because the change was not championed by the leaders in that space, and it was not fully understood. That’s been corrected, and the detectives are massive champions now of our operating model.

**McKinsey:** How did you go about building the new capabilities and ways of working?

**Mike Bush:** We increased the training—whether it’s around prevention, whether it’s around response or investigation. There has been much more professionalisation of core policing skills, building a police officer’s judgment, and ensuring they bring their core skills and their intrinsic values to the job. It’s a two-and-a-half-year programme to roll out. We’ve got 12,000 through, soon to be 14,000 people.

It’s also about leadership skills, which is a big change for them as well. It’s going from a high-fear/low-trust leadership model, which is the model I joined under. Back then, you were scared of your bosses, and there was very little trust. But now we have moved - and it’s low-fear/high-trust. I’ve got to build capability in all my people, because I have to trust them when they’re out there day and night.

I’ve also learned to never assume. Never assume that because something is a better, and maybe even easier, thing to do, that people will adopt it. People adopt things for different reasons. The example I use is technology. You give everyone a smartphone. Tell them they can do whatever they like within the law on that device. And at the same time, use it for the policing purposes.

Never assume that they’re all going to adopt it. We only had a 50 percent uptake. So then we had to step back and say, “How do we lead this change?” So never assume.

**McKinsey:** The last question: If you were speaking to someone who’s in a position like yours embarking on a five-year journey, what is the one thing you’d want them to know?

**Mike Bush:** You have to own it and lead it. Without the leader, it will fail. Your leadership is critical, and you cannot delegate transformation. I’ve seen people delegate transformation and fail. It has to be central to your purpose.
In March 2019, New Zealand suffered its worst ever terrorist attack when 51 innocent people were murdered and dozens injured as they attended Friday Prayer. Speaking at the International Conference of Crime Prevention in Dubai, New Zealand Police Commissioner Mike Bush discusses the implications the attack had for his force’s ‘Prevention First’ policy.

On 15 March 2019, a gunman entered the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and opened fire on worshippers. Minutes later, he drove to the Linwood Islamic Centre where he again fired on those attending Friday Prayer. He killed 51 innocent people and wounded dozens more. This horrific act of terror was motivated by hate yet the perpetrator, who was legally in possession of the firearms, had never come to the attention of any of the authorities, including the police.

“He had travelled to 70 countries. He had donated funds to ‘groups of concern’. He had joined a gun club and acquired semi-automatic firearms. You’d think that was enough to come to our attention. It wasn’t,” says New Zealand Police Commissioner Mike Bush.

Commissioner Bush revealed that that attack shone a light on force’s “Prevention First” approach to policing. Introduced in 2011, Prevention First had previously proved to be successful, but in this instance, as Commissioner Bush says, it had not enabled them to “get ahead” of the attack.

Prevention First is the operating strategy for the New Zealand Police Service, placing “prevention at the forefront of the organisation and people at the very centre”. In practice, it shifts the service’s focus from prosecution to prevention although the two are not mutually exclusive.

“Everything we do is important: preventing, responding, investigating and resolving. The principle here is that it is the order in which you think and act that makes the difference. If you put prevention at the front, you are honouring your reason for coming to work.”

Three-pronged strategy

The Prevention First operating model follows a three-pronged strategy. The first is to identify the driver for demand. “You must understand what’s driving crime in your country, area or region. You must problem solve that and work in partnership with everyone that has the ability to resolve those drivers.”
The second strand relates to deployment. Having a robust deployment intelligence model is critical, says Commissioner Bush, in understanding the demand on the business and the resources available for deployment.

The final strand relates to changing police culture which he described as a ‘long journey’.

“*How do you change the mindset of 13,000 people? It’s not easy. Having one jurisdiction is helpful, but it takes huge change management processes, championing that philosophy and proving that it actually works.*”

The Prevention First model was tested when, between 2015 and 2017, aggravated burglaries across New Zealand soared by 50%, leaving many victims living in fear. The force applied the model, using the crime triangle of offender, location and victim. Alongside a high focus on offenders, staff were also deployed across the country to reassure communities. Around 1200 of the affected businesses were visited and given crime prevention advice which led to substantial improvements in their security. Around 300 repeat victims were also identified. Technology also played a key role and the force managed to secure $1.8m NZD (€1.1m) from the government to install CCTV cameras in high risk locations. Tackling the robberies was made a priority, nationally, but also locally.

“*Every district commander needed to understand what was going on in their area, address it and report back to the centre. When commanders are asked to account for what’s going and ensure they have the solutions, performance improves,*” adds Commissioner Bush.

The approach worked. Data for 2016 -17 showed a 40% decrease in armed robberies with 61% of the crimes resolved. Not only did crime come down, but perceptions of safety increased significantly as did trust and confidence in the police. Overall, Prevention First was successful. Then 15 March 2019 happened.

Listening to Commissioner Bush talk about the events of that day and the police service’s inability to prevent this horrific attack taking place, it’s clear that it still weighs heavily on the service. What was frustrating for the police is that the perpetrator wasn’t even on their radar.

“This person – an Australian who had lived in New Zealand for two years and who had travelled to 70 countries – had never come to the notice of the authorities including the police, mental health and immigration. How do you get ahead of people like that?”

The attack caused the force to reflect on the Prevention First model which revealed that while the police had many excellent relationships and partnerships with diverse communities, it wasn’t enough.

“We have a big firearms community. This man was lawfully in possession of firearms used in that attack. He trained at a gun club. Did anyone in that community come to us? No. Would they have if we had better relationships? I think so.”
‘We need to do more’

Commissioner Bush view is that every law enforcement organisation has to “deepen and broaden” their relationships with every community, including the online community, if they are to prevent an attack like this happening again.

“They [law enforcement] must be immersed in every community so you learn about the people that may pose a risk. You have to build that trust and confidence.”

While the police were unable to prevent the first attack happening, they did succeed in quickly foiling a subsequent plot - and were also able to reassure communities, keeping them safe in the aftermath of the first incident.

“We failed on one and succeeded on the other. Trust and confidence in the police rose by a significant amount because the way we policed this post event made people feel safe. People felt reassured.”

New Zealand’s Prevention First model remains very much at the heart of its approach to policing, but Mr Bush says it now needs to go further.

“We need to deepen it and broaden it. Everyone comes to work to ensure these things never happen. We need to sit and reflect. Are we doing enough? No, we need to do more.”

(note: Mike Bush retires from the New Zealand Police in April 2020)

Discussion Questions

1. In the context of police as an organisation, define change management. Does it differ to Security Sector Reform (SSR)?

2. How does Mike Bush’s leadership-style and approach compare to the leadership of your police?

3. When implementing police reform and priorities, what style is more important leadership or management?

4. How open/resistant to change are your police (ref. management/culture/personnel)?

5. How does your country compare to New Zealand’s approach on “Preventive Policing”? Give examples of preventive policing strategies already used in your country.

6. Both NZ’s Commissioner Bush and the former Head of Community Policing in Manchester (UK), stated that community-oriented preventive strategies are the key to reducing crime, as well as countering violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism (VERT). Agree / Disagree?

7. How do you measure the success in preventive policing?

8. If you were promoted to the Chief of Police:
   a. how would you change police ideologies and organisational culture?
   b. what policing areas would you focus on?
The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

The Gladbeck hostage situation unfolded over 54 hours in the summer of 1988, after Dieter Degowski and Hans-Jürgen Rösner, both already convicts and armed, robbed a branch of Deutsche Bank in the Ruhr valley town and took hostages away in cars and a hijacked bus. Three people, including two teenage hostages, and a police officer whose vehicle crashed, were killed.

The gangsters’ odyssey, from 16 to 18 August 1988, involved a road chase from the Ruhr, northwards to Bremen, and into the Netherlands before they were intercepted by police special forces on a motorway near Bonn.

The incident is notorious for becoming a media circus in Germany and the Netherlands.

Chronicle

16 August

In the early morning two armed and hooded offenders broke into a branch of the Deutsche Bank in Gladbeck before opening hours.

At 8:04 am an emergency call was made by a witness to the police. A parked police car was seen by the offenders as they left the branch. They went back into the bank and took two bank clerks hostage, demanding a car and ransom money, firing their guns into the air several times.

A radio station was the first to conduct an interview with them as the hostage crisis was happening. After several hours of negotiations, the abductors were given 300,000 DM and a white Audi 100 as a getaway car. At 9:45pm the getaway started. Marion Löblich, the girlfriend of Hans-Jürgen Rösner, boarded the car in Gladbeck.

17 August

After driving on the autobahn to Bremen, the abductors stopped and hijacked a public-transit bus with 32 passengers at 7:00 pm on 17 August. The media interviewed the abductors and the hostages without any interference from the police. Some hostages had a pistol pressed against their throats.

After the release of five hostages, the bus was driven to the autobahn service area of Grundbergsee, where the two bank clerks were released.

Two police officers arrested Marion Löblich, who was using the toilet. Demanding an exchange, Degowski and Rösner threatened to kill a hostage every five minutes. After the expiration of the ultimatum they shot a 15-year-old Italian boy, Emanuele Di Giorgi, in the head; he was said to be protecting his sister. Löblich was about to be released by the police on demand of the abductors but arrived too late because of a broken handcuff key and poor police communication. An ambulance arrived 20 minutes later, but the shot teenager died two hours later in hospital.

After this incident the bus was driven to the Netherlands. During the chase a police car collided with a truck, leaving one police officer dead and another injured.
The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis

18 August

At 2:30am on 18 August 1988, the bus entered the Netherlands. At 5:15am two women and three children were released, after the Dutch Police refused to negotiate as long as children were being held hostage. At 6:30am Rösner and Degowski were given a BMW 735i. The new getaway car had been prepared with a “kill switch”, so that the engine could be stopped by remote control. While attempting to escape, Löblich and the bus driver were injured.

During a stop in Wuppertal the abductors went shopping at a pharmacy.

After stopping in a pedestrian area in Cologne at 10:30am, the car was surrounded by media and shoppers. Some reporters offered to guide the abductors on their way or to hand them pictures of police officers to prevent trickery if hostages were exchanged. A reporter - Udo Röbel - guided the abductors to a nearby rest area on the autobahn and accompanied them for several kilometres.

On the A3 close to Bad Honnef, a few kilometres before the state border between North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, a police car rammed the getaway car at 1:40pm and rendered it immobile, triggering a gunfight. During the firefight, one of the hostages, Ines Voitle, was able to exit the car, the other - 18-year old Silke Bischoff - was fatally shot (presumably by Rösner). Soon after the abductors were arrested.

The remote control intended to stop the car engine was not used as the responsible police officers had forgotten to take it with them. Across the state border in Rhineland-Palatinate, Federal Police Special Forces (GSG9) were in position waiting to take action.

Trial

On 22 March 1991 Rösner and Degowski were pronounced guilty by the regional superior court of Essen, receiving life sentences. Löblich was sentenced to nine years. In 2002 the Higher Court in Hamm ascertained "guilt of a very serious nature" and Degowski's sentence was increased to 24 years. In 2004 the same Higher Court refused an application for parole and a request by Rösner to shorten his sentence. The court also declared a state of "preventive detention" ("Sicherungsverwahrung"). In October 2015, Rösner was allowed to leave prison for four hours the first time in 27 years. In November 2017 he went into a resocialization programme. Degowski was released from prison on 15 February 2018 with a new identity.

Aftermath

On 20 November 1988, the Bremen Minister of the Interior Bernd Meyer resigned over mistakes by the police. Several years after the incident, there was a public discussion at a local police academy about the incident with the judge who had sentenced Rösner and Degowski to life in prison and journalists including Udo Röbel, the reporter who had got into the vehicle with the hostage-takers and went with them, giving them directions out of Cologne. The judge praised Röbel for having prevented a potential bloodbath in Cologne. This was not a view expressed in the official report into the incident by a parliamentary enquiry in the state of the North Rhine Westphalia, which commented negatively on the journalists’ ethics.

Emanuele de Giorgi was buried in Italy; his family returned there to live in late 1988. Silke Bischoff was buried in the family grave of her grandfather. Ines Voitle survived, but suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.

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**The Gladbeck Hostage Crisis**

*Exercise – Lessons Learned*

**Group Discussion A:**

1. Identify what went wrong with the police decision making process, including interagency cooperation and coordination.

2. What role did politics and public opinion play?

3. What effect did the media have on the case?

4. Make recommendations for the future handling of such cases.

5. If your group had been responsible for establishing the Incident Command System (BAO):
   a. What steps would you have taken?
   b. What would your priorities have been?

**Group Discussion B:**

Your group are on duty and have been informed that a 15-year-old girl - Jessica Sims - has been reported missing (for the last 18 hours). She left home upset after arguing with her parents about not being allowed to go to a party. The parents have had little luck in finding her: she’s not answering her cell phone, and as they are new to the area (6 months) don’t know their daughter’s friend’s last names.

1. What are the first steps you would take to discover her whereabouts?

2. Through enquiries you’ve established that *foul-play* may be involved? What happens now?
Police and Community Relations

Democratic Policing and the Social Contract

An important function of the State is to provide security and public order. To do so, the State claims sole monopoly in legitimate physical coercion within its geographical and political jurisdiction. Police functions in a democratic society must:

- be operationally independent from the state and be responsible towards the needs of citizens; and
- be transparent, accountable, and guided by the rule of law & human rights standards.

In autocratic and fragile states, police are closely associated with maintaining the government - often ‘securing order’ through the misuse of force. Under these conditions law enforcement adopts a militarised approach, where normal civilian police duties (crime prevention) have been downgraded in favour of State Security (public order). Such practices are seen as obstacles to well-functioning policing and community engagement.

In liberal democracies, police are authorised to use proportionate force against the public - when considered necessary. On the whole, the public regard this arrangement as reasonable under the social contract - a theory which regards use of force as necessary to uphold law and order in maintaining a safe society.

Under the social contract individuals are understood to voluntarily surrender some of their rights to the State. Although government officials, police are seen as politically impartial in their role, themselves governed and restricted by rules and the same laws. The social contract views police as a protective force against crime and social disorder. This view is held widely by the general public, and even when faced with scandal (corruption, racism, disproportionate use of force, and abuse of powers), the police remain respected as both a public service and institution.

The social contract – and goodwill - is essentially the public’s ‘buy-in’: a socio-political and cultural relationship that often does not exist in international police interventions.
Police and Community Relations

Vocabulary Building

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1. Having a ____________ means the exclusive control, by one group, of a service.

2. ____________ is the territory and range of legal authority of the judiciary, law-enforcement, or governmental body.

3. To ____________ support and defend an idea, principle or structure.

4. An ____________, a ruler who possesses absolute and unrestricted authority.

5. ____________ means to be responsible to someone or for some action; answerable.

6. Being ____________ is not having a prejudice or bias towards or against any particular side or party.

7. The ____________ refers to the target population within a specific area.

8. To be ____________ means to be at liberty, or refers to a group in general.

9. Police become ____________ by adopting military practises normally used in war zones: tactics, weapons, uniforms, vehicles and force.

10. ____________ is being authorised and acting in accordance with the law, whilst the having credibility and trustworthy to do so.

11. If you ____________ to an idea, you actively agree and become a stakeholder.

12. ____________ is governing by force.
Use of Force – Guidelines For Implementation

An Introduction

From the streets of Ferguson, Missouri to the favelas of Brazil, the police use of force and firearms makes global headlines when it turns fatal.

In countless cases, including in response to demonstrations, police are too quick to use force instead of seeking peaceful conflict resolution. In many countries police deploy tear gas, rubber bullets and other weapons in arbitrary, abusive or excessive use of force, causing serious casualties, including killing and maiming people, often with little or no accountability.

“All too often, in many countries around the world, people are killed or seriously injured when police use force in violation of international standards or existing national laws,” says Dr. Anja Bienert, Amnesty International Netherlands’ Police & Human Rights Programme.

Nobody is disputing that police have a challenging, and often even dangerous, duty to perform. But governments and law enforcement authorities frequently fail to create a framework to ensure that police only use force lawfully and as a last resort.

The power to use force and firearms is necessary for police to carry out their duties, but that does not mean it is an inevitable part of the job – in fact, the underlying principle of the international standards for police is not to use force unless it is really necessary. In many countries police fall short of this mark, and often resort to the use of force and firearms in an indiscriminate, excessive or otherwise unlawful manner.

In all regions of the world there are examples where deaths and serious injuries have resulted from police use of force and firearms. In recent years these include:

- killings by police in Brazil which impact disproportionately on young black men;
- numerous police shootings in the USA resulting in the death of unarmed people, likewise with a disproportionate impact on African American men;
- in Bangladesh, special police forces carrying out heavy-handed police operations with lethal force, resulting in the death of many people;
- use of tear gas, rubber bullets and other means of force, sometimes even firearms, during public assemblies, resulting in serious casualties, including in Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, Greece, Hong Kong, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela and Ukraine.

This is due to a variety of reasons, including domestic laws that contradict international human rights obligations, deficient internal regulations, inadequate training and equipment, lack of command control and the absence of accountability for police who act outside the law.

“The UN Basic Principles are an acknowledgement that, in certain limited circumstances, police can and will need to use force to maintain law and order. But this must be done in compliance with international human rights law and it certainly must never be seen as a licence to kill nor as granting immunity to police officials: nobody is above the law, especially those who have a duty to uphold the law,” said Dr. Anja Bienert.
The Crisis of Police Militarisation

“Do Not Resist”


When the Chechen-born Tsarnaev brothers set off a bomb at the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing three people and wounding 264, New York filmmaker Craig Atkinson looked on with as much horror as anyone else. But he noticed something else, too: Boston Police Department armored vehicles and heavily armed officers - dressed like combat soldiers - deployed onto the streets, fanning out across neighbourhoods as though they were an infantry division engaged in Afghanistan. Atkinson asked himself, when did local police forces, in their equipment and tactics, come to resemble armies of occupation?

The answer Atkinson came up with is “Do Not Resist,” a documentary film that traces the transformation of police departments across the United States into forces that often look like occupying ground troops - and all too often act like them. Watching “Do Not Resist,” is an eye-opening experience. The film takes a series of events that might appear unrelated - the heavy-handed police response to the demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014; the use of heavily armed SWAT teams in South Carolina to carry out routine drug arrests - and shows that they are part of a pattern that has taken hold in many police departments across the country. “What we discovered is that there had been a massive change in the tactics used by SWAT teams,” Atkinson told me. “And that happened as the federal government was giving away military equipment to police departments.”

Atkinson is not the first person to detail the militarization of America’s police. But he is the first to provide a visual account of how police forces across the country have changed - and how they are using the extraordinary weapons they've been given by the Pentagon.

This is demonstrated in a scene in which the Richland County Sheriff Department’s Special Response Team (SRT) practice close quarter combat (CQC) with assault rifles and submachine guns. It shows the SWAT teams enjoying the adrenaline rush of military-style training with heavy weaponry and armoured vehicles. One officer justifies it all by stating the need to be ready for ISIS, WMDs and “situations like what they had in Missouri”, saying that civil protests necessitate the use of armour and assault rifles.

The practice of donating unused military equipment to local governments began in 1997, when the 1033 program was included in an otherwise unremarkable Department of Defense (DOD) budget authorisation. Under the 1033 program, the DOD publishes a list of surplus equipment that is available to local governments. But the turning point - as with so many other issues - came after 9/11. Since the 90’s, the DOD has donated some $5bn worth of equipment. But the over-all value of military equipment acquired by police forces is actually much higher: local governments have received approximately $34bn in grants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to buy their own military equipment from private suppliers. That brings the total to $39bn - more than the entire defence budget of Germany.

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1 The Times, the Washington Post, USA Today, and the Marshall Project did it earlier.
2 Oversight of who receives the equipment, and type have proved to be non-existent, with criminal organisations posing as law enforcement – as uncovered in a media sting.
The Crisis of Police Militarisation

The 1033 and DHS programs have resulted in local governments around the country acquiring an astonishing range of military equipment, including armoured personnel carriers, assault helicopters, M-16 assault rifles, grenade launchers, and infrared gun sights, all of which were designed for combat. Among the vehicles routinely given to police departments is the MRAP (mine-resistant ambush-protected), designed to survive roadside bombs. According to the Marshall Project, some 600 MRAPs have been handed out to local authorities around the country; they cost about a million dollars each.

The Marshall Project has broken down DOD donations by county and city. It turns out that NYPD has acquired surprisingly little under the 1033 and DHS programs: just two armoured personnel carriers and some non-lethal gear. The Brevard County Sheriff’s Department (Florida) scored big, getting its hands on nearly $7m worth of equipment, including thirteen helicopters, two armoured personnel carriers, and 246 assault rifles. In 2014, the Los Angeles Unified School District announced that it would return the three grenade launchers it had acquired but would keep its armoured personnel carrier and 61 assault rifles.

As the Pentagon was gifting free military equipment, something else was happening, too: there was explosive growth in SWAT team deployments, often armed with the same military equipment that was obtained from the federal government. According to Atkinson, SWAT teams were deployed about 3000 times a year across the country in the 1980’s. By 2005, they were deployed 45,000 times a year; in 2015, as much as 80,000 times.

In one scene, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department deploys its Special Response Team (SRT) to raid a home in a run-down neighbourhood where the inhabitants were suspected of keeping marijuana. The SRT members, who are dressed in military uniforms, helmets, vests, and assault rifles - smash the doors and windows, enter the house, and arrest the tenant’s son. SRT seize $873 in cash from the suspect, which he tells police is needed to purchase gardening equipment for his landscaping business. They end up finding 1.5 grams loose marijuana (enough to fill a teaspoon). The suspect’s mother tells the filmmakers, “they tore down the house. My son went to jail for a gram and a half that they shook out of a bottom of a book bag.” The lead TRT officer says with a shrug that drug raids are a “50-50 proposition in terms of finding something worthwhile”.

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3 https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/03/the-pentagon-finally-details-its-weapons-for-cops-giveaway#dod-graphic
4 Surveillance had misinterpreted frequent references to grass and weed as meaning marijuana
Atkinson states that the raid in South Carolina was typical of the dozen he went on with law enforcement officers from across the country. Atkinson shows that particular raid because he wanted to demonstrate how civil asset forfeiture has spiralled out of control. For all the military equipment and tactics that were used, very little in the way of criminal activity was ever discovered. “We kept going out, but we never found much of anything,” he said. “Do you know the type of ill-will generated in these communities?” he says. “It makes the police seem like an occupying force.”

The picture that emerges from “Do Not Resist” is that the acquisition of military equipment and the use of SWAT teams for routine arrests are feeding on each other - that heavy weapons are encouraging police to act in ways they otherwise would not.

Defending militarization, FBI Director James Comey gives a speech about “so-called warrior cops, a term I have heard, and the militarization of police”. Through an anecdote he states that “monsters are real”, to justify the need for these weapons. Unfortunately, the editing is selective: the clip ends before Comey importantly adds that “the issue is the way in which we use it – when and how we deploy advanced equipment; when and how our officers are trained to use that equipment. The way we do it matters enormously.” But Comey does not speak out for stronger gun control as a means to reduce the need for such equipment and attitudes.

“Do Not Resist” is interspersed with scenes from Ferguson, Missouri, where large demonstrations began after a police officer shot and killed Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager. When people gathered in the streets to express their anger, police moved in with armoured vehicles, riot gear, pepper spray and tear gas. Not surprisingly, events escalated.

Garry McCarthy, then Chief of the Chicago Police Department, told President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing that the heavy-handed response by the police had recklessly provoked Ferguson residents. “What happened in Ferguson - the actual practice of how the demonstrations were handled - I think we were all embarrassed, quite frankly, in law enforcement,” McCarthy said. “In my book, if you fire tear gas, you’ve got a riot right now. You don’t have a demonstration.”

For more than a century, US Federal Law has prohibited the military from being deployed inside the United States against American citizens. The far-sightedness behind that distinction is obvious, not least because while the military is trained to use maximum force, the police, ideally, should only use as much as is necessary to protect themselves or local citizens. “Do Not Resist” shows that the distinction between the two has been severely eroded.

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5 where police confiscate goods and money for their own use before a suspect is even found guilty.
The Crisis of Police Militarisation

Class Discussion: *Warriors vs. Guardians*

1. What are the issues at play?

2. What is the consequence of Police Militarization?

3. In the film, Dave Grossman plants the image of law enforcement as “Super Heroes - constantly under threat - who need to meet force with superior force”. What are your thoughts?

4. How do you view the US Defense Department’s 1033 programme and DHS grant?

5. How does militarized civilian law enforcement affect Community Relations?

6. What role does culture play?

7. How is a *search warrant* conducted in your country? When do you think an aggressive *no-knock* search warrant should occur?

8. What strategies would you employ to reform US Law Enforcement? What would be your priorities and focus areas?
Why Cops Need a ‘Warrior’ Mindset
- and why they shouldn’t want one

North American policing is often heavily criticised for adopting what is called the warrior mentality - an "us versus them" approach to policing communities. RCMP Inspector Kevin Cyr looks at the nuances of this approach - and why we shouldn't give up on it altogether if we want to keep communities and police officers safe.

In May 2019, the Mayor of Minneapolis announced a ban on the city's police officers taking warrior-style training, stating that the training was "fear-based" and taught police officers to adopt a mind-set that "threats are everywhere". The mayor believed that warrior-style training would prevent the police from forming meaningful relationships with the community.

This isn’t new commentary. Critics have long worried that police officers who subscribe to a warrior-style mindset will adopt an "us-versus-them" approach in dealing with their communities, undermining their abilities to deliver quality policing. These concerns are not without merit, but the warrior mindset is an unfortunate necessity of policing and an inevitable reflection of the reality of the police officer’s working domain. That said, it is a mindset that can be taken too far, and its limitations must be appreciated.

Most police officers believe that catching criminals is what being a cop is all about. Never mind that actual crime fighting accounts for less than 25% of an officer’s time. We all grew up playing cops and robbers, not pretending to go to noise complaints or deal with social issues. We watched TV shows where police work is action-packed and always ends with a bad guy going to jail: many police officers still define their role based on this aspect of the job.

Policing Culture
That the crime-fighting image of policing is deeply ingrained in policing culture is demonstrated by the extreme popularity of well-known police trainer Dave Grossman’s 1 “sheepdog” description of police work.

In the sheepdog analogy – which is so prevalent in policing circles that it is almost cliché - society is divided into three groups. The law-abiding citizens are the sheep. This characterisation is meant to be descriptive, not derogatory, as the average citizen is a peaceful, productive person who is incapable of violence except under extreme provocation and who naturally expects others to be the same. Criminals are the wolves; they have a capacity for violence and use it to prey on the sheep. Finally, police officers are the sheepdogs tasked with protecting the flock. Like the wolves, they have a capacity for violence, but are guided by a morality that the wolves lack.

This romanticised notion of policing is exactly the type of fear-based perspective that the Minneapolis mayor was concerned would create an us-versus-them mentality and teach officers that threats were constantly present, which does not seem to be supported by statistics on policing. Policing is not a [physically] hazardous occupation when compared to fishing or logging for on-the-job fatalities, and isn’t even in the top 10 for dangerous occupations in Canada.

Why, then, is it necessary, to construct a view of policing that raises images of police officers forever in the crosshairs of violent criminals?

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1 Lieutenant-Colonel, U.S. Army (retired)
In Defence of the ‘Warrior Mentality’

The necessity is that even if the police were to dismiss this combatant notion, dangerous criminals would not. It is well ingrained in the criminal ethos that the police are the enemy. Cop killer Robert Sand provided a glimpse into this mentality in a diary entry he wrote as he sat in a jail cell while on trial for the murder of RCMP Constable Dennis Strongquill.

Robert Sand’s words, written after he reviewed crime scene photographs of the slain officer as well as his brother, Danny, who had been killed by a police sniper, are chilling:

“I was looking at this man, on a table. And he had several shotgun wounds, to the side, back, chest, etc. And I started to think, he’s just a man, and shouldn’t be dead. He had a family and friends, and now he’s a body on a table. I realized it’s not the man I hated, but the uniform he wore. His flag, colours of war. But seeing him without his uniform I felt bad for the loss of his life.

I flipped to the pics of Dan, and my thoughts changed. Cos’ now I felt that the other man is right where he should be. And losses on both sides are always expected, only Dan took my place. And when I looked up at the cop car I felt pride, and remembered the battle. I remembered how these enemy soldiers fled in fear and cowardice. I saw how much damaged I’d causes to their unit and smiled, from the knowledge, that the enemy isn’t as strong as they want us to believe. But they should beware that the moment they fly their flag, wear their uniform. That their at war and people die in war, everyone has their enemies.”

While critics rush to condemn an “us-versus-them” policing model, they fail to realise that the “us” isn’t the police, and the “them” isn’t the public. The police and the public are the “them”. The “us” are the criminals. Us-versus-them is the perspective of the predator, not the guardian, and we can’t pretend it doesn’t exist. If we reject the image of police as crime fighters because that does not constitute the majority of their work, and because that is perhaps their most distasteful task, then we have to pretend that the police aren’t the ones society calls upon to confront human aggression. The relative infrequency of violent encounters does not eliminate the need to be able to handle them when they happen. It isn’t so much that the police are constantly at risk, it is that they are unpredictably at risk. Officer survival tactics are not practised on a whim; they are born out of hard-won experience that was paid for in blood.

To see the dangers of completely discarding a warrior-based mentality we can return to the wolves and the sheep analogy, but this time from Aesop’s fables:

“Why should there always be this fear and slaughter between us?” said the Wolves to the Sheep. “Those evil-disposed Dogs have much to answer for. They always bark whenever we approach you and attack us before we have done any harm. If you would only dismiss them from your heels, there might soon be treaties of peace and reconciliation between us.”

The Sheep, poor silly creatures, were easily beguiled and dismissed the Dogs, whereupon the Wolves destroyed the unguarded flock at their own pleasure.”


**Negative Impact**

But it would be unwise to adopt a warrior-based mentality without understanding the baggage that comes with it. First, even entirely appropriate officer safety practices can have negative community impacts. Routine actions such as asking a person to take their hands out of their pockets or shining a spotlight into a car during a traffic stop may appear to an average citizen (who doesn’t understand the threats the officer is trying to protect themselves from) as being rude, unnecessary, and perhaps overly coercive. It is difficult to fault police officers for wanting to reduce the threats they face, but risk can never be reduced to zero and some would argue that there comes a point when officer safety practices require coercive actions that the police should not be able to apply without some overt threat being present.

Second, the warrior mentality can be taken too far. Lt. Col. Grossman provided an example of the sheepdog mission by quoting the motto of one California law enforcement agency, “We intimidate those who intimidate others.” What Lt. Col. Grossman failed to point out is that motto was from the LAPD Rampart Division CRASH Unit (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums), an anti-gang unit that was ultimately disbanded after allegations of assaults, theft of drugs, and framing of suspects. Sheepdogs, it seems, can sometimes act like wolves.

Finally, when we provide police officers with a warrior-based mindset, we risk further isolating them from the society they serve. Most of society simply doesn’t understand the reality of being a police officer, and social isolation is a well-established aspect of policing culture.

Every police officer has had the experience of meeting someone for the first time, disclosing their occupation, and then having to suffer complaints about undeserved traffic tickets or, at best, having to respond to legitimate interest in policing stories which the officer probably has limited interest in recounting. Indeed, “the whole civilian world is an audience for the policeman [which] further promotes police isolation and, in consequence, solidarity.”

The problem with social isolation and excessive solidarity among the police is it can make it difficult for the police to discern society’s expectations. Since the police are subject to incestuous social confirmation of their attitudes and beliefs by their limited peer group, any disagreement between what the police think is appropriate and what the public expects can be written off as a failure of the public to know “how the world really is”. Essentially, “officers can lose the capacity to read nuance in the social landscape or even to cast a critical eye on their own behaviour.”

This was best summarised in the movie, A Few Good Men, when Colonel Jessop (Jack Nicholson) said, “I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom that I provide, then questions the manner in which I provide it.” Simply put, objections from the public can be dismissed as bleating of the sheep.

The warrior mentality is not an all-or-nothing separation. A police officer does not have to choose between either adopting an identity of a coiled cobra ready at any moment for a battle to the death or being completely apathetic to the potential danger of her occupation. Rather, those options represent the two furthest ends on a spectrum of attitudes. An officer must be able to move along different points of that spectrum depending on the circumstances presented. Adopting the warrior mentality wholeheartedly no matter the circumstances is foolish, but abandoning it completely is dangerous.

**Group Assignments**

- **Group One:** Present an objective synopsis of the article
- **Group Two:** Present arguments/justifications for the Warrior approach
- **Group Three:** Present argument for the Guardian approach
Excessive Force against Demonstrators, Abuses in Detention

(Santiago) – According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), Chile’s national police, Carabineros, have allegedly committed serious human rights violations, including excessive use of force in the streets and abuses in detention, after thousands of Chileans took to the streets on and in the weeks following 18 October 2019, Human Rights Watch said today.

Human Rights Watch met with President Sebastián Piñera on 26 November and recommended a series of reforms directed to help prevent police misconduct and strengthen oversight as a result of compelling evidence on excessive use of force and abuses against demonstrators and bystanders. From the beginning of the demonstrations through to 21 November, the National Human Rights Institute filed 442 criminal complaints on behalf of victims with prosecutors, regarding injuries, cruel treatment, torture, rape, killings, and attempted killings allegedly committed by security forces.

“There are hundreds of worrying reports of excessive force on the streets and abuse of detainees, including brutal beatings and sexual abuse, that should be promptly and thoroughly investigated to ensure victims’ access to justice,” said José Miguel Vivanco, HRW Americas Director. “Issues such as the indiscriminate and improper use of riot guns and shotguns, abuse of detainees in custody, and poor internal accountability systems gave rise to serious violations of the rights of many Chileans. This is precisely why police reforms are urgently needed.”

The protests began over an increase in the price of public transportation and have continued for over a month. The demonstrations broadened to reflect anger over serious deficiencies in the provision of social services and economic inequality.

On 18 October, Piñera declared a state of emergency in several locations, deploying the military to enforce it. The state of emergency, which included measures restricting freedom of movement such as curfews, was lifted on 28 October. The national police responded to massive protests across Chile. While most demonstrators were peaceful, some groups engaged in violent acts, including attacking police officers and police stations with rocks and Molotov cocktails, looting, and burning public and private property. On 21 November, the police command said that more than 1,896 officers were injured from 18 October to 20 November, about 127 of them seriously.
Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests

HRW interviewed more than 70 people in Santiago and Valparaíso in November. Some were victims who had been injured by pellets fired from shotguns or direct hits from teargas cartridges fired from riot guns; others alleged to have suffered police abuse in the streets or police stations. Human Rights Watch also interviewed police officers, some of whom had been injured by demonstrators, doctors, lawyers, academics, representatives of civil society, and government officials, including the Supreme Court president, the attorney general, the chief public defender, the police general director, and the foreign affairs, interior, defence, and justice ministers.

HRW found compelling evidence that police used excessive force to respond to protests, injuring thousands of people, whether they were engaged in violent actions or not. According to the Health Ministry, the country’s emergency services treated 11,564 people injured during the demonstrations from 18 October to 22 November. Of those, more than 1,100 had moderate or serious injuries.

The use of shotguns that scatter pellets indiscriminately over a wide area with the potential to harm anyone in their path is of particular concern. The pellet shotguns were the main cause of the more than 220 eye injuries documented by the National Human Rights Institute, an official and independent body. On 17 November, the Health Ministry reported that 16 lost eyesight in one eye and 34 had severe eye injuries that could result in partial or total eyesight loss, with their recovery depending on an assessment in the next three months.

On 19 November, the police temporarily suspended the use of the pellet shotguns for crowd control at protests while external experts evaluate the composition of pellets. Given their inherently inaccurate nature, indiscriminate impact, and evidence of the serious injuries they have caused, their use should be suspended indefinitely in all circumstances until competent and independent authorities conduct a proper examination of their risks.

Police also brutally beat protesters, shot bean bag rounds and teargas cartridges directly at them, and ran over some with official vehicles or motorcycles.

The Attorney General’s Office is investigating 26 deaths. Among them are a demonstrator who died after an alleged police beating on the street, three protesters allegedly fatally shot by military forces using live ammunition, and one who was run over by a Navy vehicle, according to information from the Attorney General’s Office.

Medical personnel said that one demonstrator with a heart problem died when he did not receive proper emergency care, because police were using weapons against protesters and medical personnel. The Attorney General’s Office is also investigating the deaths of two men in police custody, which it is currently treating as suicides.

HRW learned that at least another 18 people died in fires during looting, were run over by private cars during demonstrations, or died for other reasons without evidence, so far, that government agents played a role.

The police detained more than 15,000 people and ill-treated some of them.

Of 442 criminal complaints filed by the National Human Rights Institute on behalf of victims of abuse, 341 refer to allegations of torture and inhumane treatment and 74 of sexual abuse.
Many detainees allege they were brutally beaten by police. Another of the most common allegations was that police forced detainees, including children, to undress and squat fully naked in police stations, a practice banned by police protocols in March 2019 but that still occurs, including before the protests.

The police appear to be more likely to force women and girls to strip than men, based on data that the National Human Rights Institute. A Chilean human rights lawyer cited a case in which men and women were detained in the same circumstances, but only women were forced to undress, with examples of police touching women’s genitalia after they were forced to strip.

The Attorney General’s Office has opened preliminary investigations into alleged abuses against 2,278 people, in which 203 members of security forces are allegedly implicated, including 173 police officers. Only 9 – 4 police and 5 members of the Armed Forces – have been “formalised,” meaning that their cases moved to the next investigation phase.

Before the protests, the government adopted a protocol on the use of force and promoted it. During the protests, according to information provided by the government, it took measures, such as requesting security forces to implement the protocol and the deployment of 250 human rights police instructors to units engaged in crowd control operations.

The abuses in detention and the serious injuries suffered by hundreds of protesters were facilitated by structural failures of oversight and accountability that predate the demonstrations.

**Indiscriminate and Improper Use of Shotguns**

Since 18 October, pellet ammunition fired during anti-government protests injured at least 1,015 people in the lower and the upper body.

The most serious injuries include ocular lesions. At Del Salvador Hospital, where the vast majority have been treated, 77% of eye injuries were caused by pellets. Teargas cartridges caused the second most injuries.

**Marlene Morales Canales**, 33, approached a crowd near her home in Santiago on 19 October with her 14-year-old daughter. She saw the police about 20 metres away, heard gunshots, and felt a pellet bursting her right eye. “I lost my eyesight immediately, and there was a lot of blood,” she said. After the gunshots, the police also started shooting teargas. Doctors told her she will never recover sight in her right eye.

Some of those injured were wounded by multiple pellets, suggesting they were shot at from a closer range, given that pellets scatter over a distance.
Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests

*Ronald Barrales*, 36, was participating in a demonstration in downtown Santiago on 11 November when people in front of a police truck started throwing rocks at it, he said. He was trying to walk past, when a police officer opened the passenger door, pointed a shotgun at him from eight meters away, fired, and hit him in the belly, chest, and left eye with pellets. Doctors told him he will never recover sight in that eye.

On the right, an X-ray showing the pellet that hit Barrales in the eye as a round bright object

*Jorge Ortiz*, Finance Unit Director at the National Human Rights Institute, was injured by police on 29 October, while he was monitoring protests in La Alameda. Ortiz was wearing a yellow jacket and helmet, widely recognised in Chile as gear used by the Institute’s team. He sustained six pellet wounds on his back, buttocks, and the back of his left leg as he was running from the police, who were shooting toward an area with demonstrators located close to the Institute’s team, Ortiz said.
Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests

- The police entered the Liceo 7 school in Santiago on 5 November after the students voted to join the demonstrations. Two girls were injured, including one who was hit with more than 10 pellets, the Children’s Ombudsperson Office (Defensoría de la Niñez) said. Prosecutors have charged a police major with inhuman treatment in this case.

- A 16-year-old boy was looking out to the street from the hall of his apartment building with some friends in Santiago on 19 October when police officers entered and shot at him as he ran to his apartment, according to the Children’s Ombudsperson Office and the National Human Rights Institute. They hit him with at least 10 pellets in the back and ribs.

General Mario Rozas, the top police commander, said on 13 November that the police use 12mm shotguns that fire cartridges containing 12 x 8mm pellets, and that they are permitted to open fire “when their lives are at risk or a civilian is in danger.” Police have used them in response to attacks by demonstrators with rocks or other projectiles, police officers and witnesses said. To be authorised to fire the gun, police must undergo a two-week training course and renew their certification every year.

While initially concentrated within a small radius as they are fired, the pellets contained in the cartridges expand away from each other, to create a constellation of projectiles that can reach several decimetres in radius within a few meters of being fired.

A review published in the British Medical Journal of studies examining the use of similar types of less-lethal weapons in six regions between 1990 and 2017 documented injuries to 1,984 people with these weapons, 53 of whom died as a result. Among those injured, 71% had injuries that were considered severe and 300 people suffered life-long disabilities. Out of those, 84% had permanent eye damage.

A 2012 internal report by the Chilean police made public on 21 November by local media outlets concluded that people hit by pellets from these shotguns at a distance of 25 metres or less could suffer serious injuries and even death. Even at 30 metres the pellets could cause injuries that would result in eye loss, the report warned.

Police officers told Human Rights Watch that they are instructed to use the shotgun at a minimum distance of 30 metres and aim between the knee and the ankle, to avoid hitting vital parts of the upper body. But beyond 45 metres, they shoot straight to make sure the pellets reach rioters, said a captain of the Special Operations Group (GOPE), the elite force. Shotguns, however, do not have a scope, and therefore each officer has to roughly estimate the safe distance to fire in the midst of what are often stressful and chaotic circumstances.

Police authorities admit there is “high risk” involved in using such an imprecise weapon. “It’s not a weapon to aim,” General Rozas said. General Jorge Ávila, in charge of public order, said that, “the shooter does not control the trajectory of the pellets.” Because of the complex physical and environmental dynamics that affect the trajectory of the pellets, even when police shoot toward the lower extremities it is almost impossible to ensure that pellets do not hit the upper body, increasing the risk of grave or possibly lethal injuries.
Police commanders do not seem to have conveyed that risk to the rank and file, however. Human Rights Watch interviewed three officers who minimized the possible harm of the pellets. A captain said, “it’s very hard for a pellet to go through cloth, even if shot very near,” and a corporal said it was “impossible [for pellets] to cause serious eye injury.”

The University of Chile’s Mechanical Engineering Faculty published a report on 18 November that found that pellets were 80% silica, barium sulphate, and lead, and only 20% rubber. On a scale of rigidity, they are as hard as a shopping cart’s wheel. Medical experts at the Carlos Van Buren hospital reached similar conclusions after analysing pellets removed from patients.

On 19 November, after the university report was released, the police suspended their use of these shotguns when responding to protests pending an external analysis of their composition. They stated they may only be used “as an extreme measure and exclusively in self-defence, when there is an imminent risk of death.” However, even in those extreme circumstances, because of the imprecise nature of the shotguns, the police cannot ensure they hit only the intended target.

Other Injuries Caused by Police
The police also need special training and a yearly certification to use the 37mm riot gun that launches teargas cartridges. They are instructed to fire toward the sky, to slow down the heavy projectile’s trajectory in a downward arc meant to land on the ground, behind the crowd, a GOPE captain said. However, there have been credible allegations that police officers shot teargas projectiles straight into the crowd, which can be lethal.
Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests

Juan Gabriel García Barco, 25, passed through a demonstration in downtown Santiago on 11 November as he was walking home. He passed a bridge where demonstrators were throwing stones at police vehicles blocking the way, when he was hit in the face with a projectile. He felt pain and had blood running down his face. He believes that it was a teargas cartridge, as he saw a police officer stick what he thinks was teargas riot gun out of one of the vehicles and heard a loud noise directly before he was hit. He also smelled teargas after being hit, he said. A witness said he saw police aiming at García Barco from a distance of roughly 5 metres. García Barco had no sight in his left eye when Human Rights Watch interviewed him three days later.

Claudio Inda, 26, was standing in front of a bus close to Congress in Valparaíso during a demonstration on 21 November. When the bus drove away, he saw police on the other side of the street. The police shot a teargas cartridge directly towards where Inda was standing. Human Rights Watch reviewed a video filmed by a bystander showing the incident, which Inda said was filmed at the time. Doctors treating Inda at the Van Buren Hospital told Human Rights Watch that the cartridge broke his jaw.

The police appear to have also used bean bag rounds fired from riot guns against protesters. A bean bag round consists of a small fabric pillow filled with lead pellets. They are meant to be fired at extremities to reduce injuries, but there has been at least one case in which someone hit by these rounds during a demonstration was seriously injured.

On 28 October, a doctor at the Posta Central Emergency Care Hospital in Santiago operated on a patient who arrived with one of these rounds inside his skull. The doctor said the round had fractured the patient’s skull, and such an injury posed a “serious risk” to the patient’s life. Possible consequences of this trauma must continue to be assessed for a year, he said.
Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests

There have also been several reported cases of police hitting demonstrators with their vehicles or motorcycles.

On 14 November, Agustín Gómez Pérez, 19, and his brother were heading to Viña del Mar to take photographs of a demonstration, when the police tried to arrest him near a metro station in Valparaíso. Gómez Pérez tried to escape, but several officers intercepted him with their motorcycles. He was run over by a police motorcycle, as can be seen in a video Human Rights Watch reviewed. The victim was admitted at Gustavo Fricke Hospital, where he was diagnosed with abdomen trauma.

Broad Powers of Detention

Under Chilean law, in addition to detaining people caught in flagrante - committing a crime or against whom there is an arrest warrant, the police have other legal basis on which to detain people, including:

- **Preventive Identity Controls:** Article 12 of Law 20.931, adopted in 2016, allows police to verify the identity of any person over age 18 who is on the streets, in public spaces, or in private spaces with public access, such as a mall. Police may detain people for up to an hour to verify their identity.

- **Investigative Identity Controls:** Article 85 of the Criminal Procedures Code grants the police power to detain people if there is an “indication” they may have committed or attempted to commit a crime or infraction, were about to commit one, could provide useful information to investigators about such offenses, or had hidden their face or identity. Police may register the person, clothes, baggage, or vehicle, and demand proper identification. The police have up to 8 hours to complete the identification process.

Under both provisions, the detained person must be released unless the police find they tried to hide their identity or provide a false one, or if there is evidence they committed a crime.

In the absence of rigorous monitoring of when and how these powers are used, this system risks enabling discriminatory and abusive arrests. People detained for up to eight hours for identity checks are registered but not designated as “detainees,” a police commander said.

In cases in which the police intend to formally arrest a person, they must communicate with prosecutors within 12 hours of arrest. Prosecutors then decide if the detainee should be released unconditionally, released pending a hearing set for a later date, or detained until they are brought before a judge within 24 hours of arrest. Police typically communicate with prosecutors about such cases on the phone or electronically, meaning that prosecutors do not see such detainees in person.

According to official data shared by Carabineros, police carried out over 3.1 million identity controls in 2017 and 4.8 million in 2018. In both years, about 90% were considered preventive identity controls. Only 182,000 people were detained after these arrests.

Under Chilean law, prosecutors can investigate crimes, including those committed by police, by their own initiative or if someone files a complaint. However, in practice, they do not ordinarily visit police stations to examine detention conditions or the police detention and identity-check registries, the Public Defenders’ Office said.
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Based on official documentation, at least 6,972 people were formally detained in police stations in the context of the demonstrations between 17 October and 21 November.

The actual number of people deprived of liberty in the case of demonstrations is much higher. The police detained more than 15,000 people from 18 October to 19 November, and “held” an additional 2,000 for violating the curfew during the state of emergency.

Chile’s chief public defender stated that police do not have the power to detain someone for breaking a curfew and can only issue a fine. Therefore, he said, this suggests that those held by police only because they had breached the curfew may have been victims of arbitrary arrests. There is some room for interpretation under Chilean law regarding the power to hold someone who broke the curfew until the curfew ends, but several jurists stated that police cannot sanction people with detention for breaking curfew.

- Xiomara Aguilar, 18, was on her way home with a friend in Santiago when they were detained five minutes after the curfew started at 7 p.m., she said. Police bent their arms hard, pulled their hair, and took them to the police criminal lab, she said. They spent five hours sitting in a corridor there, handcuffed. At midnight, they were transferred to a police station, where police made them undress and squat fully naked. Police kept them in a cell without water or food until 6 a.m., when the curfew ended.

Under Chilean law, detainees facing charges must be brought before a judge to assess the legality of their detention within 24 hours of arrest. The Public Defender’s Office said that in the first week of the demonstrations at such hearings nationwide, the number of detentions declared unlawful almost quadrupled - increasing from 2% of all detention to 7.6% - because there was no evidence that the detainee had committed a crime and, in some cases, because the detainee had been mistreated by the police. Since 29 October, that number has decreased, but judges are still finding twice as many illegal detentions as in the months preceding the protests - 4.5% since 29 October, as compared to 2% previously.

Mistreatment, Sexual Abuse, and Torture in Detention

From the beginning of the demonstrations through 21 November, the National Human Rights Institute filed 442 criminal complaints on behalf of victims with prosecutors alleging police-inflicted injuries, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, attempted killings, and killings.

The National Human Rights Institute has filed 341 complaints that refer to allegations of torture and inhumane treatment and 74 of sexual abuse since the protests began. One of the most common complaints was that detainees, including children, were forced to undress and squat naked in police stations. Police protocols explicitly ban that practice, without any exceptions. Yet, several officers said it is allowed when there is suspicion that the detainee may have drugs or a weapon hidden in body cavities.

In reality, the police have ordered people to undress in a context that did not reflect even an mistaken belief that the detainee was seeking to smuggle contraband into detention, suggesting that they discriminated against women and girls. Officers are more likely to force women and girls to strip than men, according to the data from the Institute. A Chilean human rights lawyer described a case in which men and women were detained in the same circumstances, but only women were ordered to undress, and cases in which officers touched women’s genitalia after making them strip. The Institute also documented cases of threats of rape and rapes of four men.
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Chile’s Children’s Ombudsperson Office has collected information about 327 cases of possible violations of children’s rights during the demonstrations between 18 October and 15 November. Of those, 118 are cases of physical injuries associated with beatings, and 54 are cases of injuries by pellets and bullets.

Claudio Muñoz, 18, said that two people dressed as civilians detained him and beat him as he was running away after throwing a rock at a police truck in Santiago on 20 October. They handed him over to the police, who also beat him and took him to a nearby station. Inside, more than 10 officers kicked and punched him, and hit him with a police baton. The police later took him to a bigger police station, where he was again beaten twice. Police made him and three other detainees, including a 14-year-old boy, strip naked and squat, Muñoz said.

He was taken to a 3x3 metre cell where there were 14 men. Muñoz’s mother, who saw him briefly at the police station, noticed lacerations, a bloody mouth and ear, and bumps in the head, she said. At around midnight, a guard hosed Muñoz and the others in the cell with cold water through the bars, he said. At around 2 a.m., police placed another 15 men in his cell. It was so crammed they had to lean on one another while standing, Muñoz said. The police released him 18 hours after his arrest, without taking him before a judge.

Josué Maureira, 21, went into a looted supermarket in Santiago on 21 October after curfew, believing he heard a woman asking for help, he said. The police found him and beat him there, in their vehicle, and in the police station, he said. “They forced me to shout out loud ‘I am a fag,’” said Maureira, who had painted nails and wore tight pants.

A group of five police officers raped him with a police baton and then placed him in a cell, Maureira said. In the morning, the police forced him to sign an already typed confession in which he admitted to looting, he said. Maureira said he was never informed of his rights, and that he asked for a lawyer, but was not given one, or allowed to contact one.

At his hearing, the public defender raised the allegation that Maureira had been mistreated and the prosecutor set a later date for an interview with him on that matter. The judge ordered his pretrial detention. Maureira told the doctor at the jail that he had been tortured,
but he only gave him some painkillers, he said. Maureira was released on 25 October after the National Human Rights Institute appealed the detention order. He had a medical exam that day that, according to his lawyer, documented that he had anal and other injuries.

**Juana Molina** (pseudonym), 39, was detained by navy officers on 21 October near a supermarket in Valparaíso, that had recently been looted, together with 11 others who were in the area, according to gathered testimony. The officers pulled Molina’s hair, threw her to the ground, and beat her with their guns on her back. They ordered her to “*walk like a dog*” while pointing their guns at her until she got to a part of the street where water was running – there, the officers told her to crawl “*like a snail*.”

They later took her into the supermarket that had been looted, where the officers forced her onto the floor, which was littered with broken glass, and stepped on her head and feet. The officers were not wearing name tags and had their faces covered, she told lawyers from the legal clinic. She was later taken to a police station, where she was not allowed to speak with her family or a lawyer, and the police forced her to sign a document that she said she could not read carefully stating she had “*no injuries.*” During her detention that night with other women, officers woke them up twice, and refused to let them go to the bathroom. On 22 October, she was charged with theft and released under investigation and on condition that she does not get close to the supermarket.

**Jaime Guevara** (pseudonym), 17, was detained by police on 18 October, near the metro station Elisa Correa in Santiago. He running away after the police attempted to disperse a peaceful demonstration. An officer that did not have a name tag on him handcuffed one of his hands to his motorcycle, resulting in a burn on his hand, and drove away, forcing Guevara to run after the motorcycle. Guevara said he was held with another 17-year-old boy and that during their detention, which lasted all night, officers forced them to strip and squat, and brutally beat and kicked them. The officers also banged the other boy’s head against the wall, Guevara said.

Inconsistent use of cameras in police stations and not saving recordings create obstacles to investigating police station abuses. Only about half of police stations in the country have cameras, said Colonel Karina Soza, the police human rights director. At a station in Santiago supposedly covered by cameras “*everywhere,*” as an officer put it, Human Rights Watch found a large blind spot in the holding cells area. In addition, there is no centralized archive of images recorded by the cameras. At another station in Santiago, the major in charge said that the footage was automatically erased after seven days due to lack of local storage capacity.

As in Molina’s case, several people who said they had suffered abuse in detention stated that the police were not wearing their name tags. Colonel Soza said that some officers wear new vests without fasteners for the names.

The conditions in which injured detainees receive medical exams is another concern. Police said that the law requires them to ask detainees if they have injuries and take those who say yes to nearby medical centres. There, doctors are supposed to make an independent assessment of the injuries in a report that can be used in judicial proceedings. However, police acknowledged that the exams are often performed in cubicles without the necessary privacy.
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In addition, the police admitted that sometimes the same officer who makes the arrest – and could have mistreated the detainee – takes them to the medical centre for the exam.

Muñoz said a police officer was standing outside the examination cubicle, within earshot. Maureira said that a doctor examined him while he was handcuffed, and an officer kept him in a chokehold. And Guevara said a policeman was standing beside him the entire time. At the Posta Central hospital, the largest medical centre near the biggest demonstrations in Santiago, medical personnel said that the police often try to observe the forensic exams and resist when a doctor tells them to move away.

Inadequate Internal Accountability

The police have internal disciplinary proceedings to punish officers who commit abuses with administrative sanctions, including expulsion from the force, but the system lacks independence and transparency.

Allegations of irregularities are investigated by an internal affairs department made up of about 400 staff, the comptroller general in charge of the system said. However, investigators from internal affairs can be transferred to other sections of the police force and end up working alongside the officers they previously investigated, or even work under their command. Once an irregularity has been investigated, the results are sent to “administrative prosecutor’s offices,” which are headed by colonels. These colonels are not necessarily trained as lawyers, the comptroller said. They typically work in that position for three to five years, and are then transferred to other roles within the police force. Colonels make a recommendation for disciplinary action, but the final decision comes from the immediate superior of the officer being investigated.

The Chilean government told HRW that as of 19 November, there were 273 administrative cases open against police officers for incidents related to the protests, and an additional 73 cases under preliminary investigation. HRW could not find publicly available information about these or other internal affairs investigations and their result.

Exhausting Working Conditions for Police and Violence by Rioters

The wave of demonstrations has forced many police to work shifts that are much longer than usual – up to 16 hours a day instead of 8 – and without days off or overtime pay, police commanders said.

The police’s leadership mobilised 20,000 of the 60,000 officers to respond to demonstrations nationwide, General Rozas said. Of those, only 1,400 are members of special unit trained in crowd control. But due to the scale of demonstrations, management mobilised administration personnel, after just one day of training.

On the streets, the police encountered tens of thousands of peaceful demonstrators, but also groups of violent rioters. From 18 October to 22 November, 1,896 officers were injured in the context of the demonstrations, according to police leadership. Official data indicates that 127 suffered serious injuries, including 5 officers who had partial or total eyesight loss. At least 2 were burned by Molotov cocktails, and others had broken bones, Alberto Naranjo, a medical doctor and the chief of emergency care at the police hospital in Santiago said.
Lieutenant Leandro Veloso Soto, 33, said he was in a group of about eight officers using a megaphone to tell 200 demonstrators to clear the streets of Paine on 12 November, when demonstrators started throwing stones at them. Veloso, who was not wearing his visor because not enough were available, heard gunshots and then felt a hit on his right eye. Doctors told him that a projectile had ruptured the veins inside his eye, and he may only recover partial eyesight.

Standards on Use of Force

Chile is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and has both fundamental obligations to respect rights as well as procedural obligations to investigate and punish violations of those rights.

These standards are consistent with the United Nation’s Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (BPUFF), which require law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, to resort to non-violent means and de-escalation as much as possible before resorting to the use of firearms. Whenever the use of firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials should use restraint and act in proportion to the severity of the risk faced. They should prioritise the use of less-lethal equipment to ensure that the legitimate objective be achieved with minimal damage and injury, and the preservation of human life respected. The deliberate use of lethal force is permissible only when it is strictly necessary to protect life.

BPUFF require authorities to promptly report on and investigate all incidents of law enforcement officials killing or injuring people with firearms through an independent administrative or prosecutorial process.

Group Assignment

1. Make of list of human rights violations, stating which Human Rights Standards have been broken and why.

2. Define “Use of Force” and explain the “Use of Force Continuum”.

3. When should Tear Gas be used? What are its limitations? What are the safety issues associated with use?

Introduction

Up until the early 2000's the US military had a very simplistic and limited understanding of countries undergoing intervention and assistance, causing a negative impact on stability (especially counter-insurgency) and capacity building assistance programmes (donor nation view of host nation wants). Cultural Competence provided an effective tool to gain a practical understanding of cultural behaviour for use in intelligence, mission management, the decision-making process, and strategic planning – similar to the needs of any police operation.

Of course, the role of the military and civilian law enforcement are worlds apart. Police do not face an enemy; and any force used is done in proportion to the threat. Also, unlike deployed soldiers, police officers are already on their ‘home turf’ – and have been authorised by the community to police that community.

Part One: Domestic Policing

Community Disconnect

In the past police officers were known members of the community in which they worked – having in-depth local knowledge; nowadays an officer generally doesn’t live in the area in which they police - that ‘connection’ and ‘intimate knowledge’ is lost. Communities requiring ‘special’ police attention are no longer from one social group, instead being a multicultural melting pot or ethnic cluster – typically with low income, high unemployment, social poverty and few prospects. By comparison, most police personnel come from middle-class backgrounds, meaning they do not represent or understand the communities they police.

Class, cultural and geographic differences lead to a disconnect in engagement, communication, understanding and shared objectives. Due to their diverse makeup communities can view police as friend or foe – or both, negatively effecting police partnerships, cooperation and flow of information. To solve these issues, police authorities ‘attempt’ to reflect the makeup, values and wants of society through a number of strategies.

“Police need vs. community want” are the issues facing police officers both in-mission and at home in their domestic duty stations, most often using a form of Community Policing.

Although approach differs across the world, in general terms Community Policing focuses on the police building ties and working closely with communities within their area of responsibility. This cooperative approach creates relationships and promotes trust.

Community Policing focal points being:

- cause and prevention
- reassurance
- hotspot identification
- problem solving
- information and intelligence
- local engagement and partnerships
Cultural Competence

Although an ideal solution, Community Policing face regular operational challenges:

- personnel shortages
- political prioritisation (e.g. terrorism)
- financial limitations
- community agreement (“buy-in”)

Community buy-in is vital, however through our shared sense of values, all parts of society are relatively ‘open’ to the idea of police cooperation.

Police cooperation means developing strong community networks, relationships and resources. Developing these relationships requires both ongoing efforts and constant renewal of relationships through clear communication and trust between local law enforcement and multicultural community members.

But - as was clearly the case in London and Chicago – half-hearted and improvised attempts at community “buy-in” were less than successful.

Cultural Competence as Policy

“by the people, for the people” (Abraham Lincoln)

Cultural Competence is no different than any other required skill, it needs to be integrated as a core part of police philosophy, through policy, management, training, and field operation. This means:

- needs assessment,
- developing community-policing strategies and active partnerships,
- resources, and
- ensuring field officers are prepared and supported.

The objective is to develop officers who can understand and adapt, and who can skilfully use this knowledge in their daily work. Police officers often engage in ‘on-the-spot’ social work and mediation.

As Cultural Competence is essential to grow meaningful stakeholder engagement (community groups, business, local government), knowledge base should include:

- Intercultural communication
- demographics and ethnography
- sociological changes
- culture-based crime (e.g. honour killings)
- public relations
- religion and beliefs
- putting knowledge into practice
- local history
- multiculturalism / community relations
- behavioural influences
- community support institutions
- conflict resolution skills
- role of gender in the community

The aim is to support police officers’ interpersonal skills in:

- engaging, communicating and passing on information;
- developing sensitivity, interpreting emotion, reactions and body language;
- being open (not assuming); and
- mediation and conflict resolution.
Cultural Competence

Part Two: International Policing

International Assistance

Cultural Competence raises understanding of how culture impacts on your work within the Mission area relating to your international colleagues, the organisation itself, and locals.

“...peacebuilding and SSR programmes should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and experiences, rather than forced foreign methods of conflict and crisis management and governance...”.

The purpose of international police cooperation is to support a Host Nation in their transition from crisis/conflict/disaster to peace, stability and normalisation, through the establishment of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and democratic policing programmes. International Police Advisors (IPAs) work closely with their local counterparts, as investigators, monitors, mentors and trainers. Due to this close daily contact natural working relationships develop.

The biggest problem for an IPA is the inability to understand the culture, language, local customs, practices and mentality of the people in the mission area – not just locals but also fellow ‘internationals’. Very often stereotypes exist regarding professionalism, capability, skills and ethics.

A professional attitude and open mind will help overcome this:

- Do not generalise and stereotype;
- Do not “label” others;
- Do not display prejudiced attitudes;
- Do not display a sense of superiority of your own status, social system or way of life;
- Do not speak critically of the politics of others.

Outside of their duty IPAs are often accommodated directly in the communities in which they serve – sometimes as a boarder with a local family, sharing an apartment with a fellow officer, or renting purpose-made housing (depending on operation area, security issues and accommodation availability). Because of this closeness, IPAs learn first-hand about the local people - their culture, their beliefs, their views, and their differences - simply by living among them. And the exchange is two-way, breaking down barriers and creating a foundation for understanding, if not trust. Through the simple act of living, shopping, socialising and working among the local population - these officers become familiar with their target Human Terrain, gaining workable cultural insight. With such knowledge, officers can more easily establish practicable SSR programmes - and gain local ‘buy-in’.
Corruption - Sleeper Threat to International Security
Based on an article by Viola Gienger, U.S. Institute of Peace (3 July 2014)

In non-violent uprisings and full-scale revolutions ranging from the Arab Spring to the overthrow of the President of the Ukraine, one common underlying theme was rebellion against government corruption. Corruption fed the fires of chaos in post-revolutionary Libya and undermined Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. Yet the role of severe corruption in provoking protests and violence is underestimated.

In the Ukraine, frustration with government corruption and profiteering was among the factors that drove citizens into Kyiv's Independence Square in November 2013 and led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych. The events sparked a geo-political crisis when neighbouring Russia intervened militarily.

"Corruption is often seen as system failure, as something broken in a system, or [as] individuals who are doing bad things within a system that's supposed to be operating on behalf of the people". (Sarah Chayes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Operating with this perspective, Western aid donors and investors sometimes view corruption as a necessary inconvenience or even as a means to ensure stability within transitional countries because it divides the plunder among local competing elites.

However, "corruption is the system in certain countries. Governments in countries like this ... are highly effective criminal organisations that are achieving their primary aim, which is the extraction of resources for personal benefit, and governing is either a way to achieve that end, or a [platform for a corrupt] front operation." The system works fine for those with the 'right’ connections.

Channels
Corrupt government officials extract their revenues in a variety of ways, including the purchase of office, kickbacks, extortion, plundering the country's natural resources, and often through misuse of Western donor aid. Western governments end up enabling these trends, knowingly or not, and are hated by the local populations as a result.

The ruling elites also ensure their own impunity by hijacking the justice systems, either through controlling police or courts or through direct intimidation mechanisms.

Corruption in the legal system is particularly destructive. "The institutions that are supposed to safeguard the state and citizens against such harms are contaminated by abuse of power and lack of integrity," Chayes said. "When the justice system is corrupt, you literally don't have a place to take these matters."

Still, the past five years have shown that the elites in these societies may not hold all the control. The victims can take action too, but they might do so through the use of direct violence - by joining insurgencies, by sparking revolutions or taking other measures that can turn into violent conflict.
In the Balkans, Latin America and Africa, some governments have aligned with "criminal superpowers" such as drug or weapons traffickers whose networks cross continents.

In Libya, many clashes since the 2011 overthrow of Gadhafi have been misdiagnosed as continuing skirmishes for political power and territorial control between pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces. "Actually, when you dig a little bit deeper, they have a whole lot more to do with the trafficking networks and consolidation of routes and markets", said USIP.

Undercutting in Both Ways
Nigeria is home to one of the worst insurgencies on the African continent, and the government is effectively fighting three conflicts - against Boko Haram in the north, as well as separate clashes in central and southern parts of the country. And yet corruption not only fuels those conflicts, but also erodes the fighting will and capability of Nigeria's military, the largest on the continent.

Nigeria spends a quarter of its budget on security forces, and yet there is widespread evidence that Nigerian military officers are stealing oil directly or conspiring with oil smugglers. Corruption prevents basic supplies such bullets and transport vehicles from reaching the front lines, as they are sold to the insurgencies. Soldiers go without food and water, as these supplies too can be diverted to enhance the profits of military leaders.

"Nowhere is the link between corruption and insecurity greater than in Nigeria today," said Johnnie Carson, former US Assistant Secretary of State. In Mali, too, the 2012 coup was sparked by outraged military officers over stolen money meant for them to carry out operations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, low morale in the military is due in part to a shortage of weapons and munitions because officers were pocketing the funds.

The resulting deprivation, elevated risk and sense of injustice was given as the reason a group of Nigerian soldiers in May 2014 fired at a vehicle carrying one of their commanders.

Western Attitudes, Options
Carson suggested that one solution might be legislation prohibiting foreign aid for militaries found to engage in severe corruption, similarly to the way the U.S. blocks assistance for foreign militaries found to commit human rights violations.

“Foreign assistance also can be structured to provide incentives for reducing or preventing graft or to ensure that it isn't funneled through corrupted channels”, Chayes said.

Contrary to Western assumptions that Afghans accept corruption as a way of life, she said, they often criticise what they see as a failure by foreign donors to understand that they are sustaining a criminal organisation that exercises illegal power over its citizens.

Afghans often say, "We thought you were going to bring the rule of law to this country, and instead you brought a mafia."

Western donors too often deliver aid via corrupt government agencies in receiving countries, prioritising good relations with the authorities over concerns about corruption.
Afghan forces are struggling to man the front lines against a resurgent Taliban, in part because of untold numbers of "ghost" troops who are paid salaries but only exist on paper.

The nationwide problem has been particularly severe in the southern Helmand province, where the Taliban have seized vast tracts of territory in the 12 months since the U.S. and NATO formally ended their combat mission and switched to training and support.

"At checkpoints where 20 soldiers should be present, there are only eight or 10," said Karim Atal, head of Helmand's provincial council. "It's because some people are getting paid a salary but not doing the job because they are related to someone important, like a local warlord."

In some cases, the "ghost" designation is more exact - dead soldiers and police remain on the books, with senior officials pocketing their salaries without replacing them, Atal said.

He estimates that some 40% of registered forces don't exist, and says the lack of manpower has helped the Taliban seize 65% of the province - Afghanistan's largest - and threaten the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Those men who do serve face even greater danger because of the “no-shows”. In the last three months alone, some 700 police officers have been killed and 500 wounded, he said.

The province's former deputy police chief, Pacha Gul Bakhtiar, said Helmand has 31,000 police officers on the registers, "but in reality it is nowhere near that."

Nearly 15 years after the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban, and despite billions of dollars in military and other aid, corruption remains rife in Afghanistan and local security forces have struggled to hold off insurgent advances across the country. In 2015 the Taliban seized the northern city of Kunduz for three days, marking their biggest incursion into a major urban area since 2001.

The Defence Ministry declined to comment on ghost security forces. Interior Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi acknowledged the problem and said an investigation has been launched.

He said investigators had checked police numbers and status in 200 districts, 30 of which could only be reached last week with the help of U.S. forces due to security problems. He said 86 percent of Afghanistan's 157,000 police were digitally registered.

"If you have a roster of 100 people, not all of them will be there 100% of the time - there is leave, training, and we take casualties. And it takes time to replace them," Sediqqi said.
Afghan Forces Thinned by 'Ghost' Soldiers

Iraq also struggled with the ghost soldier phenomenon, a factor in the Islamic State's rapid conquest of much of the country's north and west in the summer of 2014. In December of that year, Iraqi officials said the payment of tens of millions of dollars in salaries to non-existent forces had been halted.

But Afghan lawmaker Ghulam Hussain Nasiri, who has been researching the problem for more than a year, said his government is ignoring the issue. "When we say we have 100 soldiers on the battlefield, in reality it is just 30 or 40. And this creates the potential for huge catastrophes when the enemy attacks," he said. "It is an indication of massive corruption - the reason Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt nations in the world," he added. Afghanistan consistently ranks among the most corrupt countries in indices released by global watchdog Transparency International.

Nasiri said the government "doesn't seem to want to know about it," and that he received death threats after revealing the names of parliamentarians who are allegedly in on the scam. He said he handed a list of 31 names of corrupt parliamentarians to the Interior Ministry but has so far received no response.

Cash-strapped Afghanistan's security forces are entirely funded by the international community, at a cost of some $5bn (USD) per year, most of which comes from the United States. The U.S. government's auditor told a congressional hearing in 2015 that Afghan government figures on security personnel and pay "could not be regarded as accurate".

"No one knows the exact numbers of the Afghan National Defence Forces," an Afghan official said on condition of anonymity. He said the best internal estimates put the number at around 120,000, less than a third of what's needed to secure the country.

The heaviest cost of the ghost soldier phenomenon is being played out on the battlefield. Neither the government nor NATO publicises casualty figures for local security forces, but NATO calculates casualties are up 28 percent from 2014, when some 5,000 members of the Afghan forces were killed.

In December 2015, an army base in Helmand’s Sangin district was besieged by insurgents for almost a week before reinforcements were brought in, supported by U.S. airstrikes and British military advisers.

In the northern Helmand district of Kajaki, soldier Mohammad Islam said many of his comrades deserted their posts because they didn't believe their bodies would be sent back to their families if they died. In the absence of a body, the family would not be eligible for compensation payments.

"Everyone knows that we are facing this fight alongside 'ghost soldiers', and that's the reason we don't have enough men," he said. "The Taliban know it, too. When they attack us, and we're unable to protect ourselves, the big men then ask why."

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Afghanistan’s Ghost Forces

Helmand Province: walking a Diplomatic Tightrope

Scenario

This scenario is based on real events - and is sometimes the function and dilemma facing an International Police Advisor.

You have been deployed to Helmand Province in the dual role of International Police Monitor and Mentor. As part of your duties you have been requested to conduct an audit on local police capacity (ability, strength, facilities, equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, morale) in two towns, five isolated village posts, and several highway checkpoints.

The audit proves to be time consuming and difficult, made worse by disturbing results. Upon completion you note a large inconsistency between listed officer numbers, their abilities (untrained), equipment, munitions, vehicles and supplies in all posts. You believe the discrepancies are at a level that compromise personnel safety and local security.

The local Police Chief, Aziz Andish, who is directly responsible for district security, tolerates your presence, but is generally unfriendly and uncooperative. However, under his leadership the sector has been comparatively well protected and orderly. During the war he was a local Mujahedeen Commander - who remains feared by the Taliban and commands the loyalty of local fighters and militia. Kabul therefore regards him as a powerful and useful asset.

As his monitor, you have a responsibility to inform, question and advise him about the discrepancies. From your perspective, this is less about corruption and more about meeting the needs of local protection, safety and security... something that needs to be diplomatically addressed.

Although living a comfortable lifestyle, Chief Andish doesn’t display the material wealth normally associated with those of similar status and position, but his tribe doesn’t seem to be suffering the same levels of deprivation as those in surrounding areas.

Task

1. **Presentation**: summarise the two Security Sector corruption articles, presenting the issues and negative effects.

2. **Roleplay**: Using a Language Assistant (L.A.), confront Chief Andish with your findings.

   Considerations:
   A. How would you approach the issue?
   B. How important is cultural awareness and competence? What cultural cues do you need to be aware of?
   C. If you find he is responsible for the discrepancies, what would be your next step(s)?
   D. What are your considerations? What would be his motive?
Security Sector Reform

-A Path to Normalisation

**Security Sector:** the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the delivery, management and oversight of security in a country.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR):** the process of rebuilding and reforming a state's security sector through monitoring, evaluation, review and improvements.

SSR includes **Rule of Law, Human Rights, Democratic Policing** and **Integrity** practices – positively influencing **Human Security** and Development.

**SSR Concept**

The aim of Security Sector Reform is to increase a country’s ability to face security and justice challenges, “in a way that meets international democratic standards, accepted principles of good governance, and the rule of law”.

Improvements made through SSR help create a secure environment that encourages other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of **corruption**, crime and armed violence.

The focus for international donors is to support partner **host countries** in achieving four primary objectives in the security sector:

1. Establishment of effective **governance, oversight** and **accountability**;
2. Improved security and justice services;
3. Development of local leadership and their ownership of the reform process; and
4. **Sustainability** of justice and security service delivery.

Basic working principles to support the SSR process:

- People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic standards, human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear and reduction in armed violence and crime.
- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, through integrated development and security policies, and through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
- Based on a broad assessment of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state.
Security Sector Reform

Section 1
Vocabulary Building 1: Match the definition to the correct word

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>honesty, truthfulness, honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>is all processes of governing (rules, standards and actions, structures, regulations, and accountability)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
<td>is dishonest behaviour by an official that violates their duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>governance</td>
<td>means the ability to run something and maintain it over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>integrity</td>
<td>is the principle that no one is above the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>oversight</td>
<td>means to improve, modify, restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>reform</td>
<td>More than traditional physical security, all aspects that contribute to security and well-being e.g. food, water, employment, health education etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>sustainable</td>
<td>are the moral principles which describe certain standards of human behaviour, protected as legal rights in international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>is the action of overseeing something; monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>“policing by consent”, enforcing only laws which have been adopted democratically</td>
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</table>

Democratic Policing

Democratic Policing is an increasingly important activity in the peacebuilding and development process as it supports demilitarisation, democratisation, boosts economic growth, reduces poverty, and improves respect for human rights.

However, the process is often not easy. Case studies from Latin America highlight the difficulty of achieving reform where violent crime is on the rise: government support may be inadequate, and citizens may be suspicious of law enforcement officers due to their role in past conflicts.

*Accountable policing* is more effective than *repressive policing*. However, where crime is rising, police effectiveness is often seen as requiring a forceful approach, which more than often bypasses the safeguards of human rights.
Security Sector Reform

Key Points to Police Reform

• Reforms are often implemented under difficult conditions, where societies are suffering from rising levels of violent crime, corruption, mistrust - and where external influence is limited.

• The way in which reforms emerge – through government or police initiatives, or political agreements initiated by civil society – shapes the process.

• Confusion and waste occurs where international donors: 1.) do not adapt reform programmes to local conditions, or 2.) fail to co-ordinate their efforts.

• Police Reform is rarely successful unless accompanied by Judicial Reform.

• To be effective, reforms must be understood and supported by society, but traumatised and split communities are not always willing or able to get involved.

• Overly-ambitious reform programmes sometimes overlook short-term needs, so when immediate objectives are not met, the result is a sense of failure. International donors must be sensitive to local realities, and should be prepared to sacrifice speed and efficiency to adapt to these.

Solution? Efforts should be made to promote inclusive dialogue and engagement. Actors should recognise that their programmes may face shifting public and political concerns, especially where there is rising crime or the origins of conflict have not been solved. In addition, institutional limitations may result in a gap between policy and what is realistically achievable.

To increase the chance of police reforms succeeding:

• Basic standards could be established for police training, but donors should not try to impose standard models;

• Co-operation should be increased between professional police experts, development professionals and country experts;

• Donor efforts should be better co-ordinated, and progress measured against clear benchmarks covering both achievable output and outcomes;

• To prevent disillusion, reforms must deliver short-term service improvements, even where they are intended as long-term programmes; and

• Local ownership of reform needs to be enhanced, both among local government institutions and civil society.

A typical Police-focused SSR Mission, will include:

• observing, monitoring and reporting

• executive policing (incl. war crime investigations, formed police units, patrols etc.)

• Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR)

• strengthening policy and procedural reform

• mentorship of senior police management

• skills transfer and training of frontline personnel (patrol service, formed police units, investigations, organised crime, community policing etc.), and

• public information and community outreach
Some nations prefer a “train and equip” approach to SSR, however developing a state’s security sector is more complex, involving the engagement of civil society, growing leaders, developing institutions and professionalism. SSR programmes need to balance local politics, policy, legitimacy, accountability, and interrelationships - between the government and its people. SSR needs to consider and balance ‘local want’ and local solutions already functioning well.

As an example, in Timor-Leste the United Nations Mission (UNMIT) initially criticised customary law due to its community-level administration and regional irregularity (ref. criminal definitions and penalties), instead solely favouring standardisation and use of formalised legal instruments. Beyond the impracticalities of following UN guidelines, this went against community practice, wishes, traditions and sense of legitimacy - creating tension in UN-community cooperation. The UN failed to understand that Timorese customary law prioritises community rights and harmony over those of the individual. Therefore, any offence against an individual is a wrongdoing against the entire community. Although not formally included in the Constitution, customary law has since been granted backing and informal recognition as a broker for conflict management and local enforcement.

In Somalia’s north, customary tribal councils are recognised by the regional authorities in Puntland and Somaliland to judge cases and settle inter-tribal disputes. Western judiciary focuses on offender punishment and/or rehabilitation, but most often little thought is given to the victim; under Somali customary law (Xeer) - a ‘blood price’ is taken in the case of libel, theft, physical harm, rape and death, as compensation to the injured party.

For example, if a married male was murdered, the entire family (or whole tribe) of the offender would be liable to pay the blood price - to ensure that the victim’s wife can provide for her family in the long-term (two cows, a goat etc.). International development agencies working in both provinces quickly realised that in a country torn apart by over thirty years of civil war, this system of providing justice works, significantly easing local tensions and conflict - and should not be interfered with. That simple act of understanding gained international agencies acceptance, credibility and opened doors.

“An interventionist force [...] which does not quickly gain acceptance and confidence of the people is likely to face impossible obstacles on its pathway to full reformation as valuable resources which could otherwise be directed towards state building will be required to suppress uprising and call into question the very legitimacy of the intervention itself”.

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## Vocabulary Building 2

Match the definition to the correct word

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Accountable Policing</th>
<th>B. Repressive Policing</th>
<th>C. Civil Society</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>local ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>legal instruments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td>liable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>broker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>K.</td>
<td>intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Customary Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.</td>
<td>donor</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>legally responsible, answerable, accountable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>any law(s) passed by a recognized legislative body in national or international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“what has always been done and accepted as law”; standards of a community that have been long-established as law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Initiatives driven by the local community, for the local community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>intercession, interference, to become involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>holding police officers and policing agencies responsible for effectively delivering basic services of crime control and public order, while treating individuals fairly within the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>negotiate, deal, advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>supporter, patron, contributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>policing actions which by-pass laws and restrict civil freedoms to ensure public order and State security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>legality, acceptability, real</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>social re-education and reintegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations, community groups, the “third sector” (not government nor business)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security Sector Reform

Liberal Democratic Programming

SSR is most often started utilising the Liberal Democratic programme of rule of law, human rights, transparency, accountability and other Western-orientated governance mechanisms – some of which may seem forced. The use of such mechanisms is an ‘exercise in compromise’ due to compatibility issues with established local governance structures, customs, laws, or religion. However, the result of regime change, through popular overthrow or international intervention\(^1\), calls for a political process of inclusion, equal representation and justice. No other modern political system offers this except democracy. Although the Arab Monarchies\(^2\) survived the Arab Spring, the winds of change that swept through neighbouring countries also forced them to modify domestic policy, granting more rights and freedoms to their citizens. Fittingly, in the words of Winston Churchill,

> “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time....”.

Security Sector Reform is both deeply cultural and political – requiring the active “buy-in” of the Host Nation - as it re-wires existing authority structures and practices, requiring four cultural knowledge areas:

- Organisational Culture
- National Identity
- Police Culture
- Community

Vocabulary Building 3

Find the correct word or words (highlighted above) and match them to the definition below

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<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>values and behaviours that are unique to a professional group e.g. police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>B.</td>
<td>negotiation given-and-take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>C.</td>
<td>meaning that all groups are fairly represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>D.</td>
<td>are not well-matched, cannot work or fit together well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>E.</td>
<td>revolution, coup, takeover by the masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>F.</td>
<td>the ability to see everything, no activity is hidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>G.</td>
<td>the process of involving and improving the ability and opportunity of minorities to take part in society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya
\(^2\) Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

SAINT | Security Sector Development

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Section Two:
Discussion Questions

1. How does corruption undermine the aims of “Security Sector Reform”?

2. Rule of Law and Human Rights mechanisms are “Western” – and therefore not relevant in many countries. Agree or Disagree? Why?

3. Do similar instruments exist in Buddhist, Hindi and Muslim countries?

4. What role does Human Rights play in law enforcement?

5. Why is gender such an important theme in SSR programmes?

6. What role does culture have in mentoring, advising, and training police officers from the host nation?

Project
Your group has been sent as Police Advisors to help re-establish, train and empower a National Police Service in Myanmar.

As a result of a short but brutal civil war there are no recognised or functional national security forces.

Apart from assisting with the normalisation process through the establishment of a state security sector, ultimately your Mission’s aim is to limit - if not end - the refugee crisis and the trafficking of persons.

Based on your knowledge discuss:
A. What steps you will need to take
B. Focus areas
C. Partners
D. What challenges and obstacles you believe you’ll face
E. How will you solve them
The Vigilantes of Mexico

- Advisory and Mediation Exercise

“Justice at the Barrel of a Gun”

A rapid expansion in 2013 of vigilante militias – unauthorised civilian armed groups that claim to fight crime – has created a third force in Mexico’s ongoing cartel-related violence. Some of these militias contain well-meaning citizens and have detained hundreds of suspected criminals. However, they challenge the government’s necessary monopoly on the use of force to impart justice. As the militias spread, there is also concern some are being used by criminal groups to fight their rivals and control territory. The Federal Administration needs to develop a coherent policy for dealing with the vigilantes, so that it can work with authentic community policing projects while stopping the continued expansion of unregulated armed groups; this also requires demonstrating that the state has sufficient capacity to restore law and order on its own. If the government fails to deal with this issue, militias could spread across the country, triggering more violence and further damaging the rule of law.

The government faces well-armed, ruthless cartels that dominate portions of the country, as well as the problems presented by uncoordinated national, state and municipal law enforcement bodies and a legacy of impunity. The appearance of a growing number of armed groups in at least nine of the 31 states, from close to the U.S. border to the south east, however, has added another dangerous level of complexity to the security challenge. Their epicentre is in the Pacific states of Guerrero and Michoacán, where thousands of armed men participate in a range of vigilante organisations. There have been hundreds of killings, either by or against the vigilantes, and they have become increasingly worrying hotspots of insecurity. While the vigilante killings are still only a fraction of the more than 10,000 cartel-related murders that have taken place across Mexico, the concern is that this new type of violence could expand across the land.

The vigilantism issue is complicated by the fact that many communities, particularly indigenous, have a centuries-old tradition of community policing. Many groups have shown themselves to be successful and have demonstrated legitimate ways of providing security. However, it is legally ambiguous how far such community groups can go in bearing arms and imparting justice. Furthermore, many of the new militias copy the language and claim the same rights as these community police, even though they do not come from a local tradition or are not even rooted in indigenous communities.
The government needs to work with the authentic and unarmed community police and clearly define the boundaries of what they can and cannot do. Some rules can be guidelines that are being developed under state and federal laws or by expanding agreements being worked out between state governments and community leaders. In some cases, the government needs to require the disarmament of vigilante groups; in yet others, it needs to more aggressively detain and prosecute militias with criminal links. But the government also needs to significantly improve security in all the communities where militias have been formed. Many residents have taken up arms because the state has systematically failed to protect them. The outcry for security is legitimate; but justice is better served through functional state institutions than the barrels of private guns.

“Mexico's Wild West: vigilante groups defy president to fight cartels”

Lizbeth Diaz, Reuters, 13 September 2019

Surrounded by armed men, Commander “Toro” said Mexicans taking the law into their own hands in the western state of Michoacan will not listen to government calls to lay down arms because it would leave them at the mercy of violent gangs.

Toro - real name German Ramirez - was once a school teacher in Santa Maria Ostula, an impoverished, largely indigenous village in the municipality of Aquila in western Michoacan.

But he says that after suspected cartel hitmen kidnapped and shot dead his father six years ago, he found a new vocation training neighbours to resist brutal gangs fighting for control of the market for synthetic drugs and other narcotics.

“Every time they kill someone there are more angry families,” said Ramirez, 31. “That’s how people take up arms and our strength increases. This is what’s happening.”

The re-emergence of dozens of so-called self-defence groups that rose to prominence under the previous administration has exposed shortcomings in President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s strategy to bring down record levels of violence.

Some 17,614 homicides were registered between January and July this year, putting the death toll on track to surpass last year’s record. Of those, 809 were in Michoacan, 13% more than in the same period the previous year, official data show.

Ramirez says he has more than 200 armed civilians under him patrolling highways and roads in the area, throwing out - but not killing, he says - unwanted intruders from marauding gangs. He says local police rarely enter parts of rural Michoacan, let the self-defence groups operate and at times even provide weapons.

The ministry for public security did not reply to requests for comment.

Lopez Obrador took office in December vowing to pursue an amnesty with criminal gangs, saying it was time to take a less confrontational approach to curbing the violence. However, he never clearly spelled out how the scheme would work.
Since then, his government has sent mixed messages about how it will deal with the vigilante groups, which are not always clearly distinguishable from criminal organizations.

“The government is only worried about disarming us,” said Hector Zepeda, alias “Commander Tetos”, another self-defence group leader from Coahuayana, about 50 kilometres (30 miles) from Aquila.

In August, Obrador said the vigilante groups were outside the law and should disarm. However, other officials have suggested that the government is negotiating with them. Interior Minister Olga Sanchez told reporters last month the government was talking to “various groups” before stepping back from her comments.

The president says his newly-created National Guard (gendarmerie), will restore order.

Battle for Control

Security experts interviewed by Reuters say vigilante forces have helped contain violence in crime-stricken areas like Michoacan. But some of them have also struck alliances with criminal gangs in exchange for weapons and protection, they add.

“I don’t think the current government is proposing to change the situation,” said Erubiel Tirado, a security expert at the Iberoamerican University in Mexico City.

Ramirez, “El Toro”, acknowledges that some self-defence members deviated from their original path. Some, he said, had joined criminal gangs the vigilantes are fighting.

The groups began emerging after former President Felipe Calderon launched a military-led crackdown on cartels in Michoacan, his home state, shortly after taking office in December 2006.

Gangs fragmented, and the violence kept rising.

But it was not until Calderon’s successor Enrique Pena Nieto took power in 2012 that self-defence groups began fighting major battles with the cartels, making national headlines.

By early 2014, the government had reached an uneasy accommodation in Michoacan with vigilante groups whose aggressive campaigns beat down the Knights Templar, a cartel that was then the most prominent threat to the government’s authority.

In conjunction with the Sinaloa Cartel of captured kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Knights Templar once dominated the main trafficking routes on the Pacific coast.

The Templars’ displacement opened the door to incursions by rival outfit the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) from the neighbouring state of Jalisco, deemed one of the most dangerous transnational groups in the world by the U.S. government.

Offensives by the CJNG to secure smuggling routes for drugs like fentanyl and illegally-mined minerals have spilled into the sparsely-populated coast of Michoacan, which is sandwiched by two major ports - Lazaro Cardenas in the south of the state, and Manzanillo, a few kilometres north into neighbouring Colima state.

“Everything enters through Manzanillo, it’s no secret, even things that shouldn’t,” said Griselda Martinez, the mayor of Manzanillo, who survived a murder attempt last month.
The Vigilantes of Mexico

Attempts to extort businesses in the iron-ore rich area that supplies steelmakers such as Ternium have added to headaches for villages caught in the middle.

“Now we don’t just have to deal with the criminal gangs trying to control ports like Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas,” Ramirez said, “now they’re coming after us.”

In September, social media erupted with images of vigilante groups fighting against suspected CJNG forces trying to enter nearby Tepalcatepec, Michoacan. Photos and video footage showed the bloody corpses of cartel foot-soldiers slumped in trucks and the sound of gunfire ringing out in remote villages.

“If we turn in our weapons, they will kill us,” Ramirez said from his perch on a grassy hill in his village, guarded by dozens of men while women cooked and children played nearby.

The vigilantes say the president’s pledges are falling flat.

Zepeda, “Commander Teto,” who lost a brother to cartel violence six years ago, said he had no hope the government will bring peace to Mexico. Even residents of Colima state have turned to him for help as they lose family members in the bloodshed, he said.

“They know that the government doesn’t care about us,” Zepeda said. “So they want to know how to take up arms.”

Original article, with photos:
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mexico-violence-vigilantes/mexicos-wild-west-vigilante-groups-defy-president-to-fight-cartels-idUKKCN1VY1GP

Photo Essay:

Project

A senior officer from the Mexican Federal Police is visiting your Police seeking advice, strategic ideas and concepts on how to resolve the vigilante issue. He is especially interested to hear suggestions from officers working on the streets, as this is the level where such ideas are implemented and practiced; ultimately the work is the same.

• What would you advise?
• What works in your State? Would it work in Mexico?

Resulting from the visit, your country has been invited to establish a bilateral advisory SSR Mission. Based on the article, what areas would you concentrate on, and what stakeholders would you involve?
As Kenya waits to hear if a police officer will be charged over the death of 23-year-old Carliton Maina, alleged unlawful killings in Kenya continue, leaving poor communities wondering if those charged with protecting them are simply killing with impunity.

At a meeting between police and community members in Kibera, Africa’s largest slum in Nairobi, Kenya, where crime is acutely high and mainly unreported, the two sides try to find common ground.

There are courteous introductions and then an appeal for openness – and information – to help the police tackle Kibera’s crime problems.

It’s a frank exchange of words, with the audience seeking confirmation of their rights when they come into contact with police. They remind the officers of the overriding principle of Kenyan law: “an individual is innocent until proven guilty”, not the reverse.

A young man asks why officers take bribes and extort money from the community. “That is corruption,” responds Inspector Nick Sulwe of Kibera’s administration police, firmly. “To eliminate it you must comply with the law.”

**Backgrounder**

More than 60% of all African city dwellers live in slums. As the climate crisis continues to drive people away from rural areas and into cities, urbanisation has become a growing issue across the globe.

Many people living in Kibera work hard, long days. They pay high rents for flimsy shacks on land owned by the government and effectively squatted on by landlords. They have no services and the only taxation comes in the form of protection money demanded by police and gangs. Each day is a struggle to scrape together enough money and food to reach the next.

Electricity, clean water, toilets, healthcare and schools are either non-existent or not available to all residents. At any one time, 50% of Kibera’s 15- to 25-year-old women are pregnant. Abortion is illegal and contraception scarce. Rape and child sex abuse is endemic. Abuse of drink and drugs is rife. Food is cheap but unhealthy – fizzy drinks are easier to get than clean water.

“If you’re arrested, you will more than likely pay not to be arrested.”

Another person wants to know why officers hire out their guns to gangs, perpetuating crime against their community. “That’s misconduct, such people are not fit to be policemen,” Sulwe says. “The government is doing its best to eliminate the problem.”

The people here want more. They want answers about the number of police killings, or “extrajudicial executions” as they are known locally. Sulwe provides an explanation that goes to the heart of such shootings: disillusionment. “If you tell me someone is a thief, they rob and rape women, and you ask me to arrest him – but with no evidence – the judge will ask for evidence. If there is no evidence, he is released and comes back to commit more crime.”
Maina was a football-loving student who had studied at Leeds University. In December 2018 he was heading home in the early hours, having watched a football match with friends in Kibera. An encounter with police resulted in a chase. Maina suffered four gunshot wounds to the chest and one to the head. Authorities say he was “part of a gang terrorising local residents” something strongly denied by those who knew him.

“When police officers raid a place … trust me, they are not wrong,” responds Sulwe. “There’s something there, there are criminals there. And normally when we come, they open fire. Are we supposed to run away? No, we don’t run away. We fire back. Trust me, if we don’t kill these people, they will kill you.”

He is then challenged over the lack of protection for witnesses and those who provide information. Why are such people at risk, not only from suspects, but from corrupt officers working hand-in-hand with criminal gangs? The perception of the audience is clear. Despite a number of high-profile convictions, they believe police fail to protect them and commit crimes against them with impunity.

Kenya’s government claims to be making an effort to weed out rogue officers and bring them to justice. Figures relating to the number of killings in 2018 vary significantly. One organisation puts the figure at 121, another at 267 – which would mark a significant increase on the previous year, when there were an estimated 152.

Data collectors monitor police statistics, news and social media reports, but struggle to obtain accurate information about incidents in Kenya’s 10 slums. Many killings go unreported or the deceased are buried by relatives who say nothing for fear of reprisal.

**Kibera by Numbers**

- Estimates of how many people live in Kibera range from 250,000 to 1 million.
- Life expectancy is 30 years.
- The biggest killers come from diet and dirt. Diabetes is rife from cheap, high-sugar food.
- One in four children attends school.
- One toilet block serves approx. 50 shacks, with each shack housing roughly eight people.
If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You
- Policing Africa’s Largest Slum

Kibera’s residents are not alone. In Pangani in north-east Nairobi, host to a largely Somali community, residents voice similar concerns. There, specialist police units like “Pangani-6”, led by Corporal Ahmed Rachid, have reportedly been involved in alleged unlawful killings.

Rachid openly admits that his mandate is to rid the streets of gangsters and criminals. “Those we profile, we have to get them alive or dead,” he told a television crew after he was captured on film shooting an apparently handcuffed, unarmed suspect. That was in 2017; it appears that in 2019 little has changed.

Maina’s case and a host of others raise fundamental questions about the conduct of Kenya’s police service. Has the government given certain officers an undisclosed mandate to kill suspects rather than bringing them before the courts? Is the government simply struggling to maintain police discipline? Or is the state simply turning a blind eye to the actions of certain officers in order to focus instead on gang crime and public disorder?

It has been alleged that some armed officers have openly engaged in robberies, there have been interventions in order to free corrupt officers from detention, and, in one case, a previously maimed suspect was kidnapped from hospital, and their body discovered days later with gunshot wounds.

The Kenyan government has to come up with a solution that fits the depth and gravity of the problem. Human rights watchers are still awaiting Kenya’s director of public prosecutions Noordin Haji to make a decision over whether or not the officer implicated in the shooting of Maina will be charged.

“The problem is complex,” says Irũngũ Houghton, Head of Amnesty International in Kenya. “Most officers work within the law. However, it appears that a few have given up on the judicial system, arguing that arresting suspects for serious crime is futile as many are found not guilty and the prisons are full. They take matters into their own hands. Others are simply corrupt, committing crime themselves. These factors fuel extrajudicial killings.”

Kenya’s 60,000-strong police service is plagued with allegations of unlawful killings, corruption and other misconduct. As of March 2018, the country’s Independent Policing Oversight Authority were monitoring 9,878 outstanding complaints against police, of which 5,085 were earmarked for detailed investigation.

There are approximately 2.5 million slum dwellers in Nairobi, representing two thirds of the capital’s population. The largest is Kibera. Poverty and wrongdoing are apparent on a grand scale. Daylight protects communities from gang activity but allegedly allows some officers to extort money from shopkeepers already struggling to make a living. By night, residents face the savagery of gangs who rob, rape and extort, undeterred by police who tread carefully to avoid confrontation, remaining on the slum’s outskirts and entering only when absolutely necessary – and then only in sufficient numbers to stave off an ambush from gangs and resentful locals.

To add to Kibera’s violence, every four years political violence pollutes the slum as electioneering politicians bid for popularity. Residents allege the use of criminal gangs to sway voters, creating mayhem and turning Kibera into a tinderbox that sparks conflict in regions of Kenya.
“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”
- Policing Africa’s Largest Slum

Elections often result in confrontations between residents and police.
Photograph: Marco Longari/AFP

It takes little to trigger angry confrontations between stone-throwing mobs and police, who retaliate with tear gas and automatic gunfire.

“When election time, politicians comes into slums like Kibera, they put Kikuyu against Luyha, Nubians versus Luo, encouraging violence,” says Kennedy Odede, founder of Kibera-based charity Shofco. “Politically people are used to kill each other. They come here and leave you killing your brother with pangas (machetes) whilst they go and drink champagne in the Serena Hotel. When Kibera cries, the whole of Kenya cries. People are used to kill each other.”

In 2007, post-election violence claimed more than 1,000 lives across Kenya. In August 2017, 24 people died following the presidential vote, including a six-month old baby who died after reportedly being struck numerous times by a baton when officers entered a home “looking for protesters”, discharging tear gas and beating the occupants. Earlier this year, an inquest ruled that 36 officers should be held liable for the death.

In 2017, Kenya’s police force recorded just 77,992 crimes. In 2018, there were 88,268 recorded crimes, a 13% increase across a population of 52 million.

In Kibera, few crimes are reported or registered. Instead, police admitted, officers maintain a “black book” of offenders. We were told that once your name finds its way into this book it is difficult to have it removed.

Photograph: The Guardian

“If we find that someone is committing burglary we go and see their parents and give them a warning. If the person does not respond, then when we catch up with them we act,” said Sulwe, who would not be drawn into explaining what “act” meant.

“If your name is in the book it is likely that you will be killed by the police unless you can pay to have it removed,” said one person who did not want to be named. “If not, they hunt you, kill you, and plant a fake gun on your body to say you were carrying a weapon. Then they say that you were terrorising the community, or were about to commit crime.”

Arrangements were made to interview the superintendent in charge of policing Kibera. He agreed, and then later declined unless we offered payment.

The exact number of killings and enforced disappearances across Kenya is not known. Independent monitors suggest that between 2013 and 2017, at least 765 people have been unlawfully killed by police. It is alleged that 572 people have been “summarily executed” in circumstances similar to those surrounding the death of Maina.
“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”
- Policing Africa’s Largest Slum

According to Democracy in Africa, victims were mainly men aged 18–24, killed “on their way to commit a crime”. Most cases were reported by the victim’s mother or wife, rather than by police.

Sulwe and his officers make an effort to interact with Kibera’s residents. The ex-teacher attends community meetings and is optimistic that police and residents can work together to resolve local disputes and reduce crime.

He hopes that meaningful dialogue will reduce deaths on both sides. He says officers have been killed for no apparent reason other than doing their job. But he is realistic. The community needs to trust their police service and officers of all ranks must abide by the law.

“All Kenyans, not just the rich, have the right to be safe from unlawful killings, torture and ill-treatment,” says Houghton. “The vicious cycle of violent crime and brutal policing can and must be broken. It requires deeper community policing strategies with youth organisations. We will continue to hold commanding officers responsible for those who report to them, as well as [demanding] closer oversight by parliamentary bodies and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.”

In a written response, a spokesperson for Kenya’s police force said there are no policies, orders or directives to support unlawful killings.

Parliament has oversight of the police through parliamentary committees. Kenya’s constitution enshrines human rights, and an independent police oversight authority has been established. Kenya plays a leading role in international initiatives to uphold the rule of law across Africa.

“In cases where the cause of death is not outrightly clear, an inquest is held by a magistrate to establish the cause of death. Any person found culpable is charged in accordance to the law,” the spokesperson stated.

We strive for the highest standards of professionalism and discipline amongst officers, who are expected to operate in accordance to the rule of law. Officers found flouting the law are prosecuted like any other citizens without any special considerations.

Unfounded statements against the police not only dents a good image but has the potential to discourage would-be investors and visitors to our country.”

Rod Austin (The Guardian, 6 August 2019)
"If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You"
- Policing Africa’s Largest Slum

**Exercises**

**Vocabulary Building 1**

Match the word(s) with definition (write letter into corresponding box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. <strong>frank</strong></th>
<th>A. to identify and set aside for a specific purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>overriding</strong></td>
<td>B. deserving blame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>extort</strong></td>
<td>C. a lower-level judicial officer (judge) for minor cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>flimsy</strong></td>
<td>D. to illegally occupy/reside in a property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>shack</strong></td>
<td>E. to execute immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>squatting</strong></td>
<td>F. having precedence over everything else</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <strong>protection money</strong></td>
<td>G. no longer believing in something, especially having learned of the problems with it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. <strong>perpetuate</strong></td>
<td>H. potential source of widespread violence; explosive situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. <strong>extrajudicial</strong></td>
<td>I. to cause something to continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. <strong>disillusion</strong></td>
<td>J. money taken by criminals in exchange for not hurt victims or or damage their property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. <strong>impunity</strong></td>
<td>K. legal inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. <strong>rogue</strong></td>
<td>L. dishonest, mischievous, operating outside of the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. <strong>maim</strong></td>
<td>M. a rough cabin or hut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>futile</strong></td>
<td>N. without material strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <strong>plagued</strong></td>
<td>O. done without permission / outside of the legal system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. <strong>implicate</strong></td>
<td>P. direct, straightforward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. <strong>earmark</strong></td>
<td>Q. to show that someone is involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. <strong>tinderbox</strong></td>
<td>R. to annoy, to trouble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. <strong>summarily</strong> (execute)</td>
<td>S. incapable of producing a result, ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. <strong>inquest</strong></td>
<td>T. to cripple, to disfigure, to deprive the use of a limb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. <strong>magistrate</strong></td>
<td>U. to act without fear or limitation of punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. <strong>culpable</strong></td>
<td>V. to take money from someone through intimidation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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“If We Don’t Kill These People, They Will Kill You”
- Policing Africa’s Largest Slum

Vocabulary Building 2

Gap fill: place the correct word in the matching sentence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. undeterred</th>
<th>b. flout</th>
<th>c. inquest</th>
<th>d. endemic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e. undisclosed</td>
<td>f. mayhem</td>
<td>g. resolve</td>
<td>h. perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Even though negotiations had failed before, the mediator was _____________.
2. Transparency International’s findings are unlikely to surprise anyone who has ever worked
   in Nigeria: corruption at all levels is considered ________________.
3. Rwanda and Ethiopia, with dark pasts of civil war, genocide and ________________, are now
   among the fastest-growing economies in the world.
4. The story indicates that Israel is continuing to ________________ international law,
   preventing Palestinians access to their properties.
5. The attack was conducted as a ________________ for U.S. military participation in
   Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
6. Assange was in the Ecuadorean embassy in London, Snowden an ____________ location in
   Russia.
7. That ________________ is false and often reflects not just ignorance but also
   elitism and racism.
8. Concerning Kashmir, Modi has ordered his army commanders to strike back hard at dissident
   forces to demonstrate Indian ________________.

Group Assignment

The United Nations Regional Headquarters in Nairobi has called on your SSR Task Force to conduct
a Needs Assessments on how to address issues highlighted in the article.

1. identify issues important to both the police and the community
2. make recommendations on how to satisfy the community, whilst fulfilling police duties
3. slum security in the evenings is a major issue, suggest how can police restore order
4. make suggestions on how to deal with police corruption and vigilante police officers
5. make suggestions on how to rebuild trust between police and the community
“Before I was kidnapped I had friends”
- Girl Soldiers of South Sudan

A reintegration programme has helped 360 girls leave armed groups in Yambio county, but for many the trauma of sexual violence persists.

Samuel Okioror, The Guardian, 20 August 2019

Late one night in April 2015, 13-year-old Patricia and her sister, who was 11, were kidnapped from their beds by rebel forces fighting the government in South Sudan.

The girls were taken from their home in a raid on their village by the South Sudan National Liberation Movement in Yambio county, not far from the border of the DRC.

Although she spied on government troops during her captivity, Patricia’s main job was carrying food and cooking. She was also forced to have sex with soldiers.

“When we reached the military base, I was assigned to a certain soldier as his wife. He was older [about 40]. But I refused and I was beaten. I resisted for two weeks. But one night this man came and grabbed me. I tried to fight and wrestle with him. But he was strong and overpowered me. I tried making noise and alarm, but nobody came to my rescue”, says Patricia, now 17, sitting under a mango tree at her parents’ home.

Her sister sat helplessly as Patricia was raped. After that, the rapes continued almost daily.

On 7 February 2018, her ordeal at the hands of the rebel soldiers came to an end. She was released in Yambio as part of the deal reached by authorities in Juba and the rebel group. When she went home, she was four months pregnant.

The number of children used in armed conflict worldwide has more than doubled since 2012, with a 159% rise and almost 30,000 children recruited, according to Child Soldiers International.

As a child soldier, Patricia was entitled to receive emotional, physical and practical support from UN and child protection agencies. But almost 18 months on, she’s still struggling to come to terms with the trauma of what happened to her, and finding it hard to earn money to support herself and her one-year-old son.

“I keep having flashbacks. At times I feel so bad and frustrated. I isolate myself from people,” says Patricia. “It’s mum who tries to counsel and advise me to forget about the past and move on. But it’s difficult. I need medication to help me.”

Since fighting broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, more than 19,000 children are understood to have been “recruited” by armed forces and groups, according to a briefing published by the UN children’s fund, UNICEF, in March.

Children can be used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers and spies. Girls are often subjected to sexual violence. Recruiting children under 15 constitutes a war crime, although despite an international focus on ending impunity, very few war crimes are investigated.

Since February 2018, 360 girls and 610 boys have been released in Yambio through the National Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (DDR), in partnership with UNICEF and the UN mission in South Sudan. More than 3,000 children have been released in other states.
“Before I was kidnapped I had friends”
- Girl Soldiers of South Sudan

When she was demobbed, Patricia, like other child combatants, received a reintegration package including clothes, bed sheets, shoes, three months of food rations and other basic items. She was assessed by staff at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and has been assigned a social worker. It is hoped that with the support of the social worker and her family, Patricia will be able to move on with her life.

Vanessa Saraiva, World Vision senior adviser in South Sudan, says,

“Patricia sometimes talks to her mother about her past, which is one of the best support circles for psychosocial support wellbeing. She is responsive and developing her relationship with her sister which is also a good sign.

“Over time, these [counselling] sessions will enable Patricia to process what has happened, heal from those experiences and build a resilience to move on in normality.

Community support is also crucial, especially in helping children reintegrate back into their own communities and their families.”

At least 752 former child soldiers in Yambio have received psychosocial support and case management services through World Vision. In addition, 200 have graduated from vocational skills training, 80 have been given support to start small businesses, and 60 have been given the resources they need to work in agriculture through the charity, which is campaigning for more UK aid money to be spent on protecting children in crises.

However, Luciano Damian Canchelara, an MSF mental health activity manager, based in Yambio, says this is not enough. “Organisations are providing some services but in some cases this is not enough, and the children still struggle a lot.”

Jean Lieby, chief of child protection for UNICEF in South Sudan, said fear and stigma sometimes mean girls and women miss out on getting the full support they need.

“Girls are given special attention, and offered counselling following the screening. It is, however, recognised as a problem, in certain areas, to identify girls leaving the armed forces and groups, because they do not want the stigma of being identified.

Girls, therefore, often return to the community by themselves and do not come forward to be identified for assistance.”

According to UN guidelines, demobbed girls should be offered vocational training “in all types of occupations, including those traditionally limited to men and boys”. Such support should be boosted with resources to help improve girls’ education.

Patricia says she doesn’t feel she has received adequate support to cope with her experiences and to deal with life back home with a baby:

“T feel frustrated. I find it hard to take care of myself and the baby. I have to do casual work to get money. I have to do farming to get money for food, treatment and buying baby clothes. I have no one to assist me. My parents are poor. They can’t support me and the baby adequately. I need help.

Before I was kidnapped I had friends. But when I returned from captivity nobody wanted to be close to me.”
“Before I was kidnapped I had friends”
- Girl Soldiers of South Sudan

Despite returning home last year, Patricia had to wait until July before she could enrol on a six-month sewing course that could help her earn a living as a tailor. After she finishes the training, she will be given a start-up kit so she can start her own business.

“I can’t manage to go back to school. But I want to support my sister with her education. If she studies, she will help our parents who didn’t go to school,” she says.

**Exercises**

**Vocabulary Building**

Gap fill: place the correct word in the matching sentence.

| a. raid | b. assign | c. impunity | d. flashback |
| e. demobilisation | f. demobbed | g. reintegration | h. stigma |

1. to give, appoint or announce a task: _______________________
2. sudden assault or attack, as upon something to be seized or suppressed: ____________
3. a person who has been demobilised from the military or militia: _________________
4. recurrent and abnormally vivid recollection of a [traumatic] experience: ____________
5. to disband troops: _________________
6. exemption from punishment: _________________
7. a mark of disgrace associated with a particular circumstance, or person; _________________
8. the action or process of integrating someone back into society: _________________

**Group Assignment**

You have been made responsible for the establishment of a Child Soldier DDR programme, with the ultimate objective of rehabilitation and resocialisation. It has been stated that,

“These children have often lost their families (sometimes at their own hands), so have no support network or way to make a living. Many are victims of rape. Some return home with child. Some were better off with the rebels”.

**Considerations:** How would you establish such a programme? How would you measure success? What would your priorities be? What areas would you focus on? What concerns would you have? Would treatment for PTSD be part of your programme? How would you break the cycle of violence? Who would your stakeholders/partners be? What role would the local community play? How would you encourage community support? Would you focus on education and vocational training? Would you attempt job-based gender-mainstreaming? How long should each programme take?
Abstract

The classic detective novel sets a scene of criminal intrigue, introducing a hapless victim, the fallible but noble detective, and the scheming, villainous perpetrator. But that isn’t the story of Wildlife Crime, where the role of defender and offender are blurred, with right or wrong a matter of ethical perspective.

Following the IUCN Beyond Enforcement Symposium in South Africa (February 2015), the no-nonsense IIED Brief “Beyond enforcement: engaging communities in tackling wildlife crime” (Roe et al, 2015), made three bold statements:
1. tougher law enforcement measures do not prevent poaching;
2. militarised law enforcement can harm the communities who live alongside wildlife; and
3. local communities must be allowed to benefit from conservation efforts as an equal partner in the fight against wildlife crime.

Previous and subsequent conferences, case studies, and research pieces (including those by RFI) reached similar conclusions.

Therefore, in the context of Sub-Sahara Africa, this paper briefly examines the role and impact of:
- wildlife law enforcement,
- affected communities, and
- the poachers,
recommending alternate frameworks to prevent and counter poaching through integrated policing methodological approaches, further complemented by inclusive community-orientated partnerships and stewardship.

Introduction

Wildlife Crime is generally defined as,
“any violation of a national or international criminal law, or convention expressly designed to protect wildlife” (UNODC, 2016).

The Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT), including poaching and trafficking of wildlife and products, is a form of transnational crime - operating within, across and beyond national borders.

Wildlife crime poses not only a very real threat to the maintenance of ecosystems but has also come to be regarded as a security issue in source countries through its association with organised crime, armed conflict, insecurity and instability (ENVI, 2016). As such, in 2012 the United Nations designated IWT a “threat to the rule of law”.

Organised Criminal Groups (OCGs) are actively identified as participating in and profiting from illegal wildlife crime – a trade considered a low-risk activity with high profit margins. Proceeds from the IWT are known to support and finance insurgent activities, with interests and activities overlapping.

Wildlife crime actively undermines development efforts and is counter-productive to developmental advancement, environmental interests, and potential donor funding – the very initiatives that seek to create conservation-based, sustainable and self-supporting local economies.

Within the broader field of Environmental Crime, since 2012 over $350 million (USD) has been invested in countering the Illegal Wildlife Trade, resulting in intergovernmental policy initiatives (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014) broadly centred on three international strategies:
1. increase law enforcement;
2. reduce demand; and
3. engage local communities.

This stance is mirrored and furthered in the multi-stakeholder Zero Poaching Toolkit, which identifies and aims at bridging the enabling fields of activity towards the eventual elimination of poaching.
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

The Poachers

Modus Operandi
In any conservation area will be one, several or all of four types of poachers, with a variety of motivations doing so: (Kahler, 2015)

1. local premeditated (direct poaching),
2. organised premeditated (external),
3. opportunistic, and
4. provoked.

Motivational Drivers (Harrison et al, 2015)

- Poverty and subsistence needs
- Social mobility (commercial, to generate income above and beyond basic needs)
- Retaliation to perceived injustice, injury (e.g. lack of compensation)
- Human-wildlife conflict (e.g. crop or livestock protection)
- Cultural traditions
- In response to political influence (e.g. grants of external access to reserve area)

Law Enforcement

For the purpose of this paper, the term Law Enforcement applies to all authorities directly engaged in patrols or surveillance to dissuade and discover Wildlife Crime activity, and those who investigate and apprehend offenders. This includes police, special units, assigned military, conservation officers, game wardens and rangers (state and private), and community scouts.

Law enforcement is an essential aspect of Wildlife Conservation. However, as a response to aggressive poaching, law enforcement has intensified and militarised, creating cyclic escalation in the use of force and violence. Unintended side effects have included negative social impacts on communities and the proliferation of small arms (Holtom & Pavesi, 2018).

Green Militarisation

Green Militarisation - the use of paramilitary actors, techniques, technologies - has led to human rights violations, the often-violent perpetuation of exclusionary practices of conservation, as well as the further marginalisation of already vulnerable people. Militarised anti-poaching efforts risk widening the gap and increasing hostilities between the parks, neighbouring reserves and adjacent communities (Massé et al, 2017).

Inclusive Anti-Poaching

It is acknowledged that the largely (para)militarised approach to anti-poaching has its limitations and can be counter-productive by alienating local populations. As the name suggests, inclusive anti-poaching focuses on including people from local communities in anti-poaching initiatives, as opposed to top down policy and external physical intervention.
Including local people in conservation law enforcement efforts can help address poaching and the problematic aspects of current anti-poaching measures. However, to be a genuine and sustainable alternative, community ranger programmes must be part of a broader shift towards developing local wildlife economies that benefit local communities, as opposed to supporting pre-existing and external “top down” anti-poaching interventions.

**Community-based Conservation Crime Prevention**

The paper “Community-based Conservation Crime Prevention” (Kahler, 2015) highlights, “traditional conservation techniques such as community-based management, wildlife damage mitigation and prevention align with Situational Crime Prevention strategies (i.e. opportunity reduction). However, these do not deal with premeditated wildlife crime, in particular organised and/or violent poachers that enter wildlife areas and are a threat to species conservation and the security of rural communities”.

In contrast, **Community-based Conservation Crime Prevention** draws on all best practice tools, such as:

- Intelligence-led Conservation, and
- Inclusive Anti-Poaching,

merging them with proven modern policing methodologies: (OSCE, 2017)

- Situational Crime Prevention (SCP),
- Community-Orientated Policing (COP),
- Problem-Oriented Policing (POP),
- Predictive Policing (PP),
- Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP), and
- SARA

The objective is to create readily adaptable prevention-specific tools from mainstream policing to fit complex wildlife crime contexts, aimed at: (Kurland et al, 2017)

- increasing poacher risk(s),
- increasing poacher effort,
- increasing incentives for compliance,
- reducing potential poaching rewards,
- reducing provocations, and
- removing reasons for people to commit wildlife crime.

Community-based conservation crime prevention will not replace strategies aimed at dealing with long-term fundamental drivers, such as poverty and weak governance, it instead works in conjunction with these efforts to attempt to achieve both more immediate and sustained wildlife crime reduction. Implementation must take into account diverse cultural, economic and security contexts, and the driving motivation behind people committing wildlife crime.
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

The Relevance of “Mainstream Policing” Tools

**Community-Orientated Policing** (COP) is a strategy of policing that focuses on building ties and working closely with members of the community, focusing on local problem-solving initiatives.

**Problem-Orientated Policing** (POP) is a strategy that involves the identification and analysis of specific crime and disorder problems, in order to develop effective prevention and response strategies. The model places emphasis on the problem behind crime or safety concerns.

**Intelligence-Led Policing** (ILP) is a logical consequence of Community-Orientated Policing, focusing on the use Community Focal Points, informants and surveillance techniques to combat repeat offenders.

The basic principles of ILP and multi-agency wildlife protection were applied in South Africa as early as 1987, employing the basics of what has been coined Intelligence-Led Anti-Poaching.

**Note:** ILP success is not automatic, as it is critically important to follow best practice principles to ensure the integrity of leadership, have as few parties involved as possible and all partners should be regularly assessed and held accountable (Taverner, 2017).

**Predictive Policing** (PP)

Utilising mathematical and predictive analytics, Predictive Policing identifies potential criminal activity (when, where, who, conditions etc.). In Wildlife Crime, this is expressed as (Koen, 2017):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POACHER</th>
<th>WILDLIFE</th>
<th>RANGER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vegetation density</td>
<td>Landscape preference</td>
<td>Skilled use of technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to incursion</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Data recording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to static deterrents</td>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>Stages of the month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>Historical wildlife presence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of day</td>
<td>Wildlife presence</td>
<td>Active deterrents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
<td>Wildlife track(s)</td>
<td>Corruption index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poacher presence</td>
<td>Wildlife sighted</td>
<td>Festive periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive poacher observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA)**

SARA, which combines and draws on elements from all policing methodologies used in problem solving and the decision-making processes, would adapt well as a counter-poaching tool.

1. Scanning involves looking for patterns of problem activities (target, locations, types of crime). It requires an evaluation of the problem, the perception of the problem by both law enforcement and external partners, and an analysis of the severity of the problem.
2. Analysis includes looking for the root causes of any problems or issues identified. Information is gathered from a variety of sources, including reports and community members.
3. Once the cause is identified, law enforcement officials work with the community to come up with and execute an appropriate, long-term response.
4. After the response is implemented, an ongoing assessment is required to evaluate the effectiveness of the solution and make appropriate adjustments.
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

Criminal Intelligence

“Understanding crime trends and criminal behaviour is critical for policing today.” (INTERPOL)

*Criminal Intelligence* is information compiled, analysed, and disseminated as a means to anticipate, prevent, or monitor potential criminal activity. Timely and accurate intelligence analysis is key to understanding the inner-workings and driving factors of criminal enterprises. Criminal Intelligence Analysts examine a range of data such as sociodemographic information on criminals, and the times and locations of criminal activity.

The means of intelligence gathering includes Intelligence-led Policing, Community-Orientated Policing, and Predictive Policing, utilising *Human Terrain Mapping* (*de Saint-Claire, 2016*):

- **Known Players** (groups, characteristics, modus operandi etc.)
- **Human Geography** (especially those affected in the area)
- **Culture and relationship with land** (*incl. sympathies*)
- **Physical Geography**
- **Local Economics and Employment**
- **Poaching**
  - Causes
  - Impacts
  - Remedies (*incl. incentives*)
  - Attitudes
  - Past and Current Efforts

Not surprisingly, misperceptions have historically clouded intelligence-led approaches due to its association with national security and military intelligence.

Criminal Intelligence Activity Data

(Moreto, 2015)

One type of data used to assess criminal activity is patrol information: *law enforcement monitoring* (LEM) and *ranger-based data collection* (RBDC).

LEM and RBDC are the practices of collecting data during patrols on illegal activities, wildlife, and the environmental status of the protected area through ranger patrols. Such data is collected through GPS devices and uploaded into a centralised open-source database referred to as the *Management Information System* (MIST) in order to assess trends. Agencies have also begun to adopt the *Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool* (SMART), a bottom-up programme that utilises RBDC, providing advanced analytical capabilities to facilitate near real-time decision making and resource allocation. In addition to this, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has developed an online Wildlife Crime Database that allows agencies to track offenders, establish offender profiles, and track court cases.

Although data management platforms are clearly useful, the main obstacle is the absence of *criminal analysts* within the organisation. Trained by the military, “Intelligence Rangers” are conversant with counterintelligence, operational intelligence, and aspects of criminal investigation, but lack necessary subject specific knowledge in *criminal intelligence analysis*.

Certainly, modern technology and AI can now play a significant role in terms of real-time detection, and to a certain extent deterrence (*ref. identification*). However, the predictive and criminal intelligence elements can only be used in combination with solid data collection and analysis. Such intelligence gathering and analysis, together with Integrated Policing and Community Engagement requires specialist consultancy, facilitation and support.

Intelligence-led Conservation (ILC)

As the overall goal is conservation and not policing, the development of a separate and unique *intelligence-led conservation (ILC)* framework is required. Essentially,

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1 SMART; RF Mesh Networks; motion detectors/sensors; UAVs; high resolution, infrared, FLIR cameras etc
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

“the apprehension of offenders and the prevention of criminal activity is only a part of the wider conservation agenda, which includes reducing human-wildlife conflict, developing community-based conservation initiatives and problem solving, and potentially promoting associated economic development”. (Moreto, 2015)

An ILC framework is introduced to adapt and extend the principles of intelligence-led policing (ILP). Importantly, an ILC approach promotes the idea that intelligence is not solely the responsibility of the law enforcement department nor is it only useful for crime-related purposes. ILC embraces a broad definition of intelligence by recognising that information useful for conservation can be found within the different agencies (ref: intelligence sharing).

Conservation intelligence is defined here as analysed information that combines crime analysis, criminal intelligence, wildlife and protected area information, and community-based knowledge for informed conservation initiatives. Note: conservation agencies have a broader mandate than simply law enforcement initiatives.

Conservation Criminology is the integration of criminal investigation techniques in conservation methodology. The purpose is to increase understanding of the context in which wildlife crime takes place, as well as the diverse sociological conditions, motivations, and opportunities that drives people to commit wildlife crime. The concept behind Conservation Criminology is to develop, evaluate and implement a community-based approach to conservation crime prevention - not only diversify a suite of responses to wildlife crime, but also to move beyond detection and toward prevention.

Case Study: The Mangalane Community Scout Programme (MCSP)


This case study examines the potential of a community scout initiative, a move towards a more inclusive and sustainable approach to Wildlife Crime prevention and conservation.

The Mangalane area is located in southern Mozambique, adjacent to South Africa’s Kruger National Park. Households are largely subsistence oriented with a focus on livestock, particularly cattle, and subsistence agriculture. Employment opportunities and wage labour in the area are scarce and basic infrastructure and social services are sorely lacking. Historically, labour migration to South Africa has been a key source of income, with remittances sent to families. Labour migration continues today, but its prominence has decreased with many young men having turned to the rhino poaching economy.

While some local people are poachers, most poaching groups come from outside of the Mangalane area and use the communities as a primary transit point in and out of the Sabie Game Park (SGP) and Kruger. Many people from Mangalane thus work in support roles by providing information to poachers and/or working in the rhino-horn supply chain. The intensification of rhino poaching has brought about devastating social and economic consequences, including the arrests and deaths of hundreds of young men, leaving behind widows and fatherless households. The get-rich-quick mindset that accompanies poaching and the presence of external poaching gangs have also generated a rise in criminality, accompanied by social tensions and breakdowns within the villages.

To combat rhino poaching with limited resources, SGP’s wildlife protection activities are led by an anti-poaching NGO that largely employs green militarisation tactics.
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

Community Scouts
Initiated in 2015, the Mangalane Community Scout Programme (MCSP) employs 21 local residents as community scouts, with each community having its respective group of four to five scouts. A primary motivation for becoming a Community Scout is the salary, which is just above minimum wage. There are monetary benefits to be derived from wildlife and conservation. In addition, community support for the scouts is strongly related to their broader law enforcement roles. Scouts undertake conflict resolution within their respective communities, acting as a link between communities and formal law enforcement. Scouts are also credited with eliminating cattle theft in the Mangalane area and play an active role in managing problem animals and human-wildlife conflicts.

There are two primary ways in which scouts contribute to anti-poaching efforts and thus protect their rhino populations. First, they monitor and patrol the reserve border. Second, scouts provide intelligence regarding potential poaching incursions or past poaching activity, as gathered within their respective communities. Community scouts provide eyes and ears for law enforcement outside of reserve boundaries and in communities. As poaching groups are largely from outside the Mangalane area, the scouts provide information on the movement and arrival of vehicles and people from elsewhere who may be connected to poaching syndicates.

Bringing local people into anti-poaching efforts serves to increase the credibility and legitimacy of anti-poaching and conservation efforts in adjacent communities. There are still tensions between communities and the SGP, but community members, scouts and reserve management see an inclusive approach to anti-poaching as a step towards addressing the antagonistic park vs. people relationship. It also demonstrates a willingness on the part of the reserve to work with communities.

Importantly, employing people as community scouts offers an alternative source of income, especially for young men, who are otherwise likely to be involved in the wildlife trade. The salary itself cannot compete with the money from rhino poaching, but it does offer an income in an area where the economy is largely subsistence oriented and based on migrant labour to South Africa - or rhino poaching.

Discouraging people from entering the wildlife trade may gain traction if scouts know they can climb the occupational ladder and become rangers or guides, and if community-based anti-poaching is integrated with the broader development of a local wildlife economy, as originally intended.

Issues
Most importantly is the lack of direct benefit from wildlife and from supporting anti-poaching initiatives. The lack of ownership over wildlife means that poaching is not seen as stealing from communities, but rather as the most lucrative way to use wildlife, with the scouts only getting in the way of this. In describing his anti-poaching duties, one scout explained how fellow community members accuse scouts of disrupting their livelihoods by making it more difficult to hunt (rhino), and that they are responsible for community members, being arrested and put in jail. As such, community support for the scouts’ anti-poaching efforts can be tenuous, leading to a host of problems.

With the benefits of conservation and community participation in anti-poaching largely accruing to a private reserve, incentives to become involved in anti-poaching simply do not compete with the incentives offered by the wildlife trade. Scouts, like rangers and police, are routinely offered money to cooperate with poachers, or turn a blind eye. Corruption among community scouts and law enforcement is a major challenge. Numerous scouts, rangers and police have collaborated with poachers through information sharing or in more direct ways, leading to their arrest. In a context where the monetary gains from the wildlife trade are high, wages earned by community scouts, rangers and police simply cannot compete.
Wildlife Crime: Changing the Narrative

In addition, scouts revealed how their patrol duties take them away from farming, which is needed to feed their families in the absence of higher wages. Indeed, scouts, rangers and environmental police all claimed to be denigrated by community members involved in poaching, and being insulted for being ‘poor’, having ‘no future’ and being ‘unable to properly support their families’, because they do not involve themselves in poaching.

Like anti-poaching rangers across sub-Saharan Africa, community scouts are at risk from poachers and the syndicates they are a part of. All Mangalane scouts reported routine threats of violence, and even death. Violence against scouts is also indicative of the lack of support they get from community members for their anti-poaching duties. Scouts unanimously spoke of the alienation they faced after being labelled ‘traitors’ or accused of ‘working with the white men’, since anti-poaching is seen to benefit white-run private reserves.

It is widely agreed that the tensions within communities are driven by outsiders (working for syndicates) and those aligned with them. The reality is that those associated with poaching are seen as enriching the community, at least in monetary terms, while anti-poaching forces (scouts or otherwise) are seen as impeding that source of wealth and income.

The challenge is ensuring that anti-poaching initiatives directly benefit local communities, and is not co-opted by external interventions, especially those that are militarised.

*The story of Wildlife Crime is still unwritten…. the outcome is not set…. change the narrative.*

- Simon de Saint-Claire, PhD

RFI INSTITUTE (18 September 2019)

Task

1. Summarise the issues – limitations and potential - raised in the article, regarding:

   - Green Militarisation
   - Integrated Policing
   - Community Relations

2. Based on the article, how would you address the issue of Wildlife Crime?

   *note: this is a current project involving international policing, military & conservation consultants*
Conflict, Fragility and Violence

Facts

- 1.5bn people living in fragile and conflict affected states
- 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since 1989
- Cost of violent conflict over 30 years on GDP
- Basic governance transformations may take 30-40 years
- 30% of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) is spent on fragile and conflict affected states
- Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- High Levels of Criminal Violence (*ref. Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Arms Trafficking*)

New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

The New Deal is a key agreement between fragile and conflict affected states, international development partners and civil society to improve development policy and practice in fragile states. It calls for five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) to be at the forefront of all international efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries ([www.newdeal4peace.org](http://www.newdeal4peace.org)).

PEACEBUILDING & STATEBUILDING GOALS: Foundations for the Future

PSG1: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution

PSG2: Establish and strengthen people’s security

PSG3: Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice

PSG4: Generate employment and improve livelihoods

PSG5: Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.
Understanding Context

“Without context, a piece of information is just a dot. It floats in your brain with a lot of other dots and doesn’t mean a damn thing. Knowledge is information-in-context…. connecting the dots.”

- Michael Ventura, US Novelist

- Socio-Culture
- Ethnicities, Clans, Tribes
- Parties Involved
- Causes
- Areas Affected
- Economics
- Religion
- Nature of Violence
- Relationships with Population
- Political / Military Developments

Discussions Questions

1. Why do you believe it takes 30-40 for basic governance transformation?
2. In your role as an Advisor - within the context of post-conflict Missions - what is more important: the maintenance of peace and stability or pursuit of justice? In countries, such as Uganda, the ICC is seen to undermine peace talks? How? Could this be considered peace instead of justice?
3. As part of the post-conflict peace-building efforts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are conducted as a means of having victims voices heard.
   a. Instead of punishment-based justice, what measures could be taken to acknowledge past atrocities and war crimes?
   b. How might traditional or customary justice play a role in addressing the past?
4. What role does “context” have?
5. As was the case in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and numerous other war-torn and conflict affected countries, it’s often a strategy to collaborate with known warlords and [suspected] criminals to broker peace and maintain security – often legitimising these players by including them in the transitional government.
   a. What are the pros / cons?
   b. What do believe will be the long-term effect?
Mali: Thinking More Broadly About Security Sector Reform

David Law, Centre for Security Governance, 10 November 2016 (edited and condensed 12 March 2018)

For the UN, the Mali deployment has been one of its most important to date, one of its largest in terms of numbers of deployed personnel, and one of its most deadly in terms of personnel losses. At the time of writing, MINUSMA also appears to have been one of the least successful.

Overall, implementation of the peace agreement has been slow, uneven and flawed. The ongoing violence has made it difficult for armed groups to withdraw from certain areas, let alone disarm, and has prevented the development and implementation of new power-sharing arrangements, as agreed in Algiers. Mixed Units - to be composed of previous opponents - have not got off the ground as violence among these groups continue. It appears that the political ground work needed to make possible cooperation among Malians from the centre and the North has not been undertaken.

While it is far too soon to draw definitive conclusions from the situation in Mali, the crisis and the efforts to address it raise a number of points that may be instructive for the overall SSR/SSG agenda.

1. The Mali situation confirms that mainstream SSR programming is spot on. This calls for the country’s security actors to be capable of:
   - defending the population;
   - using security resources responsibly, and;
   - being subject to effective supervision and oversight (by the executive, the parliament, the judiciary, civil society and the media).

The Malian security sector has traditionally been ineffectively overseen. It has also been grossly under-equipped and financed. It has had little capacity in the North. It was totally unprepared for the challenges that emerged in the country after 2011. Had the Malian security sector been more functional, the country would have had a reasonable chance of neutralizing the destabilizing elements that descended on it as Libya was plunged into chaos and region-wide terrorist ambitions took root.

2. Mali must redouble its efforts to develop a power-sharing formula that respects both the authority of the central government and decentralises the decision-making across its different communities and regions. In a country like Mali, a federalism of sorts, even if basic, needs to take shape. Security sector governance in any national entity needs to ensure that sub-national identities are taken into account and effectively addressed.
International Police Crisis Management

3. The security situation in Mali cannot be addressed without considering how regional and international developments impact the country. The Tuareg community is a prime example. The Tuaregs are connected with fellow Berber communities across the Sahel and in neighbouring regions. The central government in Mali and their supporting donors need to factor this more prominently into their security sector decision-making. Any national SSR process needs to take into consideration regional interests.

4. The Malian crisis has highlighted how badly prepared the international community is to stage a Mission when intervention becomes the only option. In Mali as many as seven different Missions – local, regional, European, UN – have been engaged in an effort to find a viable response to the crisis. Not only has valuable time and resources been lost in the process of mounting successive overlapping operations, but the credibility of these efforts have suffered.

It seems that MINUSMA was ill-prepared for its missions. A former UN Assistant Secretary General made the following statement about the UN role in Mali:

“Our most grievous blunder was in Mali. In early 2013, the United Nations decided to send 10,000 soldiers and police officers to Mali in response to a terrorist takeover of parts of the north. Strangely, we sent a force that was unprepared for counterterrorism and explicitly told not to engage in it. More than 80 percent of the force’s resources are spent on logistics and self-protection. Already 56 people in the United Nations contingent have been killed, and more are certain to die.”

The credibility of the intervention has also been diminished by broad and overlapping mandates. MINUSMA has been criticized for having too wide a mandate, which has led to disagreements over its interpretation, especially given the great number of states involved. MINUSMA has also been criticised for catering to the priorities of the international community instead of prioritizing the needs and expectations of the Malian people. This may point to a local ownership deficit in responding to the crisis. However, it may also mean that the Malian capacity to deal with the crisis has been so weak and dysfunctional that external actors have had to assume greater responsibilities than they would normally undertake.

At the same time, there has been conflict among international stakeholders about who should take the lead in coordinating the actions on the ground in Mali. In principle, this is the UN’s task. In practice, the EU has been trying to play this role.

In conclusion, there are two all-encompassing issues that come to the forefront when looking at the Malian crisis (from a security sector perspective):
1. While external actors can play a decisive role in suffocating conflict and helping a country instigate the necessary reforms, over the longer-term security must come from within. A country cannot systematically rely on external actors for support in the reform process, and the support it receives will be limited in volume and in time. At the end of the day, it will have to depend primarily on its own efforts.

2. The Malian experience also points to the need for external actors – ECOWAS, AU, EU, UN – to review the course of events in Mali and how their efforts could have been made, individually and collectively, more effective. In particular, it appears that many of the Missions were implemented without an effective appreciation of the socio-cultural and political realities at work in the country, and how they would need to be reshaped as a requirement for any successful peace and reconstruction process.

It is to be hoped that national, regional and international actors will all come away wiser from their Mali experience. That said, Mali looks increasingly like a state that lacks the material and political capacity to maintain itself as a viable entity. If the latter is true, this will have major implications for neighbouring states and the situation in West Africa – and perhaps adjoining regions of the continent as well.

**Group Task: PROJECT MENASTAN**

Your group has been assigned to an International Coalition Taskforce to assist with pre-deployment planning and implementation for an upcoming Police Mission in MENASTAN.

1. **Provide a Background Brief:**
   - *Geopolitical Overview* - demographics, history, politics, government, justice system, state of the economy (*incl.* resources), corruption, infrastructure, communications, human security (rights, protection, food, employment, health, education etc.), state security and current situation (internal/external).
   - *Human Terrain Analysis*, providing ethnic makeup, languages, culture, prominent traditions and customs, religious practices, gender, community roles etc.

2. **Draft a Mission Mandate** featuring purpose and specific aims, mission type, personnel required (numbers, skill sets etc.), and mission length.

3. The Host Government has agreed – in principle – on an international police mission, however some influential internal actors need convincing. Present a brief explaining how the Rule of Law, Democratic Policing practices, and Security Sector Reform will move the State towards stability and peace, and potentially create the conditions for developing meaningful Human Security.

4. Corruption is entrenched in all levels of local society: present a strategy paper on how corruption undermines good governance, suggesting possible reduction initiatives.

5. Local police *Basic Training* is currently 4-6 weeks long, focusing solely on security-orientated tasks. As part of the SSR package, draft a new Basic Training curriculum overview (consider standards, procedures, law, field skills and course length).
During your MENASTAN Mission, your team has been asked to give a brief presentation on policing in your country.

As a lecture in comparative policing, your audience is interested in differing practice and methodologies, e.g. structure, objectives, what works, professional challenges, problems, solutions, lessons learned, change management, recent developments, and the future.

You are expected to:

- Provide a general overview of your Security Sector on the:
  - the National level; and
  - the Regional level
- Briefly discuss individual departments and their responsibilities
- Give an overview of the daily routine i.e. shifts, typical cases etc.
- Prepare relevant vocabulary, charts, maps etc.

Collecting Information

- General information on the National Security Sector
- Structure
- Incident Management
- Crime Scene Management
- Crisis Communications
- Tasks / what areas you concentrate on/ what you are legally required to do
- Problems / lessons learned / developments
- Community engagement
- Education / vocational training / career development
- Pay standards / conditions of retirement
- Rank structure and promotions
- Equipment
- Facilities and Premises
Fonsamnis District: Station South

Fonsamnis a district of Bellagri, in the east of Menastan

- Total Area: 1,245.27 km²
- Population (31/12/2016)
  - Total: 305,198
  - Density: 250/km²
Fonsamnis District: Station South

Uniformed Patrol Strength (per 8 hour shift = 3 shifts in 24 hours)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Station</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Operating Hours</th>
<th>Patrol + Shift Leader(s)</th>
<th>Patrol Vehicles</th>
<th>Alert Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fonsamnis HQ</td>
<td>148,677</td>
<td>24/7</td>
<td>24 + 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport</td>
<td>* 1,200±</td>
<td>24/7</td>
<td>2 + 1 +1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arce Domum</td>
<td>25,757</td>
<td>24/7</td>
<td>12 + 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Byron</td>
<td>21,657</td>
<td>0600-2200hrs</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Pontem</td>
<td>31,949</td>
<td>0600-2200hrs</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aquam</td>
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<td>0600-2200hrs</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alert Status Legend

- Hot Spot (violence, drug-related crimes)
- Raised Awareness
- Former Crime Hot Spot
- Normal

* 8-hour average of 850,000 passengers per year + Flight Crew + Airport Service Personnel.

Task:

As a move to tackle increased criminality in the District’s south, the District Administrator (responsible for all local governmental services) has authorised the reallocation of Patrol Service personnel and resources. In the past the Fonsamnis HQ Station has provided additional cover for Day Stations (as required), at a loss of a patrol team/vehicle within their own area of responsibility (AOR). Travel times from Fonsamnis HQ to satellite areas vary from 20-40 minutes.

The District Administrator has tasked you with composing workable suggestions and recommendations for:

1. the creation of a new Police Station;
2. the strengthening and expansion of an existing station; or
3. an alternative “third” option not previously examined.

Considerations: you may only draw on existing personnel and resource strengths (i.e. to build up a new solution, numbers need to be drawn from other stations within the district).

Note: Abovementioned strength numbers exclude non-Patrol Service Personnel:

- Community Police Officers i.e. one seasoned officer based in all satellite towns
- All Criminal Investigation Departments and Traffic Police are based in Fonsamnis HQ
- Fonsamnis does not have its own Formed Police Units (Riot Police) or Police Special Forces, but can call upon those of Bellagri - the regional authority (50km north).
The Republic of Novarovia, recently gained its independence after 65 years from the larger Federation of Multinazia.

The Republic of Novarovia’s population culturally describe themselves as:

- Novarovians 57% (majority)
- Centralovians 18%
- Outerovians 10%
- Upperovians 6%
- Lowerovians 6%
- Others 3%

In the old Federation of Multinazia it was decreed that there were no diverse and separate cultures: everyone belonged to a common culture inside a community of nations.

Novarovia wishes to be seen as a modern democratic state and after recent elections a Government was formed with a Novarovian majority, with proportional representation from the Centralovian, Outerovian, Upperovian and Lowerovian minorities. However, relations are tense between Government factions and even more so within the differing ethnic populations as everyone is beginning to understand what separate identity and culture actually means in practice.

There have already been minor acts of sectarian violence, and the government appears to be losing control of rural areas (dominated by the ethnic minorities). Taking advantage of the government’s weak position, organised criminal organisations are exploiting the opportunity with large scale cross-border smuggling operations. Endemic civil corruption is also undermining the effectiveness of government and judiciary, and therefore the economy.

In order to avoid an escalation in civil disturbance the Novarovian Government has requested assistance from the international community. Acting on behalf of the United Nations, the regional security development agency “Organisation for Security Sector Governance” (OSSG) has been made responsible for the planning and deploying of a multinational “SSR” task force to help the Novarovian Government [re-]establish norms within their new multicultural state before the situation deteriorates into open civil war and spills over into neighbouring states.

Novarovia is in a key strategic position for the international community.

The major aspect of this mission is not to keep different groups apart but initiate open dialogue, build bridges and establish mutual understanding, whilst identifying how the different cultures can be equally expressed, represented and integrated.

It is essential for the country to develop a judicial system where the majority and the minority groups have a universal legal framework for human security and rights, including access to justice, a complaints mechanism, and a professional, impartial police service.
**Briefing Assignments**

**Government of Novarotia:**

You represent the Government of Novarotia – which views international intervention as the only real chance to bring meaningful stability to your country: stability translates to economic investment and development, the benefits of which will guarantee the success of your government. International Intervention will be seen to support the legitimacy of your government.

You are to introduce your State and the issues it is currently facing, whilst you purposely ignore the negative aspects of your government’s record - or that of its “supporters” (corruption, poor management, human rights abuse etc.), instead shifting responsibility on to sectarian, regional and external actors. As part of your brief you will also give an overview of what your country can offer the International Community in terms of strategic placement, resources, infrastructure, cost effective labour force, education, and population distribution.

**OSSG Observers:**

You are an OSSG Observer who recently returned from an *Observation Mission* in Novarotia.

1. Your task is to provide an “Intelligence and Situation Report” regarding the geo-political situation, identifying the major problems. Attention should also be given to the current deployment and distribution of local military and law enforcement as well as their tasks, strengths, weapons, ethnic makeup, level of training, loyalties (*state vs. ethnic*) and possible intentions.

2. Threat assessment: consider possible militias, vigilantes, political insurgent and criminal groups.

3. Logistics: functional and dysfunctional infrastructure should also be identified e.g. water, electricity, sanitation, sewerage, roads, rail, airports, waterways etc. as they will affect the way the Mission is deployed and supported.

Your report will form the basis on how the OSSG approaches this Mission. It may not necessarily conform or reflect the information provided by the Government of Novarotia.

**OSSG Situation Centre:**

You are OSSG Situation Centre Officers whose task has been to develop a Mission plan based on the information provided by the OSSG Observers.

1. You are to address the major problems identified by the OSSG Observers, suggesting Security Sector Reform solutions – short and long term – and an appropriate mandate and force for the task.

2. Although your primary task will be to address tensions within Novarotia, attention should also be given to long-term developmental issues that have a direct effect on internal security.

Presentations will be delivered to a joint meeting of delegates representing *UN Security Council, UN Peacekeeping Command*, and the *OSSG Secretariat*.

Each presenter should speak for 7-10 minutes, utilising maps, diagrams and relevant visual data.
Appendix I – former Federal Republic of Multinazia

Appendix II - Republic of Novarovia
Republic of Ichkeria

Overview
Ichkeria is a country in South-Eastern Europe. Situated in the North Caucasus, it borders Ingushetia (south-west), Stavropol Krai (north-west), Dagestan (north-east, east, south-east), and Georgia (south-west).

A former state of the USSR, Ichkeria chose not to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but rather join the EU-initiated Eastern Partnership (EaP).

With a population of 2.1 million Inhabitants, by percentage (%) ethnicity the country can be broken down as:
- Ichkerians 71%
- Cossack 23%
- Kumyks 3%
- Ingush 2%
- Others 2%

The two main religions are Islam (Sunni 85%, Sufism 10%, Shia 5%) practiced by ethnic Ichkerians, and Orthodox Christian practiced by the Cossack population.

Before the crisis (as follows) all ethnicities lived together in peaceful harmony but after the elections in March 2012 the situation greatly deteriorated country wide, with ethnic minorities deprived of both identity and rights.
The current government (nationalist-conservative party) enacted new laws on labour rights and restricted access to public services. The three Cossack Universities in the country lost their budgets and were finally closed down. Cultural and religious activities of the Cossack minority were severely restricted and the Russo-Cossack dialect was forbidden to be spoken in public. Thousands of Cossack citizens lost their jobs because of the new laws and now live in poverty.

In October 2014 Ichkeria experienced the first public appearance of a Cossack Freedom Army (CFA), which initiated insurgent acts against the National Police - and later against the Ichkerian Army - to have the rights restored that the Cossack population enjoyed before the elections of 2012. The Cossack minority considered the CFA as freedom fighters, the Government considered them as insurgents and terrorists.

The aim of the CFA was to have the rights of the Cossack minority restored by the government. The government rejected all talks and declared a “State of Emergency” – granting security forces emergency powers - authorising lockdowns, curfews, profile-based stop-and-search tactics, arbitrary arrests, and suspension of rights.

In March-April 2015 the country suffered a short but intensely violent conflict with numerous losses on both sides. It’s estimated about 340 Ichkerian Police Officers and 210 Ichkerian Soldiers lost their lives during the crisis. The Cossack Freedom Army claims that about 600 “freedom fighters” were killed during the uprising.

As a consequence of the conflict, members of the Ichkerian Government – specifically the Ministers of Interior and Defence - as well as high ranking Ichkerian Soldiers and Police Officers face indictment by the International War Crimes Tribunal due to alleged war crimes.

In May 2015 the OSGS – on behalf of the United Nations - succeeded in getting all involved parties to the negotiation table. After two weeks of intensive negotiations a six-week ceasefire of hostilities was reached, resulting in a peace-agreement. The Vienna Concorde was signed on 24 June 2015 by all parties stating clearly, that all new laws enacted after March 2012 were to be dismissed and the rights of the Cossack and other minority populations to be restored with immediate effect. As part of a financial incentive package, the European Union agreed to increase development aid and fund new infrastructure projects.

The United Nations recognised the regional crisis management role undertaken by the OSGS in their UN Resolution 1516 (16 October 2015), further mandating the five-year OSGS Rule of Law Mission (February 2016) to:

1. monitor security forces and law enforcement;
2. mentor senior military, police and border guard management;
3. verify the downsizing of Police and Security Forces; and
4. protect and promote Human Rights and the Rule of Law.

It is a non-executive monitoring and advisory mission. OSGS Monitors are unarmed and in cases of misconduct by local officials Non-Compliance Reports will be drafted. OSGS also have authority to investigate suspected cases of corruption and human rights violations.
OSSG Mission in Ichkeria

Situation
Three days ago, 20 ethnic Cossacks illegally occupied the State-run Hydroelectric Dam at Lake Verkhniy Naur, located 5km south-east of Beno-Yurt. Beno-Yurt is a small Cossack village of around 3000 inhabitants situated in Ichkeria’s north.

Before the conflict 120 workers were employed at the Hydroelectric Dam, 40 of them Cossack. In 2013 all 40 Cossack employees were dismissed due to their ethnicity. Although the dismissed Cossack workers demanded to be re-hired in accordance with the Vienna Concorde none of them were reinstated. After the occupation the squatters forcibly expelled the Ichkerian staff (three of whom suffered minor injuries), then cut the water and power supply from the station. Thus far there has been no physical damage to the station.

To further complicate the situation, Beno-Yurt villagers have blockaded the only road leading towards the Hydroelectric Dam. Only fellow Cossacks have been granted access; local police and Ichkerian employees of the Hydroelectric Dam have been denied access and all attempts have been repeatedly repelled. OSSG Monitors still have access to the dam.

As the Verkhniy Naur Dam is the main water and power supply for the northern part of Ichkeria over 240,000 inhabitants are suffering from water and electricity shortages. Another hydroelectric dam in the east of the country is providing water and electricity on a temporary ad hoc basis but resources are limited and the continuation of the supply cannot be guaranteed much longer. The shortage of water is also having a significant impact on agriculture in the northern part of the country; farmers are already complaining that they might lose their harvest if the water supply isn’t restored immediately.

The clash represents persistent widespread problems throughout Ichkerian society.

Both ethnicities consider the outcome of the Verkhniy Naur Hydroelectric Dam stand-off as a potential milestone on the road to sustainable peace, with far reaching consequences for the entire country, ranging from national unity to international support.


Mediation
OSSG: Mediate a solution between the Cossacks villagers manning the Hydroelectric Dam and roadblock, and the Ichkerian Government.

Government: Your policies are right-wing, with a heavy bias towards Ichkerian nationalism (under which your government was democratically elected). However, you are aware that you need to keep the international community happy, whilst balancing and fulfilling your obligations to your electorate - some of whom would like to make an example of the Cossacks. Although a hard-liner, you are open to compromise for quick results.

Cossack: You want justice through the full restoration of our people’s rights, though realistically would accept the rehiring of the Dam workers. You know the longer that you hold out against the government the more attention and sympathy will be drawn to your cause from the international community, though will risk further alienation and retaliation by the Ichkerians.
**Situation Overview**

The country of *Kikorangi* is a fledgling democracy of 48.2 million people. Located in a sub-tropical mountainous region, with ocean bordering to the north and the west, and the nations of *Whero* to the northeast, *Mangu* to the southeast, *Kowhai* to the south, and *Papura* to the southwest.

Since 1984 *Kikorangi* had been engaged in a civil war with a group calling itself the *Kikorangi Revolutionary Force (KRF)*. KRF’s objective was to overthrow the democratically elected leaders of Kikorangi to form a communist utopia. KRF was being supplied arms, training and resources through Whero - paid for through drug cultivation and trafficking. Both KRF and Kikorangi security forces sustained heavy losses of life, as well as the depletion of national resources.

The International Community and citizenry of Kikorangi put tremendous pressure on the leaderships of both Kikorangi and the KRF. As a result, Kikorangi and the KRF diplomatically resolved their conflict. However, the war’s end lead to a new set of problems that now confront Kikorangi: DDR, IDFs, mass unemployment, food and housing shortages, run-down infrastructure, overwhelmed social services, and ineffective internal security.

Immediately after the end of hostilities the government downsized its military force from 80,000 to 30,000 members, while the 18,000 strong KRF was totally disbanded - with its members now attempting to be reintegrated into society.

The military police and the national police now operate as totally separate entities. Previously the civilian police operated under military command. **Now, only the Kikorangi National Police (KNP) will have authority over civilians.**

Due to delays in organising the new police service, inadequate DDR initiatives, and large numbers of unemployed soldiers, crime has skyrocketed. *Vigilante groups*\(^*\) have taken virtual control of the streets of the country’s capital *Kākāriki*. In addition to street crime and civil unrest, there have been a number of assassinations of political leaders, judges, and prosecutors. These politically motivated crimes indicate that a distinct ideology is developing among the vigilante groups. There have been reports that the military and police have reacted brutally in order to regain control of the streets, often taking justice into their own hands.

\(^*\) *Unauthorised groups of volunteers organised to keep order and punish crime.*

The President of *Kikorangi* has decided that the problem in *Kākāriki* has become a national crisis, and is afraid that the civil war will re-ignite. Therefore, the President called a meeting with his advisors to compose a variety of proposals as a means to restore order. Through these measures the President wants to reassure the people that his government is a legitimate one, dedicated to the “Rule of Law”.

1. Round up suspected vigilante leaders and detain them until social unrest diminishes.
2. Forbid any meeting of three or more individuals without a permit issued by both the national police and the military police.
3. Suspend for 30 days the constitutional rights of anyone arrested for political crimes or terrorism.
4. Set up a system of random check points to stop and search all people entering the check point area for weapons and other contraband.
5. Set up a strict curfew within the city limits of Kākāriki.
MISSION ASSIGNMENTS: BRIEFINGS

Briefing One: Peacekeeping Situation Centre

From the perspective of the United Nations Peacekeeping Situation Centre provide a Ground and Situation Report of Kikorangi - and Kākāriki specifically. This will serve as an intelligence report from which to plan any potential Field Mission.

- Ground: based on generic information in Appendix II: Geographic Overview
- Situation: provide more detailed information, loosely based on the Kikorangi Situation Overview and similar issues experienced in countries, such as Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua etc.

Briefing Two: UNDFS

From the perspective of the UN “Department of Field Support” (UNDFS), identify the main problems in Kikorangi - with specific attention to Kākāriki - that need immediate attention and suggest recommendations

Deployment:
- Mandate (mission aim, authorisation, activity, numbers and length)
- Mission type (observation/monitoring, executive, non-executive mentoring, training)

Short term -
- Internal Security: Security Sector Reform (SSR) i.e. police, military, vigilantes, crime gangs etc.
- Rule of Law: Judicial Reform
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rehabilitation (DDR) strategies
- Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
- Human Rights Issues
- Mission essential infrastructure (water, electricity, sanitation, sewerage, road, rail, ports etc.)
- Identify internal issues/tensions: politics, ethnicity, religion, wealth imbalance, corruption etc.

Briefing Three: International Police Advisor

You believe the President’s proposals do not conform to international law and human rights standards. While maintaining the proposals’ intent, modify the suggestions to meets both legal instruments and human rights laws.

Presentations will be delivered to a joint meeting of delegates representing UN Peacekeeping Command, the UN Secretariat, Security Council, and to a Government Representative of Kikorangi.

Each presenter should speak for 5-7 minutes, utilising maps, diagrams and relevant visual data.
Appendix I: Republic of Kikorangi
Appendix II: Geographic Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th><strong>Land</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sea</strong></th>
<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,038,700 km²</td>
<td>100,210 km²</td>
<td>1,138,910 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mangu 1790 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papura 708 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mōrena 339 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kowhai 1494 km,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whero 2341 km</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coastline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3208 km²</td>
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</table>

**PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tropical along coast and eastern plains; cooler in highlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>flat coastal lowlands, central highlands, high mountains, eastern lowland plains</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lowest point: 0 (sea level); highest point: 5,730 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, hydropower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>deforestation resulting from timber exploitation; illicit drug crops grown in the national parks; soil erosion; soil and water quality damage from overuse of pesticides; air pollution, especially in Kākāriki, from vehicle emissions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Hazards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>highlands subject to volcanic eruptions; occasional earthquakes; periodic droughts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LAND USE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arable land: 1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent crops: 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent pasture: 34.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Irrigated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10,900 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HUMAN GEOGRAPHY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>population majority lives in the north and west where agricultural opportunities and natural resources are located; the vast grasslands of the south and east (which make up 60% of the country) are sparsely populated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian: 74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro: 12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous: 11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: 2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish / English / Quechua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic: 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant: 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customary: 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: 9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instructions

Write an application letter to the Organisation for Security Sector Governance (OSSG) for one of the positions on the following pages (or for real position). Your letter should introduce yourself, give an overview of your current position, as well as any professional experience directly related to the position being applied for. The letter should also state your motivation, and any additional background experience or skills you believe may be relevant (e.g. languages, previous travel etc.).

Note: The letter is your way of introducing and promoting yourself to an unknown board, therefore should create a word picture of why you are the best candidate for the position.

The Organisation for Security Sector Governance (OSSG) is a security-orientated intergovernmental organization concerned with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and security sector reform.

As a partner and sub-contractor of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the African Union (AU), and the Arab League, OSSG’s mandated area of operation is Greater Europe, Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (MENA).

Pool Vacancy Announcements

As the following positions will become available in the near future, applications are being sought from suitable candidates for deployment in:

- Afghanistan
- the Balkans
  - Albania
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - Kosovo
- Bangladesh
- Myanmar (Burma)
- FRONTEX (various short-term Mediterranean locations)
- Georgia
- Iraq
- Libya
- Mali
- Palestine (West Bank)
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- the Ukraine
Police & Law Enforcement Advisor
- Counter-Terrorism / Organised Crime

Duties and Responsibilities

Under the direct supervision of the Head of the Politico-Military Department (PMD), the Police and Law Enforcement Advisor (Counter-Terrorism / Serious and Organised Crime) -

A. Oversees the development and implementation of all relevant police reform initiatives;
B. Establishes and maintains effective working relationships with national official structures on combating terrorism, serious and organised crime, and law enforcement;
C. Establishes co-operation and co-ordinates activities with other international partners;
D. Organises, co-ordinates, implements and monitors anti-terrorism, police assistance and organised crime-related projects;
E. Participates in working groups on upgrading anti-terrorism training skills, management of terrorism response, building of counter-terrorism strategies, sharing of intelligence and law enforcement initiatives;
F. Develops effective working relationships with regional authorities dealing with the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious criminal offences, e.g. terrorism, organised crime etc.;
G. Actively supports the Mission’s Anti-Terrorism Unit and the Strategic Police Matters Unit, to identify, develop, co-ordinate, implement and monitor activities in the field of anti-terrorism/police assistance/organised crime;
H. Determines current regional status of anti-terrorism, organised crime and legislation;
I. Produces analytical reports on developments in the region within the incumbent's field of expertise, as assigned;
J. Supervises 11 staff members (3 internationals, 8 nationals);
K. Performs other duties as required.

Mission Specific Requirements
- Minimum 10 years of diversified law enforcement-type experience including at least 12 months operational experience in the specialised subject areas (anti-terrorism, and/or serious & organised crime)
- Proven working experience in project management, including planning/development, implementation, monitoring, evaluation/controlling and reporting
- Relevant experience in police or security sector reform development and implementation
- Relevant professional experience in the field of counter-terrorism and police issues
- Fluency in oral and written English, and the ability to draft documents clearly and concisely
- Previous working experience in a programmatic/strategic planning role
- Experience and competence in negotiation and mediation
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and with limited time frames
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity
- Education in community-policing relations, crime prevention or related fields
- Ability to operate Windows applications, including word processing and e-mail
Senior Community Police Advisor

Duties and Responsibilities

A. Represent the Department in all forums related to community policing to ensure co-operation, communication and implementation of the best practice on community safety initiatives throughout the region;

B. Provides oversight and guidance to the Community Safety Development Section (CSDS) Team in their support of the capacity-building efforts of the Municipal Community Safety Councils;

C. Implements the field activities of the Section as it conducts informal interviews and discussions with municipalities, local police and community leaders to assess current community conditions, attitudes, and relationships relating to police and readiness for community policing;

D. Develops and implements comprehensive community-policing training programmes for police officers assigned to community policing throughout the region;

E. Builds community policing capacity for mid-level ranking officers by developing and delivering training courses on community-orientated policing;

F. Develops, monitors and/or modifies Community Safety courses to build sustainability for the various community safety forums;

G. Liaises closely with responsible Mission counterparts (HQ and field), as well as local and international stakeholders;

H. Drafts thematic, analytic and performance reports;

I. Provides supervision and guidance to assigned staff;

J. Performs other duties as directed.

Mission Specific Requirements

• Experience in the implementation and management of community policing and community safety training courses for capacity-building purposes;

• Experience of developing, managing and implementing training as well as analysis of training needs and evaluation;

• Clear understanding of International Human Rights standards together with their implications, with regards to public security and safety operations and development;

• Experience in project management (planning, design, budgeting, management and evaluation);

• Ability to design, coordinate and implement developmental strategies and training plans to support community safety agencies/platforms and related security service partners;

• Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and within limited time frames

• Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different national, cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender and diverse political views while maintaining impartiality and objectivity;

• Analysing, drafting reporting and presentation skills;

• Fluency in English, both oral and written.
Training Advisor

Duties and Responsibilities

A. Provides recommendations to the department’s and unit's leadership, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other partners in the analysis, development, implementation and evaluation of the police training programmes;
B. Implements or assists in the implementation of other training initiatives that respond to identified needs from national and international partners, within the frame of mission's mandate and available resources;
C. Delivers training, co-training, coaching and mentoring to national border guard/police trainers using Adult Learning Strategies consistent with established principles and methodologies;
D. Monitors, mentors and guides the national counterparts on implementation of the training programmes in the regions of the Host Country;
E. Organises, facilitates or participates in various meetings or working groups with national and international partners, reporting through the established channels, following the mission's standard procedures and guidelines;
F. Ensures that human rights standards, ethics and gender equality and other internationally recognised principles are integrated into decentralised security forces and police training, and democratic law enforcement;
G. Performs other related work as assigned;

Mission Specific Requirements

- Experience in working for a recognized security and/or law enforcement agency in training needs analysis, curriculum development, implementation and evaluation of training courses
- Formal education or training in Adult Learning Theories and Adult Learning Strategies and their application in police environment
- Experience with implementation and management of community policing in the wider field of community safety programmes
- Facilitation, coaching, mentoring and mediation skills; problem solving capacity
- Effective oral and written communication and presentation skills
- Cultural sensitivity and judgment
- Ability to operate Windows applications, including word processing, e-mail, and presentation software (e.g. PowerPoint)
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and with limited time frames
- Ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people of different national and cultural backgrounds, different gender and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity
Security Officer (Senior Level)

Duties and Responsibilities
Under the guidance and direction of the Senior Security Officer, and in consultation with the Secretariat's Security Management, the Security Officer:

1. Assists senior management in the execution of the security of Mission staff and property;
2. Maintains and updates security plans, contingency plans and procedures to cover movement control for the monitoring teams as well as security listings of Mission staff; ensures that plans for relocation and evacuation to safe havens are current and implementable;
3. Analyses security-related information; conducts Security Risk assessments within the AOR to determine security-related threats/risks to Mission personnel and property; suggests mitigating measures when necessary;
4. Conducts regular drills (e.g. fire, evacuation, communication tests) to ensure staff preparedness for possible emergencies;
5. Conducts security surveys of personnel residences and Mission premises, puts in place appropriate arrangements to secure them; and ensures good state of repair of all security and communication equipment in close co-operation with ICT services;
6. Selects, trains, and supervises security guards as applicable;
7. Ensures that Mission Members are kept informed on matters affecting their security and that appropriate arrangements are made for briefing of newly hired staff;
8. Establishes and maintains close relations with other international [security] partners within the AO; develops good contacts with local law enforcement to secure the best possible protection for Mission staff and property;
9. Report and follow-up on all cases in which Mission staff have been the victim of criminal acts;
10. Ensures that the appropriate level of confidentiality is maintained (ref. information security).

Mission Specific Requirements
- Tertiary education in a security & safety related field; or proven experience in law enforcement / military; security & safety background in a civilian environment
- Ability to identify and analyse emerging security problems and propose solutions
- A minimum of six years of professional experience in security management or international relations with focus on security management
- Excellent knowledge of security management, combined with solid background in military, police or security specialisation
- Knowledge, understanding and ability to manage security challenges in conflict environment
- In-depth knowledge of the political-military history and recent Mission area developments
- Professional fluency in English; working Russian language desirable
- Good organisational and management skills
- Flexibility and ability to work under pressure and within limited timeframes as well as the ability to solve problems effectively and efficiently
- Ability to cope with physical hardship and willingness to work extra hours and in an environment with limited infrastructure; proven resilience to high stress environments
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team, with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views while maintaining impartiality and objectivity; Cultural sensitivity and judgment
- Prior experience in working in Eastern Europe / Central Asia or knowledge of the region
- Possession of a valid automobile Class C driving license; ability to drive manual 4x4 vehicles


**Monitoring Advisor**

**Duties and Responsibilities**

Under the overall guidance of the Chief Monitor and direct supervision of the Team Leader, the Monitoring Officer performs the following specific responsibilities:

1. Monitors and reports regularly on the security situation in the area of operation, including the overall situation in the crisis area, cases of security incidents, human rights and fundamental freedoms situation, and overall inter-ethnic relations;
2. Maintains constructive contact, inter alia, with regional and local authorities, representatives of minority and religious groups, civil society and members of the local population;
3. Maintains a high level of professionalism and displays strict adherence to the OSSG Code of Conduct and the wider organisational regulatory framework at all times;
4. Performs duties in a timely, precise and professional manner showing resilience and flexibility in a potentially hazardous and challenging working environment;
5. Liaises with other international organisations operating in the area of deployment;
6. Serve as an intermediary/mediator to facilitate dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalisation of the respective situation;
7. Contributes to analytical work of the Team in his/her identified fields of expertise;
8. Performs other duties as assigned.

**Mission Specific Requirements**

- First-level university degree in a relevant field or equivalent advanced education;
- Minimum 6 years of relevant professional experience in any of the following fields: political and security issues, military, law enforcement, border monitoring, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration, dialogue facilitation, human rights, fundamental freedoms and minority issues;
- Working knowledge of English, both oral and written, and the ability to communicate clearly and concisely;
- Ability to establish contact and constructive relations with local population and officials;
- Demonstrable interpersonal skills and negotiating experience, preferably in the area of monitoring operations and/or related activities;
- Possession of a valid automobile Class C driving license and ability to drive a 4x4 vehicle using manual transmission;
- Ability to cope with physical hardship and willingness to work extra hours and in an environment with limited infrastructure; proven resilience to high stress environments;
- Demonstrated ability and willingness to work as a member of a team with people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, different gender, and diverse political views, while maintaining impartiality and objectivity;
- Ability to operate Windows applications including word processing and email.
- Knowledge of the Russian language is a distinct advantage desired;
- Experience in the use of Unarmed/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) desired;
- Experience or in-depth knowledge of working in Eastern Europe/Central Asia;
- Experience in the monitoring of ceasefire and/or identification of weapons systems.
Emergency Protection Officer

Since the outbreak of violence in December 2013, fighting has continued despite attempts at a peace agreement. Over 1.4 million people have been displaced from their homes, with tens of thousands killed. 100k civilians currently seek refuge inside UN camps across the country.

**Duties and Responsibilities**

- Ensure Mission leadership is aware of current and emerging threats against civilians;
- Coordinate early warning tools/processes, including community liaison and alert systems;
- Provide advice to Mission leadership on ways in which the Mission can assist and build the capacity of the National Authorities to fulfil their responsibilities;
- Provide support to relevant components to ensure that protection of civilians concerns are adequately reflected in Mission operations, particularly the civilian-police-military planning processes;
- Ensure close coordination with relevant partners in advocacy, development, implementation and mainstreaming of protection programmes, particularly in child protection, gender and sexual related violence, as well as humanitarian affairs, human rights, civil affairs, etc.;
- Identify protection gaps and opportunities for interventions;
- Support the Mission in establishing sustainable coordination structures in order to strengthen cooperation with relevant protection actors, particularly civil society, local communities and the Government authorities at the national and local levels;
- Coordinate and facilitate information sharing with the Protection Cluster, other security actors that may be present in the mission area, and other such arrangements;
- Develop and maintain effective working relationships with all stakeholders - including community leaders, NGOs, UN agencies, community-based organisations and other sectors to enhance cooperation and coordination;
- Identify training needs and provide support on technical aspects;
- Maintain up to date knowledge of protection issues in South Sudan in particular as related to the current crisis and share this information as appropriate; and
- Provide technical advice on planning assessments; participate in protection assessments.

**Requirements**

- Degree in Law, Human Rights, International Relations, International Development, Military or Police Science, or equivalent
- Minimum of five years’ professional sector experience
- Previous working experience with the UN, EU, OSCE or NGOs considered an asset
- Strong understanding of protection principles and likely protection concerns arising in the South Sudan context as well as conflict sensitivity
- Solid experience in staff management in a cross-cultural environment required
- Demonstrated training and facilitation experience
- Experience in complex emergencies and ability to live/work in a remote environment
- Demonstrated analytical skills and report writing experience required (fluency in English)
- Strong interpersonal, intercultural and communication skills; proven ability to negotiate
- Ability to represent the organisation, and strong coordination and organisational skills
Instructions

- Three Board members (policing, human resources, law, administration, or psychology)
- After each interview one member rotates off, another comes on. By the end all participants should have served on the board as well as have faced an interview.
- Do not re-interpret questions or ask questions not on the questionnaire
- Welcome the applicant and briefly introduce the International Board Members
- Explain how the assessment will be carried out
- Explain to the applicant(s) that their answers should be kept concise and to the point
- Conduct: Impartial and Professional

Questionnaire

Part One – Qualifications

1. What position are you applying for? (from sample list or real position)
2. What is your current role, responsibilities and duties?
3. How does your background relate to the position that you have applied for?
4. Why should you be appointed to the position? What qualities and additional skills do you believe that you can offer the position? What is your motivation?

Part Two – Behavioural Questions

5. What are your strengths and weaknesses?
6. Describe the most challenging work you have ever encountered. How did you handle it?
7. Give me an example of a time when you did not meet an expectation. What happened, and how did you attempt to rectify the situation?
8. Tell me a time when you faced a difficult colleague. How did you work with him/her?
9. Describe a time when you faced communication break-down.

Part Three - Mission Knowledge

10. Define:
   A. Security Sector Reform (SSR)  B. Rule of Law
   C. Democratic Policing  D. Monitoring, Mentoring, Advising
   E. Mediation and Negotiation  F. Mandate

11. Why do you believe your country is engaging in International Police Cooperation?
12. What Human Rights instruments determine the conduct of law enforcement?
13. How does corruption undermine the aims of a Security Sector Reform Mission?
14. What are the geo-political and socio-cultural issues in the Mission area?
15. Which groups are the main actors / protagonists in the Mission area?
**Part Four - Problem Solving** (ask 1-2 questions, appropriate to the candidate’s background/application)

16. You’ve been asked to arrange a mediation meeting between two parties.
   a. what preparation and planning measures do you take?
   b. what is your role during mediation?

17. As an International Police Advisor, give a short concept on how you would mentor:
   a. local command/senior level law enforcement personnel?
   b. local field level law enforcement personnel?

18. You’ve been asked to put together a police basic training curriculum for local law enforcement. In the past basic training was 4-6 weeks long under a US military-led programme, with a focus on ‘security-orientated’ tasks. However, the Mission’s objective is “normalisation” (returning the country to stable and normal activities).
   a. What training topics or themes would your basic training curriculum focus on?
   b. How long should such training take?

19. You’ve been informed that there will be a non-violent demonstration, with up to 500 participants to be held in front of the Supreme Court building.

   As an International Police Advisor, what suggestions would you give to your local counterpart in preventive security measures?

20. In the context of an international mission, under your supervision all leading positions are occupied by very qualified male (M) officers from Australia, Japan, Norway, and the UK. As one of these positions will become vacant in coming weeks, you have received applications from the following: one highly qualified Superintendent from Denmark (M), and three qualified Chief Inspectors from India (M), Jordan (M), and Ghana (F).

   What factors should you consider? Who will you choose and why?

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**Note:** in a real interview questions will be less structured than practiced here and may also include questions relating to mission-specific geo-political and ethno-cultural issues, as well as problem solving directly relating to the position.